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Abstract 
 
Color Constancy in Philosophy and Science 
 
Lance Jewell Balthazar, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
 
Supervisor:  Michael Tye 
 
Color constancy is the phenomenon in which the visual system reliably ensures 
that objects that are the same color continue to look the same color despite, what one 
might call, interference.  It is frequently appealed to in philosophy to support a myriad of 
theories about the nature of color and the metaphysics of experience.  The dissertation 
investigates color constancy, particularly the empirical work on it, and reconsiders how it 
has been employed philosophically. 
The dissertation begins by analyzing a landmark empirical study of color 
constancy and explains the ways in which this work has figured in a number of 
philosophical theories.  Then, it is argued that there is another, more neglected, type of 
color constancy, and that this second type of color constancy cannot be easily assimilated 
by the above philosophical theories. 
This second type of color constancy is then applied to a puzzle about how things 
look when they are under varying illumination.  This puzzle has motivated certain 
theories of color and color-like properties.  The dissertation argues that such motivation is 
undercut once the puzzle is seen to dissolve in light of the second category of color 
constancy.   
 vi 
Finally, the dissertation turns from the issue of what color constancy is to the 
issue of how it is accomplished, i.e. the mechanisms by which the visual system produces 
color-constant experiences.  It is argued, from an empirical basis, that an appeal to color 
constancy in the grounding of perceptual representations falters because of error about 
these mechanisms.  
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CHAPTER 1: ON A PHILOSOPHICAL APPEAL TO COLOR 
CONSTANCY 
 
Note: Please view the figures in this dissertation in color.  The arguments turn on the colors in 
the figures. 
1.1. Introduction 
 Sometimes we suffer visual illusions.  For example, there are circumstances when a 
difference in how an object is illuminated will make the object look different in color, even 
thought the object is of one color.  But very often when the way an object is illuminated changes, 
we do not suffer such illusions.  In such cases of veridical experience, how do things look, what 
are our experiences like, and how is it that the experiences are veridical?  In philosophy, various 
answers to the above questions have been given, and an extensive debate has arisen.  
One group of answers to the questions claims that experience in such cases is veridical 
with respect to color because there exists color constancy which, roughly, involves objects 
continuing to look the same in color despite changes in how they are illuminated.  Thus, the 
above sort of illusory color changes are avoided because the objects will continue to look as they 
are- the same in color.  In answering the above question and developing subsequent theories of 
color and experience, some philosophy appeals to the area of vision science which highly 
investigates color constancy. 
In this chapter I look at some philosophical views that appeal to empirical color 
constancy literature, particularly, the work of Lawrence Arend and Adam Reeves, which is 
probably the most cited among philosophers.  After a detailed analysis of their work, I present 
how it fits in those philosophical theories.  This sets the stage for an argument in Chapter 2 that 
there is another type of color constancy which should be distinguished from the color constancy 
of Arend and Reeves and which cannot be subsumed under the presented philosophical theories. 
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1.2. How Things Look in Varying Illumination Cases  
Suppose there is a chair on the ground which partially blocks the illumination from some 
light source so that the chair casts a shadow on part of the ground, leaving another part well-lit.  
And suppose one were to see this scene in normal circumstances.  There would be certain ways 
that the ground looks.  The above chair case is an instance of a kind of case in which an object is, 
or various objects are, differently illuminated either at a time or over a period of time, and the 
experience of the scene is not overwhelmingly illusory1.  So consider Figure 1.1.  It is meant to 
be a proxy for the experience one would have if one were viewing the chair described above2.  
Call this kind of case a Varying Illumination case.  A significant amount of literature in the 
philosophy of experience concerns Varying Illumination cases.  
                                                 
1 This type of case only requires that the experiences are not overwhelmingly illusory, as opposed to perfectly 
veridical, for reasons that will be discussed in what follows.   
2 The relationship between the experience of a picture like Figure 1 and the scene the picture is of will be discussed 
more in what follows. 
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Figure 1.1: Chair casting shadow 
 
 
When we see things, they don’t just look.  They look certain ways.  So, the first level of 
disagreement about Varying Illumination cases is over two ways the parts of some surface or 
surfaces (in the chair case, the ground) look.  Do the parts look different or alike?  One possible 
position in the debate, the Difference Only View, claims that the parts only look different.  Of 
course, if they look different, then they very likely look different in some way.  Let’s hold off on 
this for the moment. Another possible position in the debate would hold that the parts only look 
alike.  Call it the Similarity Only View.  A third possible position in the debate holds that, not 
only do the parts look different, they also look alike.  Call this, for reasons to be explained 
below, the Dual-Dimension View.   
Before we move to the second level of disagreement about Varying Illumination cases, a 
clarificatory point needs to be made about similarities and differences.  In many cases when there 
is a difference, there is a similarity, and vice versa.  Consider first-order similarities and 
differences that obtain between particulars.  Suppose there is an orange tangerine.  It differs in 
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color from a red apple.  However, the tangerine is still similar in color to the apple. If the 
tangerine were yellow, it would not be as similar to the apple as it actually is.  And there is a 
close connection between these first-order similarity and difference relations.  At least for the 
relations mentioned, they are necessarily inversely related: increasing the difference decreases 
the similarity, and vice versa.  And it is not possible for an orange thing to be different from a red 
thing without also being similar to that red thing (or at least more similar to that red thing than a 
yellow thing is to the red thing).  Thus, when the Difference Only Views claim two things only 
look different in some respect, this allows that there is the above type of inversely-related 
similarity in how those things look in that respect, unless the things look completely different, in 
which case the inversely-related similarity has diminished to nothing.  But when the Dual-
Dimension Views talk of a similarity and difference, they do not have in mind something like the 
above inversely-related similarities and differences, but instead a similarity and difference in 
looks which are, in some sense, distinct dimensions.   
 So, while the three first-level positions mentioned above disagree about whether two 
surfaces which are differently illuminated look alike, different, or both, there is a second level of 
disagreement about how objects in Varying Illumination cases look.  This debate concerns 
another level of the modification of looks.  Not only might things look some way, but that way 
might be modifiable to a further degree.  For example, while two parties might agree that parts of 
a surface look different, they might disagree about the way in which they look different.  So 
under each position at the first level of disagreement, there are internal disagreements.  In 
particular, amongst the Dual-Dimension Views, there is disagreement about the ways or respects 
in which parts look different and alike.  Some hold that, at least as a first pass, not only do some 
parts look different and similar, but they also look different and similar in the same respect.  For 
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example, Jonathan Cohen writes of a cup which has one region partially in sunlight and another 
region partially in shadow, “If you are like most normally sighted subjects, you will find that 
these two regions are, in some sense to be explained, alike in apparent colour.  On the other 
hand…you will also find that the regions are easily, obviously, and quickly visually 
discriminable in apparent colour (in some sense also to be explained)” (Cohen 2008: 62).  So, 
roughly, there is one way (at least in some sense), in which the regions of this cup look alike and 
different- in apparent color. Others take a similar position according to which regions in Varying 
Illumination cases look different and similar in, at least prima facie, the same respect- either 
color or something color-like. This includes Gert (2010, 2013), Noe (2004), and Kalderon 
(forthcoming). 
On the other hand, Mohen Matthen argues that Varying Illumination cases that have been 
described as involving surfaces that look the same and different in color really involve the 
surfaces looking the same in surface color and the illumination looking different in color 
(Matthen 2010a: 227)3.  While Matthen and Cohen disagree at the second level about the 
respects in which stuff look different and similar, they agree at the first level that the stuff look 
similar and different.  
While parties to the Dual-Dimension View disagree about the way in which, or what, 
things look different in Varying Illumination cases, many of the disputants agree that things look 
alike in color (or something color-like).  As will be explained shortly, this amounts to an 
agreement that Varying Illumination cases exhibit color constancy.  Roughly, color constancy 
occurs when two objects which are the same in color, continue to look the same in color despite 
being illuminated differently. Part of what would allow for the largely veridical experience in a 
                                                 
3 Others have argued for a similar view including Hilbert (2005), though Hilbert leans more towards how an object 
is illuminated, a property of the object, looking colored, opposed to the illuminant itself looking colored (150-151).   
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Varying Illumination case would be this manifestation of color constancy. And to support this 
position, many Dual-Dimension Proponents appeal to empirical research on color constancy. In 
particular, Cohen (2008), Gert (2010), Thompson (2006: 80), and Matthen (2010a) appeal to the 
experiments of Lawrence Arend and Adam Reeves as evidence for the Dual-Dimension View.   
In this paper, I focus on the Dual-Dimension views of Gert, Cohen, and Matthen and take 
a close look at the very influential experiments of Arend and Reeves.  An analysis of the 
experiments sheds light on where Gert, Cohen and Matthen’s views are situated in the first-level 
debate.  Specifically, it sheds light on the extent to which things look different in Varying 
Illumination cases.  And it sheds light on the character of the difference in how things look and 
the character of the similarity in how things look in Varying Illumination cases.  Knowing these 
specifics of the sameness in looks and the difference in looks is essential to evaluating the Dual-
Dimension views, and the views’ empirical appeal fills in this gap. The next section lays out 
color constancy in more detail.  Then the experiments of Arend and Reeves are analyzed. With 
some clarity on these experiments, the philosophical positions on experience and color which 
appeal to these experiments are explored.  In Chapter 2, I argue that there is another type of color 
constancy, different from that found in Arend and Reeves’s experiments, which challenges the 
philosophical positions introduced.  Part of the point of Chapters 1 and 2 is to challenge the idea 
that Varying Illumination cases are of one theoretically-significant kind and that either the 
Difference Only View, the Similarity Only View or the Dual-Dimension View covers all 
Varying Illumination cases.  Instead, I argue that there are at least two types of color constancy 
and so at least two kinds of Varying Illumination cases.  
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1.3. Initial Sketch of Color Constancy  
 Many color scientists investigate color constancy in the context of Varying Illumination 
cases.  For example, Foster introduces color constancy with “If we look at a patch of green grass 
under a blue sky and then later at sunset, the colour of the grass seems unchanged” (Foster 2003: 
439). So here we have lighting that changes from that of a blue sky to that of sunset and, 
seemingly, a Similarity Only View of how the color of the illuminated grass looks.   
 Besides such an example of color constancy, how do color scientists tend to characterize 
color constancy?  Let’s consider a few paradigmatic glosses given by vision scientists when 
introducing the phenomenon: 
“Color constancy refers to invariance of perceived surface colors under changes of 
illuminant color.” (Arend, Jr. et al. 1991: 661)  
 
“Color constancy refers to the constancy of perceived or apparent surface color under 
changes of the spectrum of the illuminant or, in an extended sense, under changes in 
scene composition or configuration.” (Reeves et al. 2008: 1) 
 
“Chromatic color constancy is the perception of invariant properties of a surface’s 
spectral reflectance despite changes in illumination and viewing conditions.” (Palmer 
1999: 133) 
 
In this representative sample of vision scientists’ initial characterizations of color 
constancy, a pattern emerges, suggesting a first approximation of the phenomenon.  These 
descriptions of color constancy involve two halves.  In the first half, there is something that 
remains constant, invariant or unchanging.  The colors perceived are perceived as the same, seen 
as the same or look the same. In the second half, there is something that changes- the 
illumination.  As initial characterizations of the phenomenon, it is plausible (and desirable) that 
the descriptions are pre-theoretic.  Therefore, we should begin with the assumption that 
“perceived as,” “seen as,” and “looks” are used with their ordinary English meanings.  This 
assumption will be reconsidered later. 
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Concerning the second half of the glosses, it should be noted that they do not state that 
the illuminant is perceived as, seen as, or looks changing.  Instead, the illuminant is different, 
independent of our perception of it, if we perceive the illuminant at all.   
That there is color constancy is an achievement on the part of the visual system.  This is 
because the visual system faces, what is commonly called, an inverse projection problem (See 
Palmer 1999: Ch.1).  To provide us with the ability to see the world around us, the visual system 
must produce our experiences or perceptions of the world from, in large part, the energy 
stimulating our eyes.  However, the visual system does not have direct access to external items in 
the world like colors, 3-D objects, and faces- the distal stuff in the environment.  Roughly, all 
that is immediately available are the proximal stimulations of cells in the retina.  This retinal 
stimulation is caused by light impinging on it.   
For a simple model of sight and psychophysics, let’s start with light.  When we speak 
about light, sometimes we talk of a particular, like a light source.  This is an illuminant. But 
sometimes we talk of a property of objects- how an object is illuminated, the illumination of an 
object, or, more technically, the illuminance of an object.  I will use both ways of speaking.   
Light is a small portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, specifically, electromagnetic energy 
with wavelengths from about 400-700 nm to which the human visual system is sensitive.  We 
can begin with something familiar- the intensity of an illuminant.  Some lights produce more 
energy than others, and some produce less.  Thus, lights vary in intensity.  Likewise, some 
illuminances are more intense than others.   
Even while two illuminances or illuminants might be the same in intensity, there are 
ways in which they can still differ.  The photons that make up light vibrate at certain 
wavelengths.  The spectral power distribution or chromaticity of an illuminant or illuminance 
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captures the proportions of the total amount of the photons vibrating at each wavelength.  So two 
illuminants might emit the same amount of photons, but they might differ in the wavelengths at 
which those photons vibrate.  A spectral diagram graphs the spectral power distribution of light.  
The x-axis provides the wavelengths, ordered from least to greatest.  For the purposes of vision 
only wavelengths from about 400-700 nm are relevant.  The y-axis provides the intensity of the 
light. Figure 1.2 gives the spectral diagrams of 4 lights.   
Figure 1.2: Spectral diagrams 
 
From Palmer 19994 
For example, Figure 1.2 A gives the spectral diagram of a helium neon laser.  All of its 
energy is of one wavelength, approximately 632 nm.  Figure 1.2 C gives the spectral diagram of 
a light that has some energy at each wavelength.  The above spectral diagrams are in terms of the 
absolute value of the intensity.  In such a case, the area under the curve is the intensity.  
However, some spectral diagrams only tell what proportion of light is emitted by a light or 
                                                 
4 Reprinted from Palmer, Stephen (1999). Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology. MIT Press with permission 
from The MIT Press. 
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incident on an object at each wavelength, so two lights of different intensity which have the same 
spectral power distribution have the same spectral diagram. 
Many objects have a surface spectral reflectance (SSR), a disposition to reflect, at each 
wavelength between ~400-700 nm, a certain proportion of the total amount of light striking it.  
The reflected light might then interact with some intervening medium (the transmittance) 
between the viewer and the object. If it does, then the transmittance will also have an effect on 
the travelling light.  The portion of light that finally strikes the retina, the spectral return (also 
known as the color signal), is the product of the illuminance, the spectral reflectance and the 
transmittance5.  It has an overall intensity (its luminance) and a measure of how much of its total 
energy vibrates at each wavelength (its chromaticity).  The luminance and chromaticity of the 
return can be represented by a spectral diagram in the same way that the intensity and 
chromaticity of an illuminant can be represented.  The return stimulates photoreceptors in the 
retina and from there the visual system processes these retinal signals to produce our perceptions.   
Because of the physics of the way the illuminance, spectral reflectance, and transmittance 
interact to produce the return, the return confounds their effects.  This creates a problem for the 
visual system if it aims to sort out the features of the illuminance, reflectance, and the 
transmittance out in the world.   
Moving forward, I will make some simplifications.  First, I will idealize that the retinal 
photoreceptors are “transparent” meaning that it is as if the visual system has direct access to the 
return and isn’t hampered by the limitation of only 4 receptor-types.  In reality, there is no such 
direct access and one must consider more than the information loss that occurs because of the 
confounding interaction between illuminances, surface spectral reflectances, transmittances, and 
other distal factors.  Instead, the post-receptoral visual system draws on the responses of the 
                                                 
5 There are further factors and complications which are being left out. 
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retinal mosaic of photoreceptors.  However, because of the way the photoreceptors respond to 
light, the properties of the return are confounded such that two different returns can produce the 
same photoreceptor responses.  So there are at least two informational collapses, one in the 
production of the return and another in the response of the retinal cells.  The problem worsens in 
that “there is at most one photoreceptor at each retinal location […so] the visual system must 
combine information [from photoreceptors across the retina]” (Brainard & Gazzaniga 2009:2).  
This is a third layer of informational collapse6. Noise is an additional problem the visual system 
faces, including noise in the visual system and photon noise (Mamassian et.al 2002).  To avoid 
these difficulties, which are not required to make my case, the idealization makes it as if there is 
no difference between retinal input to the visual system and the return input. 
Let’s look at a simple example of when the return reflected off of objects conflates the 
effects of the illuminance and the spectral reflectance.  A white object in normal daylight will 
reflect a very different array of light into the eye than the light reflected by that same object in 
very dim lighting.  Thus, two different illuminations in the distal environment yields different 
input to the visual system.    The information available to the visual system has been confounded, 
and the challenge is to invert, in some sense, this confounded projection of the distal 
environment into experiences such that the white object looks white in both illumination-
conditions. 
Color constancy arises in this context of the inverse projection problem.  If a subject were 
to see each of these white objects and the first looks white while the other looks, say, gray, then 
there is a failure of color constancy and an instance of an illusory experience since the objects 
look different in color but are the same in color.  An instance of color constancy would ensure 
                                                 
6 Idealizing from these two informational collapses means idealizing from two classes of metamers.  In general 
metamers are ignored in this dissertation. 
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the objects look the color they are, thus avoiding illusion. Therefore, corresponding to the second 
half of the initial descriptions, when the illuminance of an object differs from part to part, but the 
colors/reflectances remain the same, the return and retinal stimulation differs.  In general, the 
input to the visual system differs.  This creates a challenge for the visual system to output the 
first half of the initial descriptions- sameness in how the color of the objects is perceived, seen, 
or looks.   
So far the output involved in color constancy has consisted in an object being seen as, 
perceived as, or looking the same in color.  One might wonder whether there are three 
distinctions that need to be made here between seeing, looking, and perceiving.  However, for 
the rest of the paper, I will neglect any differences and focus on things looking the same in color.  
This is not an innocuous move but for the purposes of this chapter I believe that it will not 
matter.   
Color constancy naturally divides views about Varying Illumination cases, placing the 
Dual-Dimension Proponents and the Similarity Only Proponents on one side and the Difference 
Only Proponents on the other.  On the one hand, for many Dual-Dimension and Similarity Only 
Proponents, illusions in Varying Illumination cases are avoided because color-identical, variably-
illuminated surfaces look the same in color, at least approximately.  On the other hand, some 
Difference Only Proponents claim that the surfaces only look different in color (or something 
color-like).  Different Only Proponents will be discussed in Chapter 3.  For the purposes of 
Chapters 1 and 2, only Dual-Dimension and Similarity Only Proponents will be considered.  In 
particular, the Dual-Dimension Views that appeal to empirical color constancy literature claim 
that not only do the relevant surfaces look alike in color, but they also look different (in 
something).   But in addition to considering in what the surfaces look alike and different, we 
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need to have a better first-level understanding of the views: an understanding of the sameness in 
looks and the difference in looks, independently of what surfaces look the same or different in.  
Most importantly, we need a more specific understanding of the character of the difference in 
looks and the extent of the difference in looks.  The next section analyses the experiments of 
Arend and Reeves, to which the Dual-Dimension Views appeal and which provide insight into 
the first-level details of the Dual-Dimension Views.  
1.4. Type-1 Color Constancy 
1.4.1 SIMULTANEOUS ASYMMETRIC COLOR MATCHING EXPERIMENTS 
 In two classic papers, Lawrence Arend, Jr. and Adam Reeves developed an experimental 
paradigm that has come to influence much of color constancy science (Arend, Jr. and Reeves 
1986; Arend Jr. et. al 1991).  What has been noteworthy for philosophers like Cohen, Matthen, 
and Gert is that the results of the experiments seem to suggest that there are, something like, two 
distinct dimensions by which objects look similar and different in the constancy-involving 
Varying Illumination cases.  These two dimensions are taken to support Dual-Dimension Views 
over the Difference Only View and the Similarity Only View.  For example, Gert writes: 
One half of the constancy data [i.e. Arend and Reeves’s data] (the relatively inconstant 
part) corresponds to the variable ways in which colors appear under changes of 
illuminant, while the other half of the data (the relatively constant part) corresponds to 
the stable color properties objects actually have, and which they also seem to have, given 
the patterns of change in the first sort of appearance. (Gert 2010: 672). 
 
 So, it’s important that we can zero-in on the character and details of the similarity and 
difference involved, for merely accepting a Dual Dimension View leaves much unspecified 
about this similarity and difference.  The experiments of Arend and Reeves are the predominant 
way Cohen, Gert and Matthen provide these details.  In this section, I describe the experiments 
and draw out the account of color constancy they suggest.   
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 These experiments investigate Varying Illumination cases.  So, what are the relevant 
objects which are under differing illumination?  The objects used in many color constancy 
experiments are called Mondrians, following Edwin Land’s designation of similar stimuli in 
virtue of their similarity to the paintings of Piet Mondrian (Land 1959).  The Mondrian is a flat 
surface composed of colored patches whose reflectances are known by the experimenter. It is 
under some illumination whose properties are also known by the experimenter7.  Since the aim is 
to test color constancy, experiments involve subjects viewing either one Mondrian which is 
variably illuminated over two different times or two Mondrians which are differently illuminated 
at the same time.  These latter, simultaneous experiments were the focus of Arend and Reeves. 
Arend and Reeves’s experiments are instances of what are called simultaneous asymmetric color 
matching (SACM) experiments.  In such experiments, one Mondrian, the Standard, is under one 
illuminant and the other Mondrian, the Test, is under another.  The two Mondrians are identical 
in surface properties. Therefore, for example, the center patches of the Standard and Test 
Mondrians have the same surface spectral reflectance.   We can call these center patches 
counterparts of each other.  Given that the Standard and Test Mondrians are identical, each patch 
in the Standard Mondrian has a counterpart patch in the Test Mondrian.  Figure 1.3 shows the 
uncolored versions of the Standard and Test Mondrians used in the experiment. 
                                                 
7 Originally, the patches were Munsell papers. 
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Figure 1.3: Mondrian schema   
     
From Arend Jr. et. al 19918 
Before we turn to the details of the experiment, a complication needs to be addressed.   In 
the Arend and Reeves experiments “the subjects viewed simulations of colored-paper arrays 
[Mondrians] on a computer controlled video monitor” (Arend and Reeves 1986: 1743).  
Computer simulations are used, largely, for practical purposes.  But as a result, the stimuli that 
the subject viewed were not objects of the same SSR’s under different illumination.  However, 
because of the way illuminances and reflectances interact to produce a given return as a result of 
light superposition, the same return can be produced from the interaction of the SSR of a 
Mondrian under a light source, or from the illumination of a computer screen.  In experiments, 
color scientists often translate between computer simulations and non-simulated stimuli9.  
Following Arend and Reeves, I will not describe the experiment in terms of the simulated stimuli 
but instead describe the experiment in terms of reflectance-identical Mondrians under varying 
illumination.  The relationship between the “real” stimuli and the simulations will be addressed 
further in Chapter 2. 
                                                 
8 Reprinted from Arend, Lawrence E., Adam Reeves, James Schirillo, and Robert Goldstein. (1991). Simultaneous 
color constancy: papers with diverse Munsell values. JOSA A, 8(4), 661-672 with permission from The Optical 
Society.  
9 There can end up being considerable debate about the appropriateness of the particular simulation used in a 
particular experiment and whether the target phenomenon can be reproduced with a simulation.  There has been 
increasing pressure to use real stimuli in color constancy experiments. 
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Now, we return to a description of the non-simulated experiment.  At the start of the 
experiment, the Standard Mondrian is under average daylight illumination (the Standard 
illumination) while the Test Mondrian is under direct sunlight (the Test illumination)10.  These 
two illuminations have different chromaticities, i.e. different proportions of their total energy is 
emitted at each wavelength.  Therefore, the returns reflected from counterpart patches of the 
Mondrians differ.  This creates an inverse projection problem and the question investigated by 
the experimenters is to what extent the counterpart patches (which are the same in SSR) exhibit 
“constancy of perceived surface color.” 
To test this, a matching task is utilized.  At the start of the experiment, counterpart 
patches of the Standard and Test Mondrians have the same reflectance, except for one pair of 
counterpart patches.  This latter pair is composed of the Standard patch in the Standard Mondrian 
and the Test patch in the Test Mondrian.  They are marked S and T in Figure 1.3, respectively.  
While all other patches in the Test Mondrian match their counterpart patches in the Standard 
Mondrian in SSR, the Test patch is randomly set to one of a specified range of reflectances 
(Arend and Reeves 1986: 1744).  The task of the subject is to adjust the reflectance of the Test 
patch until it matches, in some sense to be further explained, its counterpart, the Standard patch, 
hence the name “color-matching” experiment11.  When the subject completes the task, the 
experimenter can measure properties of the Test patch, like its return and SSR.   
Whatever the character of this match, the experimenters take it as evidence that “our 
observers had approximate constancy of perceived surface colors…” (Arend et al. 1991: 662), 
and this figures in the theory of the Dual-Dimension Proponents. But how does this relate to the 
Dual-Dimension Views which appeal to the experiments to support the claim that surfaces look 
                                                 
10 Correlated color temperatures of 6500K and 4000K, respectively (Arend Jr. et. al 1991: 662-665). 
11 In the actual experiments with simulated stimuli, the light-emitting properties of the computer screen, not its SSR, 
are adjusted. 
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alike and different in Varying Illumination cases? From what has been stated so far, it would 
seem like the SACM experiments support a Similarity Only View. The answer turns on a 
problem Arend and Reeves found in prior color constancy experiments and aimed to solve in 
their own.  Discussing previous experiments like those of McCann et al. (1976), Arend and 
Reeves note that “the observer’s task may have permitted intermixture of two types of perceptual 
judgment” (Arend and Reeves 1986: 1743).  To remedy this, they gave two different instructions 
about how the Test patch should be made to match the Standard patch and found that “this 
distinction has a major effect on the matching data” (1743).  They conclude from this that 
“constancy of surface color may be perceptually represented in at least two different ways” 
(1749)12.  Essentially, there are two ways in which the Test Patch can be made to look or be 
perceived as like the Standard Patch.  And it is this aspect of their experiments that proponents of 
the Dual-Dimension View claim supports their view of Varying Illumination cases.  Let’s turn to 
this aspect of Arend and Reeves’s experiments in more detail.  
While we keep in the back of our minds that the experimenters purport to investigate and 
draw conclusions about “constancy of perceived surface color” and while leaving the nature of 
perception and looking vague, it should be noted that the fundamental matching data involved in 
the experiments is behavioral.  Subjects adjust the Test patch, via a controller, and the 
experimenters make subsequent measurements.  The data itself might be neutral with respect to 
perception, lookings, visual experiences, and judgments, depending on how these and similar 
phenomena relate to behavior13.  However, the conclusions drawn by Arend and Reeves, and to 
be discussed later, Gert, Cohen, and Matthen, go beyond the behavioral. The behavioral data is 
                                                 
12 This should not automatically be understood in terms of the visual experiential representation associated with 
Representationalism or Intentionalism. 
13 Thanks to David Hilbert for pressing this point. 
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being supplemented, possibly by introspective evidence, in order to draw these ampliative 
conclusions. 
As stated above, at least one type of match that experimenters investigated was taken to 
support constancy of perceived surface color for subjects.  For this match, one group of subjects 
were “instructed to make the test patch ‘look as if it were cut from the same piece of paper’ as 
the corresponding patch in the standard array [i.e. Mondrian]” (Arend, Jr, et. al. 1991: 664).  
When these instructions were followed a “Paper Match” was made.  So, keeping the notions of 
sameness in looks and perceived sameness open, let’s look at the data analysis of the SSR’s, 
returns and illuminances involved in the experiment to see why a successful Paper Match was 
taken to indicate that the Mondrians exhibit color constancy for the subject.   
The results of the SACM task are modeled diagrammatically. Later the relationship 
between aspects of the data and data model will be addressed.  But for now, Arend and Reeves 
plot the chromaticity of the return of the Standard patch as the open circle in Figure 1.4A. 
(Ignore the descriptions in the boxes.)  The chromaticity of the return is determined by the 
reflectance of the Standard patch and the Standard illuminant, in this case average daylight.  The 
open triangle represents the chromaticity of the return of the Standard patch if it were under the 
Test illuminant, direct sunlight. The details of the space in which these shapes are embedded can 
be ignored for now.  The important point is that if two patches are the same in reflectance but 
under illuminations with different chromaticities, then the chromaticities of the returns of each 
patch will be different.  This difference between returns is modeled by the distance between the 
open circle and open triangle. 
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Figure 1.4: Chromaticity diagrams 
A      B 
 
From Arend et al. 199114 
At the start of the experiment, the Test patch has a randomly chosen reflectance, but is 
under the Test illuminance.  Under the Paper Match instructions, when the Test patch is adjusted 
so that it looks like it is cut from the same piece of paper as the Standard patch, experimenters 
interpret the data as suggesting that subjects have adjusted the Test patch so that it approximates 
the reflectance of the Standard patch. How is this modeled in the diagram?  The shapes represent 
return chromaticities, so if two returns differ in chromaticity, their representing shapes have 
some distance between them.  So, if the post-match Test and Standard patches were to have the 
same reflectances but were under illuminants with different chromaticities, their returns would 
have different chromaticities.  If the chromaticity of the return of the post-match Test patch is 
represented by a closed triangle, then, after a successful adjustment, the closed triangle would 
coincide with the open triangle (the chromaticity of the Standard patch if it were under the Test 
illuminant).  Since a subject’s making the patches look like they are cut from the same piece of 
                                                 
14 Reprinted from Arend, Lawrence E., Adam Reeves, James Schirillo, and Robert Goldstein. (1991). Simultaneous 
color constancy: papers with diverse Munsell values. JOSA A, 8(4), 661-672 with permission from The Optical 
Society.  
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paper is taken to indicate that the subject perceives that the patches are alike in surface color, and 
they are of the same reflectance but under different illumination, this is taken to be evidence of 
color constancy in the subject. As Arend and Reeves write, “perfect color constancy would occur 
it the subject set the test-patch chromaticity to the chromaticity that the standard patch would 
have under the test illuminant, i.e., if open and filled symbols coincided” (Arend and Reeves 
1986: 1746).  Figure 1.4B depicts these results (approximately, since the closed triangle is not 
exactly on the open triangle).   
 On the other hand, according to Arend and Reeves, a subject fails to exhibit color 
constancy if she adjusts the Test patch in such a way that it does not have the same reflectance as 
the Standard patch.  Thus the chromaticity of the return of the adjusted Test patch is different 
from the chromaticity of the return that the Standard patch would have if it were under the Test 
illuminant.  Diagrammatically, this is represented when the closed triangle does not coincide 
with the open triangle.  The greater the distance between the closed triangle and the open 
triangle, the less constancy the subject exhibits.  Thus, color constancy can come in degrees.  On 
the one hand, there is perfect color constancy.  On the other, there is a spectrum of imperfect 
color constancy, ranging from complete failure to near perfection. 
 On Arend and Reeves’s understanding of the conditions of perfect color constancy, none 
of the subjects tested exhibited perfect color constancy.  The 1986 and 1991 data give various 
ranges of imperfect color constancy (See the Results sections of Arend et al. 1991 and Arend and 
Reeves 1986 for the plotted data of the experimental subjects.).  For the most part, in this chapter 
I will focus on the idealized, perfect color constancy, as it is implied by the data model Arend 
and Reeves employ.  This is partly because some of the philosophical views discussed present 
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theories that don’t explicitly address imperfect color constancy and partially veridical color 
experiences. 
 So in the idealized Paper Match task, when the idealized subject attempts to make the 
Test patch ‘look as if it were cut from the same piece of paper’ as the Standard patch, and 
experimenters conclude the stimuli exhibit perfect color constancy, the Test and Standard 
patches have the same SSR and differ in illumination.  Again, we are leaving open the character 
of the way in which things look the same or are being perceived as the same.    
 The most common form of imperfect color constancy occurs as the closed triangle 
deviates from the open triangle by approaching the open circle.  The typical extreme occurs 
when the closed triangle coincides with the open circle.  See Figure 1.4A.  This represents 
circumstances in which the subject adjusts the Test patch in such a way that the chromaticity of 
its return, post adjustment, is the same as the chromaticity of the return of the Standard patch.  
When such an adjustment is made, reflectances of the post-adjustment Test patch and the 
Standard patch will differ.  This is because, since the illumination between the Test and Standard 
Mondrians differ by the experimental set-up, the reflectances must also differ in order to produce 
equal return chromaticities.  Thus the subject has not adjusted the Test patch to be of the same 
reflectance as the Standard.  When the open circle and the closed triangle coincide, the patches 
exhibit no color constancy for the subject.   
Interestingly, this latter sort of adjustment plays a significant role in SACM experiments. 
Recall that Arend and Reeves gave two different instructions to subjects about how they were to 
adjust the Test patch.  First, there were the Paper Match instructions. For the second matching 
instruction, subjects were “instructed to match hue, saturation, and brightness of the test patch to 
those of the standard patch” (Arend Jr. et. al 1991: 664).  When these instructions were followed 
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a Hue-Saturation Match, as they called it, was made.  When experimenters measure the 
properties of the Test patch after the Hue-Saturation Match, they find that the chromaticity of the 
return of the Test patch approaches the chromaticity of the return of the Standard patch.  Figure 
1.4A plots the results of one subject, S (Arend Jr. et. al 1991: 665).  The closed triangle 
represents the return chromaticity of the post-adjustment Test patch.  It is close to the return 
chromaticity of the Standard patch, represented by the open circle.  What does this amount to?  
As Arend et al. states, “[Suppose] [T]he subject would set the test patch to approximately the 
chromaticity [of the return] of the standard patch…in both illuminant conditions…[Then] he 
would set the test patch to the reflectance that, under the test illuminant, gives the same 
chromaticity as R 5/8 [where R 5/8 is a specification of the reflectance of the Standard patch] 
under the …standard illuminant” (Arend et al. 1991: 665).  That is, if the subject sets the Test 
patch to have approximately the same return chromaticity as the Standard patch, then the patches 
will differ in reflectance.  This is because, by the experimental set-up, the Test patch and the 
Standard patch are under different illumination. The only way for them to have approximately 
the same returns, then, is if their reflectances differ.  This is indicated by coincidence of the open 
circle and closed triangle, as in the above case of imperfect color constancy.    
At this point we can further investigate how things look or are perceived as.  First, let’s 
get a sense of how the stimuli look to subjects of the experiment prior to Test patch adjustment. 
Consider Figure 1.5A.  How it looks to you is, to some degree, how the non-simulated Mondrian 
under the Standard Illuminant looks to the experimental subject15. So 5A is a depiction or 
simulation of the Standard Mondrian under the Standard Illuminant (average daylight).  Figure 
1.5A, this object before you that you actually see, is closer in physical properties to the stimulus 
the experimental subject sees when the simulations are used than to the stimulus a subject would 
                                                 
15 I am assuming that you are normally-sighted. 
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see in a non-simulated experiment.  Now, consider Figure 1.5B.  How it looks to you is, to some 
degree, how the non-simulated Mondrian under the Test Illuminant looks to the experimental 
subject viewing the real Mondrian.16 So Figure 1.5B roughly depicts or is a simulation of the 
Test Mondrian under the Test illuminant. 
Figures 1.5A and 1.5B deviate somewhat from the simulations used in the experiments.  
The experiments are run under precisely controlled viewing conditions, and the color gamut 
employed to make the stimuli are probably different than the reader’s display. So, the extent of 
this deviation is an issue.  The extent of the deviation might be significant.  However, there is an 
aspect of the experimental displays which these Figures preserve, and it is this that is most 
relevant for my purposes.  I will highlight it in what is to come.  So, Figure 1.5 gives an idea of 
how things look to the experimental subject at the beginning of the experiment, that is, prior to 
any adjustments.   
                                                 
16 And, to some degree, it looks to you how the simulated Mondrian looks to the subjects in the actual experiment. 
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Figure 1.5: Pre-adjustment Mondrians  
A          B
From Foster 201117 
The patches marked with arrows are the Standard patch and the Test patch. Since the Test 
patch in the non-simulated experiment is assigned a random reflectance at the beginning of the 
experiment, it is depicted as gray in the figure.  
Figure 1.6, A and B provides, again roughly, how things look at the point at which the 
Test patch is made to be a “Paper Match” to the Standard patch. 
                                                 
17 Reprinted from Foster, David H. (2011). Color constancy. Vision research, 51(7), 674-700.with permission from 
Elsevier  
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Figure 1.6: Post-Paper Match Mondrians 
A          B 
 
Foster 201118 
Figure 1.7: Post-Hue-Saturation Match Mondrians 
A        B 
 
Modified from Foster 201119 
                                                 
18 Reprinted from Foster, David H. (2011). Color constancy. Vision research, 51(7), 674-700.with permission from 
Elsevier  
19 Reprinted from Foster, David H. (2011). Color constancy. Vision research, 51(7), 674-700.with permission from 
Elsevier  
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Figure 1.7A and 1.7B simulate the Mondrians after a Hue-Saturation Match was made.  
In Figure 1.7 one can see that the arrowed patches look similar.  At the least, they look 
significantly more similar than the arrowed patches in Figure 1.6.  Even though your experiences 
of Figure 1.6,A and B and Figure 1.7,A and B will be, to some extent, different from the 
experimental subject’s experiences of the simulated Mondrians, your experiences of the Figures 
sufficiently preserves some similarities and differences between the arrowed patches.  What is 
most important for present purposes is that, in the Paper Match and Hue-Saturation Match 
experiments, there is a divergence in how the Standard and Test patches come to look in the 
former case and convergence in how they come to look in the latter case.  Given how the data is 
modeled, if the ideal subject is instructed to make a Paper Match, she would make an adjustment 
to the Test patch such that it looks different from the Standard patch in a way that is roughly like 
the way the arrowed patches in Figure 1.6 look to you.    If this match were made, the 
experimenters would see that the reflectances are the same and the returns differ to a certain 
extent.   
On the other hand if the ideal subject were instructed to make a Hue-Saturation Match, 
she would make an adjustment to the Test patch such that it looks the same as the Standard patch  
in a way that is roughly like the way the arrowed patches in Figure 1.7 look to you.    When this 
occurs, the experimenters see that the reflectances are different and the returns are the same.  
This same patch-result can occur when a subject is attempting to make a Paper Match but 
exhibits no color constancy. 
 So, in the experiment, there are two circumstances in which patches look or are perceived 
as the same.  One instance in which this occurs is in the idealized Hue-Saturation Match.  This 
can be appreciated from the experiences of Figure 1.7 which approximates the idealized Hue-
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Saturation Match.  The other instance occurs in the idealized Paper Match, where the 
experimenters claim that surface colors would be perceived as the same.  These two samenesses 
do not seem as if they can be of the same sort.  Correlatively, depending on how much one’s 
experience of  Figure 1.6 diverges from an experimental subject’s experience of the post-
adjustment Mondrians in the Paper Match experiments, Figure 1.6 might not provide a similar 
enough experience as the experimental subject’s color-constant experience of the post-
adjustment Mondrians.  If this is the case, then Figure 1.6 does not involve patches looking the 
same to the reader20. But if, in the idealized Paper Match, the post-adjustment patches look, even 
remotely, different in the way that the patches in Figure 1.6 look, there must be some distinction 
between the way the post-adjustment patches look the same and the way they look different to 
the experimental subject.    
1.4.2 PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES 
Figure 1.8: Red patch  
 
 In addressing this distinction, an initial impulse might be to appeal to some of the 
distinctions with respect to “look” that have been employed by many in the philosophy of 
perception literature, including Roderick Chisholm, Frank Jackson, and Michael Martin 
(Chisholm 1957; Jackson 1977; Martin 2010).  However, as will be discussed more in Chapter 
Three there have been strong arguments against this approach.  Therefore, I will draw the 
                                                 
20 And note, since Figure 6 is a simulation of the experimental Mondrians, if patches do look the same to one, then 
this will be an illusion of color constancy. 
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distinction in a different way.  I grant vision science’s claim that counterpart patches in 
Mondrian A and Mondrian B look the same (are perceived as the same, are seen as the same) in 
color.  Instead of appealing only to how things look (or are perceived as or seen as), technical 
terms like “phenomenal character” and “phenomenal properties” will be employed to 
characterize the experiences one undergoes while viewing the relevant objects. The plan is to 
first attempt to demonstratively point to something and then, second, put a name to it – “the 
phenomenal”.  So, consider Figure 1.8.  In seeing the figure, you undergo a visual experience.  
As you attend to the figure, you can also attend to some aspect of the experience.  Specifically, 
as you attend to the red of the figure, as it would naturally be described, there’s an aspect of the 
experience you can also attend to– a certain phenomenal property.  In natural language, we do 
not have ordinary terms for the phenomenal properties of experience.21 So, as a first step in 
talking about the phenomenal, I will employ a convention introduced by David Chalmers of 
talking of the phenomenal in a way that is parasitic on the way we talk about the external world 
(Chalmers Forthcoming).  For example, since the natural way to describe Figure 1.8 is as red, to 
refer to the phenomenal property distinctive of the experience of Figure 1.8, I will talk of the red-
ish phenomenal property22.  This appeal to red in referring to the relevant phenomenal property is 
not an attempt to give a definition of the phenomenal property in terms of red.  It is only a means 
of fixing the reference of the aspect of one’s experience that has been demonstrated.  Besides the 
red-ish phenomenal property, there is a body of determinate phenomenal properties, relating to 
the colors the way the red-ish phenomenal property related to redness.  This body of determinate 
                                                 
21 Or if we do have terms in ordinary language for aspects of our experiences, they seem to be the same expression 
we use to describe things in the external world.  See Jackson (2006) for discussion and how it motivates 
Representationalism. 
22 Sometimes “ish” suffixes are attached to color terms for a different use, for example to characterize color mixing 
and combinations.  See  Byrne (2003), Hilbert and Byrne (2010), and Hilbert and Byrne (2008) and Bradley and Tye 
(2001) .  Also, Chalmer’s “–ish” suffix might be similar to Peacocke’s primed notation in Sense and Content (1983), 
though I am unclear how theoretically neutral Peacocke intended to be in introducing the primed notation. 
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phenomenal properties is subsumed under the determinable color-ish phenomenal property.   
 At this stage it should not be assumed that color-ish phenomenal properties are colors, 
representational properties, instantiated properties of external objects, color properties of 
surfaces, or color properties of illuminants. 
 We can define a set of color-ish phenomenal properties as all and only those phenomenal 
properties that exist in the color-ish solid.  If you were to view a color solid, you would have 
experiences of the object.  You would need to manipulate it to see all of it.  That is, at one time 
you would only see the colors on the surface of the solid which are facing you.  So to see more of 
the solid, it would need to be rotated.  And to see even more it would need to be cut.  But if you 
were to see all of the colors composing it, you would have many experiences.  The experiences 
would involve color-ish solid phenomenal properties, a, possibly proper, subset of the color-ish 
phenomenal properties.  The color-ish solid phenomenal properties are structured and stand in 
similarity and difference relations which parallel our prima facie notions of the color solid.  So 
consider Figure 1.9.  Your experience of one of the middle segments has a gray-ish phenomenal 
property.  Your experience of the region to the left of the segment you were previously attending 
to also has a gray-ish phenomenal property, one which is a lighter gray-ish than the first.  As I 
am stipulating “color-ish solid phenomenal properties”, the color-ish phenomenal properties of 
the experiences of each segment in Figure 1.9 are identical to color-ish solid phenomenal 
properties.  
Figure 1.9: Gray gradient 
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I will leave it open whether the color-ish solid phenomenal properties, those phenomenal 
properties had by all the experiences of the colors of the color solid, are only a proper subset of 
all the color-ish phenomenal properties. Besides the odd-sounding name, color-ish solid 
phenomenal properties are very familiar and straight-forward.  Color-ish phenomenal properties 
which are not color-ish solid phenomenal properties are trickier to get a grip on, if there are any 
such properties.  But for the purposes of this paper, the color-ish solid phenomenal properties 
will be the focus.  
So, we can return to Figure 1.8.  With the technical notions of color-ish phenomenal 
properties in hand, I introduce the technical claim that experiences of the two halves of the figure 
each have the same red-ish phenomenal property.  This red-ish is a color-ish solid phenomenal 
property.  Likewise, there is a phenomenal sameness between one’s experiences of the two 
halves- a sameness grounded in the experiences each having the same red-ish phenomenal 
property.  As another example, consider Figure 1.10.  There is a phenomenal difference between 
your experiences of the two rectangular regions. This is in virtue of each experience instantiating 
a different color-ish solid phenomenal property. 
Figure 1.10: Two patches 
      
 
Do the two halves of Figure 1.8 look the same in color?  I think that is hard to deny.  But 
since I will defer to the vision scientists in their claim that counterpart patches in Mondrians A 
and B look the same or are perceived as the same in color, as an instance of color constancy, 
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there is the question of how this can be while the parts of Figure 1.8 also look the same in color.  
Whatever is going on in the color constancy involving the Mondrians, the way or dimension in 
which counterpart patches look different cannot be the same as the way or dimension in which 
counterpart patches look alike.   But I will grant the vision scientist’s, and as we will see, 
philosopher’s, description of the situation and not venture a resolution. 
1.4.3 TWO DIMENSIONS IN COLOR CONSTANCY 
So we can return to the experiments. According to Arend and Reeves, after an ideal Paper 
Match adjustment, the Test and Standard patches are perceived as the same in color23.  Even if 
this is so, there is a visual difference between them.  And when an ideal Hue-Saturation Match is 
made, there is some visual sameness. It is very plausible that the visual sameness in the Hue-
Saturation Match consists in a sameness between the color-ish solid phenomenal property of the 
experience of the Standard patch and the color-ish solid phenomenal property of the experience 
of the Test patch, post-Hue-Saturation Match.  Two pieces of evidence support this.  First, by 
describing the task of the Hue-Saturation Match in terms of making adjustments to the “hue, 
saturation, and brightness of the test patch” Arend and Reeves invoke the color solid (Arend Jr. 
et. al 1991: 664)24.  Color-ish solid phenomenal properties were defined to fix our attention to 
those aspects of the experiences of the colors that compose the color solid.  Second, in 
considering one’s experience of Figure 1.7, which approximately preserves the similarity that the 
subjects experience in the Hue-Saturation Match, the experiences of the arrowed patches are 
similar in color-ish solid phenomenal properties.  So it is very plausible that the experiences in 
                                                 
23 Again, there are a number of steps from the behavioral data to this claim. 
24 To understand the Hue-Saturation task as a match in how the patches look in hue, saturation and brightness while 
the Paper Match is understood as a match  in how the patches look in color presents some difficulties.  Hue, 
saturation and brightness tend be treated just as the composing dimensions of color. (And Arend and Reeves do not, 
in these experiments, seem to countenance further dimensions of color).  So it is unclear how Paper Matches are not 
matches in hue, saturation, and brightness.  This is partly why I employ color-ish phenomenal properties instead of 
their distinction. 
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the ideal Hue-Saturation Match involve a color-ish solid phenomenal sameness.  And when this 
sameness occurs in the idealized case, the returns of the patches are measured to be the same. 
On the other hand, as the returns come to differ, and the reflectance comes to be the 
same, as a Paper Match is made, there is a visual difference between the patches.  For parallel 
reasons, it is very plausible that this visual difference consists in the color-ish solid phenomenal 
property of the experience of the Standard patch being different from the color-ish solid 
phenomenal property of the experience of the Test patch.   The phenomenal difference between 
your experiences of the Standard and Test patches in Figure 1.6 is similar to the phenomenal 
difference the experimental subject would have.  And it’s plausible that the phenomenal 
difference of your experience is a color-ish solid phenomenal difference.  Compare that 
phenomenal difference with the phenomenal difference between your experiences of the 
rectangles in Figure 1.10.  The phenomenal differences aren’t exactly the same, but they are each 
constituted by color-ish solid phenomenal properties.  So this clarifies one visual dimension 
involved in the SACM experiments: experiences with color-ish solid phenomenal properties.  
So what is the relationship between the color-ish solid phenomenal dimension of the 
experience involved in a Paper Match and the features of the patches?  As indicated by the data 
model, for the Test and Standard patches after the Paper Match, the extent of the color-ish solid 
phenomenal difference is the same as the extent of the difference between the chromaticities of 
the returns, if the subject makes a perfect match. As noted earlier, in the Paper Match, subjects 
don’t adjust the reflectance Test patch to be exactly the same as the reflectance of the Standard 
patch, and they do not thereby adjust the return to be the same as the return of the Standard patch 
if it were under the Test illuminant. Thus, for tested subjects, the extent of the phenomenal 
difference is not to the same degree as the extent of the return difference.  However, according to 
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how the data is modeled, in the ideal of perfect color constancy, the phenomenal difference is to 
the same extent as the return difference. What we see is that the color-ish solid phenomenal 
properties of the experiences of the Standard and Test Patches corresponded to the patch-returns.  
As this result is a product of the model of the data, it is subject to the accuracy of the 
model.  In part, this will turn on the mapping from color-ish phenomenal properties to features 
like returns and illuminances.  The space in which the open and closed shapes are embedded is a 
chromaticity diagram.  It aims to capture relationships between lights and the color solid.  Arend 
and Reeves use one chromaticity diagram but there are many others, and the differences between 
them can be quite complex25.  The experimental data of Arend and Reeves does not dictate a 
unique model. So if their chosen model is not correct, their results in the above paragraph are at 
risk.  For example, some doubt whether a perfect match can be made (e.g. Brainard et al. 1997); 
if this is correct, a model of constancy of perceived surface color should explain this, and Arend 
and Reeves’s model does not.  So in general there are questions about the accuracy of this model.  
However, what is relevant for purposes of this paper is laying out the model and appreciating the 
way Gert, Cohen and Matthen build their theories on it26.  
Returning to the relationship between the color-ish solid phenomenal difference and the 
return difference in Paper Matches, if this were all there were to color vision in Paper Matches, 
then we would lack color constancy.  Recall that, because of the inverse projection problem, 
when two reflectance-identical surfaces are under different illumination, the returns they reflect 
into an observer’s eyes differ.  Without a color constancy mechanism, and operating solely off of 
the input to the retina, the visual system would output, roughly, experiences as of different 
                                                 
25 Over the decades, various CIE chromaticity diagrams have been proposed and used, including the CIE (x,y), the 
CIELUV, the CIEL*U*V*, the CIELAB, and more.  Some reflect advances in color science like the recognition that 
we can make finer color discriminations among the blues than the yellows.  Some are the result of practical 
purposes.  
26 Thanks to David Hilbert for helping focus what is at issue here. 
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colors, corresponding to the differing returns.  The greater the illuminance difference of two 
reflectance-identical surface, the greater the return difference and the greater the experienced 
color difference.   
So if we assume for the moment, in order to consider matters in terms of veridicality, a 
simple Representationalism, according to which phenomenal properties are associated with 
represented properties, if all there were to color vision were this color-ish solid phenomenal 
difference found in the experiences involved in Paper Matches, then the experience would 
represent different color properties even though the plausible color-candidate, surface spectral 
reflectance, is the same for both patches.  Thus the experience would be illusory.    However, the 
claim is that there is more to vision; after a successful Paper Match, counterpart pairs of patches 
also look the same in color.  And this is evidence that we have color constancy. 
A clarification is in order.  Seeing as the experiments chiefly involve the Standard and 
Test patches in the Mondrians, one might think that color constancy is only exhibited at those 
patches and not at the other patches composing the Mondrians.  However, the idea is that, for a 
normal subject, prior to adjustment of the Test patch, all counterpart patches of the Standard and 
Test Mondrians, except the Standard and Test patches, look alike in color and thus exhibit color 
constancy.  The approach of the experiment, in investigating whether a subject has a visual 
system that employs color constancy, is to test a subject’s ability to make the Standard and Test 
patch also look alike in color.  
A different experimental method could test color constancy in a different way.  Such an 
experiment could use a Standard Mondrian and a Test Mondrian which are reflectance-identical 
in all their counterpart patches.  The Test Mondrian could then be placed under the Test 
illuminant.  To test whether the Mondrians are color-constant for a subject, the experimenter 
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could prompt the subject to indicate whether a patch in the Test Mondrian looks to be the same 
color as its counterpart in the Standard Mondrian or whether the Test Mondrian patch looks to be 
of a different color.  The subject could also be prompted to indicate the degree of sameness or 
difference in looks.  Supposing the subject does not know the experimental set-up, then her 
response would be evidence as to whether her experience is color constant or not: for example, 
if, to the subject, the Test patch looks different in color than its counterpart in the Standard 
Mondrian, though it is not different in color and is only under a different in illumination, then the 
subject is undergoing an illusion and the Mondrians do not exhibit color constancy.  Similar 
experimental methods, opposed to matching tasks, are performed by Reeves et al. (2008)27.  The 
point is that for a color-constant subject, the Standard and Test Mondrians in these latter 
experiments would look like and cause experiences with the same phenomenology as the 
Standard and Test Mondrians in the SACM experiments, after a successful Paper Match.  All 
pairs of counterpart patches in the Standard and Test Mondrians in the SACM experiments, after 
a successful Paper Match, differ in color-ish solid phenomenal properties but look alike in color 
and so exhibit color constancy.   
Finally, let’s return to the idea that counterpart patches look the same in color.  
Depending on the extent to which one’s experiences of the figures I provided diverge from the 
experiences one would have if one were in the SACM experiment, the figures might not provide 
a sense of the relevant color constancy.  Even if they do and the arrowed patches look the same 
                                                 
27 In one of the experiments, two reflectance- identical Mondrians were under different illumination.  The subject’s 
task was to rate to what degree the “center square of the second pattern ‘looks as if it is made from exactly the same 
piece of paper (or material) as in the first pattern’” (Reeves et al. 2008:4).  And whether it looked as if there were a 
change in material  or not was understood as it looking as if there were “changes in the reflecting properties of the 
scene” (Reeves et al.: 2).  Thus if a subject’s experience involved color constancy, the Test square would not look as 
if it is made of a different material, with a different SSR, than the Standard square.  
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in color, this would be an illusion, merely providing the relevant experience28.  However, getting 
clear on the sense in which counterpart patches in the SACM experiment look the same, after a 
Paper Match, is not necessary for the arguments to come.  However it is useful to consider some 
possibilities.  On the one hand, assuming something more is involved than the behavioral 
implications of the data, this sameness in looks might involve some phenomenal sameness.  If 
this is so, it is clear that this phenomenal sameness is not of the same sort as the phenomenal 
sameness which involves color-ish solid phenomenal properties.  It would be impossible to have 
experiences of counterpart Mondrian patches, after a Paper Match, which differ in color-ish solid 
phenomenal properties, and are the same in color-ish solid phenomenal properties.   The 
phenomenal sameness would have to involve phenomenal properties or color-ish phenomenal 
properties of a different sort.  On the other hand, if this sameness in looks does not involve 
phenomenal sameness, then we are left with the question whether it and this color constancy are 
genuinely visual.  Maybe they are just a matter of judgment, in which case it is hard to see how it 
is genuinely visual29.  I do not intend to answer these questions.   
There are three important take-aways from this analysis of the Arend and Reeves SACM 
experiments:  
1) The Phenomenal Difference -Return Correspondence. According to the model of color 
constancy, where the Mondrians exhibit perfect color constancy, and have pairs of 
                                                 
28 Again, it would be an illusion because the patches actually differ in color/reflectance.  They are not reflectance 
identical patches under differing illumination.  
29 The work of Arend and Reeves does not answer this.  They describe Paper Matches as involving “invariance of 
perceived surface color” and as a “judgment of surface color,” so how they conceive of it is unclear. Also Hue-
Saturation matches were sometimes described as “judgments.”  So, whether color constancy involves judgment 
without phenomenology and/or anything genuinely visual is still unclear. For some purposes of vision science, this 
may not matter.  If the purpose it to understand how a confounding return-input is transformed into environmentally-
useful behavior, it might be irrelevant whether phenomenological experience and judgment or judgment alone 
proceeds the behavior.  But for the purposes of the relevant areas of philosophy, the distinction is important. 
However, Arend and Reeves do recognize a distinction in the matches in these earlier papers, which is explored later 
in Reeves et al. 2008.  But besides reiterating the distinction, additional clarity is not provided.   
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counterpart patches which look or are perceived as the same in color, the extent of color-
ish solid phenomenal difference is the same as the extent of the difference between the 
chromaticities of the returns.    
2) The Similarity-Difference Distinction. There are two color-related dimensions to the 
perception of the color-constant Mondrians- one which I have associated with color-ish 
solid phenomenal properties and the other which, at the least, involves color-looks.  If 
both dimensions are phenomenal, they are of different phenomenal types. 
 3)  The “Looks Similar” Uncertainty. It is, at least, not obvious how to understand the 
fact, if it is a fact, that pairs of counterpart patches look the same in color.    
The next section looks at how these points figure in some of the philosophical theories on 
Varying Illumination cases and color constancy.     
1.5. Mondrian Cases in Dual-Dimension Views      
 The Dual-Dimension Views engage in second-level disagreement with respect to 
Varying Illumination cases, disagreeing about the way things look different and the way things 
look alike.  In this paper, the focus is on those Dual-Dimension disputants who appeal to the 
Arend and Reeves experiments- Cohen, Gert and Matthen.  As noted before, my aim is not to 
resolve this sibling rivalry.  My points will engage more with the first-level disagreements.  
However, having investigated the Mondrian cases, we have a clearer picture of where the views 
of Cohen, Gert and Matthen are situated in the first-level disagreement.  That is, prior to sorting 
out in what way things look different (whether in surface color, illumination, or something else) 
and in what way things look alike (whether in surface color or reflectance or something else), the 
three take-aways from the analysis of the experiments shed light on the difference in looks (and 
phenomenology) and, very minimally, on the similarity in looks (and possible phenomenology). 
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These features of the difference and similarity involved in the Mondrian case are 
important because it is an open question as to whether and to what degree instances of color 
constancy and Varying Illumination cases are of a single, theoretically-significant kind. The 
looks and phenomenology involved in such cases might not be uniform. That is, some Varying 
Illumination cases might be of the Similarity Only kind while others might be of the Dual-
Dimension kind.  And this latter kind might divide into sub-kinds depending on, for example, the 
extent of the difference and the relationship between the similarity and the difference.   For 
example, consider a uniformly-colored object in your vicinity which is partly in cast shadow and 
partly unshadowed. (Or consider the ground in the scene depicted in Figure 1.1).  Does the object 
exhibit color constancy in the same way that the Mondrian cases do?  The answer is not obvious.  
And even if it does, this could not be known just in virtue of undergoing the experience because 
non-visual measurements are required to know the features of the return and whether the extent 
of the phenomenal difference between the experiences of the parts of the surface is the same as 
the extent of the difference in their returns.  So, one scene might verify Dual-Dimension Views 
in the way that the Mondrian cases seem to.  Another scene might verify Dual-Dimension Views 
but in a different way than the Mondrian cases, for example where the extent of the phenomenal 
difference is not the same as the extent of the difference in the returns. And another case of color 
constancy might verify Similarity Only Views.  This cannot be ruled out from the outset and 
would probably bear on the second-level positions about, for example, in what the objects look 
similar and different.  So, it’s important that we can zero-in on these details, for merely accepting 
a Dual Dimension View leaves much unspecified about the similarity and difference and the 
extent to which Varying Illumination cases are of the Dual-Dimension sort.  The Mondrian cases 
are the predominant way Cohen, Gert and Matthen provide these details.         
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Before we look at how some in the Dual-Dimension Position have utilized the Arend and 
Reeves case of color constancy in developing their theories of experience or color,  a preliminary 
move needs to be made by reframing this internal debate amongst Dual-Dimension Views in 
terms of representation instead of how things look.  This is because Cohen, Gert and Matthen are 
Representationalists, of some sort at least, and end up framing their views representationally30.  
Let’s introduce two property-names: “color-like property1” and “color-like property2”.  Maybe it 
turns out that they co-refer, maybe not.  The represented properties “associated” with color-ish 
solid phenomenal properties are color-like properties1.  Because Gert, Cohen and Matthen do not 
specify what Representationalism consists in, the metaphysical association-relation between 
phenomenal properties and representational properties is left vague, that is, whether it is an 
identity relation, supervenience relation or something else. As will be seen, Gert, Cohen and 
Matthen take the experiments as evidence that the counterpart patches in the Mondrians, post 
successful Paper match, are represented as being the same in color-like properties2.  Essentially, 
Matthen claims that in Varying Illumination cases, homogenously colored surfaces are 
represented as being alike in color-like properties2. And experience represents the illumination of 
the scene, not the surface, as different in color-like properties1.  On the other hand, Cohen and 
Gert claim that homogenously colored surfaces are represented as being alike in color-like 
properties2 and are represented as different in color-like properties1.     
                                                 
30  Though Matthen doesn’t always frame matters representationally in this paper, I assume Matthen is a 
representationalist here because he writes about experience syntactically, having subjects, predicates and predicative 
structure, and affirms Representationalism in Matthen 2010b.  Cohen and Gert more thoroughly claim that 
experiences represent, however, neither is explicit about their view on Representationalism.  That is, they do not 
explicitly endorse one of the mainstream forms of Representationalism/Intentionalism.  Nor do they explicitly 
present their own version of Representationalism.  In The Red and the Real Cohen states, in the context of 
considering what follows from a “variation in the way that the stimulus looks,” that “[o]n a more or less standard 
view of the visual system as visually representing the world, this entails that… there is a set of variant 
representations … of the stimulus” (Cohen 2009: 22).  However, side-stepping the framing of Representationalism 
in terms of looks, this is not a clear acceptance of something like Weak Representationalism, nor is it clear that this 
is all he commits himself to.  And, for his purposes in Cohen 2008, it would be best if this is not the extent of his 
Representational commitments, otherwise providing a sameness in content for a sameness in looks would be 
unmotivated. 
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 Mohan Matthen appeals to Arend et al. (1991) to come to his conclusion about Varying 
Illumination cases.  He centers his paper on one Varying Illumination case involving the look of 
a white wall in “the pinkish light of the late afternoon” (Matthen 2010a: 226).  Accepting the 
Dual-Dimension View, Matthen thinks that, in his paradigm case, there is some difference 
involved in how things look even though things, in some way, look the same.  Towards arguing 
against parts of the wall looking pink, Matthen asks “What is the subject of this predicate, pink?” 
(Matthen 245).  That is, is pink predicated of the wall or is it predicated of the illumination?  To 
address these “details of visual phenomenology,” Matthen turns to Arend et al. (1991) to 
“[anchor] this issue in empirical bedrock” (Matthen: 245).   
Matthen rehearses the distinction between Hue-Saturation versus Paper Matches and 
argues that the work of Arend et al. supports the view that “the pinkness cast by the afternoon 
sun… is not attributed to the wall” (Matthen 249).  To briefly review his argument, he begins 
with the premise that the visual system has data in stores or files.  Some of the data is color data.  
Matthen hypothesizes that “there is a certain separation between one’s records concerning 
different things” (Matthen 247).  As a result of this separation, one file of data, which includes 
color data, might be indexed to a material object like a wall.  Another file of data, which also 
includes color data, might be indexed to illumination.  Matthen claims that “the work of Arend 
and his co-workers suggests that colour data coming from the same location is separated into 
separate stores or files” and so supports his idea that color data can be separately indexed to 
different things, specifically material objects, illumination and spectral returns (Matthen 247).  
Claiming that “data concerning something is just information predicated of that thing” and “this 
relationship between data and index corresponds to predication,” Matthen concludes that the 
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pinkness in his case is not predicated of the wall but of either the illumination or the light coming 
off of the object (Matthen 247).   
The assimilation of the pinkness in his paradigm case to a color-like property1 is central 
to Matthen’s argument. That is, Matthen is intending to give a general account of a large body, if 
not all Varying Illumination cases.  And he employs the case of a wall in pinkish light as a 
paradigm from which general conclusions about Varying Illumination cases can be drawn.  To 
understand his paradigmatic case, he turns to the Mondrian case. We noted the three key features 
of the Mondrian case.  Thus, given his appeal to it, we should expect that Matthen thinks his 
paradigmatic case, and the cases he wishes to generalize to, share these features.  So to assimilate 
the pinkness in his paradigm case to color-like properties1 gives us a clear idea of the pinkness. 
Color-like properties1 are associated with color-ish solid phenomenal properties that ground the 
phenomenal difference between counterpart patches of the Standard and Test Mondrians after a 
successful Paper Match is made, and the extent of this difference is to the same extent as the 
difference between the returns and illuminances of the counterpart patches31.     
Matthen makes this assimilation when he describes the pinkness as “the pinkness that 
accounts for matches of ‘unasserted’ colour” (Matthen 247).  “Unasserted colors” are what are 
involved in Hue-Saturation matches (Arend et al. 1991: 661).  Therefore, if Section 1.4 is 
correct, the relevant phenomenal properties of experiences of unasserted colors are color-ish 
solid phenomenal properties.  And, since Matthen needs to connect the work of Arend and 
Reeves with a representationalist framework, unasserted colors are color-like properties1.  On the 
other hand, color-like properties2 are surface colors of objects.  Thus, for Matthen, when two 
reflectance/surface color-identical surfaces are variably illuminated, experience represents the 
                                                 
31 Since the cases of concern involve objects with regions of the same reflectances but differing illuminance, the 
illuminance fully determines the return difference so the extent of each is the same. 
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surfaces as being alike in color-like properties2 and represents the illumination of the scene as 
differing in color-like properties1.        
Interestingly, Cohen uses the Arend and Reeves experiments to argue against the position 
that, in Varying Illumination cases, the “visual system is here discriminating a difference in the 
illumination falling on the surface regions…rather than a difference in apparent colour” (Cohen 
2008: 67).   Instead, concerning a homogenously colored surface which is variably illuminated, 
Cohen writes: 
 First, we want to say that colour constancy involves some sense in which the apparent 
colours of these regions are relevantly alike to subjects…Second, we need a way of 
articulating this last idea while…avoiding the straight-out insistence that the regions are 
identical in apparent colour, since, as shown by the variance reaction/appearance match 
data [i.e. Arend and Reeves’s data], there is a good sense in which they are not. (Cohen 
2008: 79-80) 
 
Similarly, Gert writes: 
One half of the constancy data [i.e. Arend and Reeves’s data] (the relatively inconstant 
part) corresponds to the variable ways in which colors appear under changes of 
illuminant, while the other half of the data (the relatively constant part) corresponds to 
the stable color properties objects actually have, and which they also seem to have, given 
the patterns of change in the first sort of appearance.  (Gert 2010: 672). 
 
And for Gert, the stable color properties that objects “seem” to have is a genuinely visual 
matter, for he later writes, “we really do seem to see that the two regions share a common color 
property.  Call this ‘the phenomenal nature of color constancy’” (Gert 2010: 673).  However, it is 
important to note that Gert and Cohen divide with respect to there being a represented difference 
in illumination across variably illuminated surfaces.  Gert thinks difference in illumination is 
represented in such cases, though he does not indicate its presence in the relevant experiences.   
To accommodate their Dual-Dimension Views, Gert and Cohen appeal to two types of 
properties, what I have called “color-like property1” and “color-like property2”.  For Cohen the 
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color-like properties1 are occurrent apparent colours (Cohen 2008:80).  For Gert the color-like 
properties1 are apparent colors (Gert 2013: 187).   
On the other hand, the way pairs of counterpart patches look alike is in color-like 
properties2 and experience represents members of each pair as sharing a color-like property2.  
For Cohen and Gert, pairs share a color-like property2 in virtue of, roughly, being disposed to 
have the same color-like properties1 in the same viewing-conditions.  That is, if they were in the 
same viewing conditions, then they would have the same color-like property1.  In Cohen’s terms, 
the Standard and Test Patches in the post-adjusted Mondrians, for example, “are alike in that 
they would share an apparent colour if, contrary to fact, both regions were presented under the 
same illumination” (Cohen 2008: 81).  That is, they are alike because each is such that 1) if it 
were under the Standard Illumination, then it would have the color-like property1/ occurrent 
apparent colour that the Standard Patch actually has, and 2) if it were under the Test 
Illumination, then it would have the color-like property1/ occurrent apparent colour that the Test 
Patch actually has, and so on for other pairs of viewing conditions and color-like properties1.   
For Cohen, color-like properties2 are counterfactual apparent colours32. 
For Gert, color-like properties2 are something very similar: dispositional properties 
“associated with functions from viewing contexts to apparent colors” (Gert 2013: 187).  That is, 
the function from viewing conditions to color-like properties1 partially specified by 1) and 2) 
underscores the disposition that is shared by the post-adjustment Standard and Test patches.  
From their accounts of color-like properties2, we can see that those properties are, in 
some sense, in terms of color-like properties1.  There is a priority to the latter.  Like with 
                                                 
32 In Cohen (2008), Cohen argues that when surfaces look alike in color constancy cases, the experiences of the 
surfaces have these counterfactual apparent colors as common representational content.  It is not clear that he carries 
this view over to The Red and the Real.  In the book he only claims that “the subject…will ordinarily judge that the 
two adjacent regions have one color rather than two” (Cohen 2009: 53) and does not claim there is a common 
represented property shared by the experiences of the two regions.  See Chapter 3 for details. 
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Matthen, it is from the Mondrian cases, and the three key features, that we get a sense of how 
things look and the phenomenology of experiences involving color-like properties2 and color-like 
properties133.   
 Additionally, there is The Similarity-Difference Distinction.  Supposing that counterpart 
Mondrian patches look alike, if there is a phenomenal similarity between experiences of 
counterpart patches, then the phenomenal properties that ground this similarity are of a different 
sort than the phenomenal properties (color-ish solid phenomenal properties) which ground the 
phenomenal difference between experiences of counterpart patches.  On the other hand, maybe 
the patches look similar without there being any phenomenal similarity between the experience 
of the patches, but this similarity is still a part of the visual experience34.  Or maybe the patches’ 
looking similar merely involves something non-visual, and possibly cognitive, like a judgment.  
The judgment might be about how the patches would look, or the phenomenology the 
experiences of the patches would have, if the patches were under this or that illumination.  I do 
not intend to adjudicate this issue, though. The point is that the experiments and much empirical 
color constancy literature seem to treat the sameness in the color constancy of these SACM 
experiments as genuinely visual.  And the philosophical literature appealing to such experiments 
develops theories of visual experience in which the sameness is part of the content of the 
experience.  If it turns out this sameness is not visual then this will pose a significant problem.  
Specifically, for Representationalists like Matthen, Gert and Cohen, any non-phenomenological 
construal of the similarity in looks creates a challenge for claiming that the Mondrian cases, and 
whatever Varying Illumination cases they intent to generalize the Mondrian cases to, involve the 
                                                 
33 Concerning Gert and Cohen, it should be noted that, while experiences represent differing color-like properties1 in 
the relevant color-constancy cases, they do not say what instantiated properties differ which verify this 
representational difference.  
34 This might be Alva Noe’s 2004 view.  
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experiential representation of color-like properties2.  This is because mainstream 
Representationalism takes the form of a thesis about the phenomenal and the representational. 
 For his part, Gert denies a mere judgment-based color constancy which holds that 
constancy involves “something like an inferred color appearance, and not [an] experienced 
appearance.”  He continues with, “But this seems to get the phenomenology wrong: we really do 
seem to see that the two regions share a common color property.  Call this ‘the phenomenal 
nature of color constancy’” (Gert 2010: 673).   
Putting aside these issues with the similar-looks involved in color constancy, I will focus 
on the difference in the way the regions look, i.e. the color-ish solid phenomenal difference 
between the pairs.  By presenting another case of color constancy, I will argue that theories of 
Varying Illumination cases that appeal to empirical work on color constancy have neglected a 
different type of color constancy.    
In summary, in at least partial support for their particular Dual-Dimension Position, Gert, 
Cohen and Matthen appeal to the empirical work of Arend and Reeves. This is an appeal to color 
constancy. Because of their heavy appeal to Arend and Reeves’s work, this paper closely 
analyzed the relevant experiments to get a clearer picture of the prospects of the Dual-Dimension 
Views. Three central points emerged: The Phenomenal Difference-Return Correspondence, The 
Similarity-Difference Distinction, and The “Looks Similar” Uncertainty.  These features inform 
the specifics of these Dual-Dimension Views.  
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CHAPTER 2: TYPE-2 COLOR CONSTANCY AND DUAL-DIMENSION VIEWS 
2.1. Type-2 Color-constancy 
 So far in the paper, one instance of color constancy has been investigated- the particular 
constancy involving the particular Mondrians in Arend and Reeves’s SACM experiments.  We 
must ask whether the features of that particular case are common to all cases of color constancy 
or, if not, to what extent other instances of color constancy differ from the above Mondrian case.  
The views of Matthen, Cohen, and Gert seem to take the above Mondrian case as paradigmatic 
of a great deal, if not all, color constancy cases, and maybe even all Varying Illumination cases.   
However, this chapter argues that there is a second type of color constancy.   
Recall The Phenomenal Difference -Return Correspondence in the color constancy 
exhibited by the Mondrians in Arend and Reeves’s experiments: the color-ish solid phenomenal 
properties of the experiences of pairs of counterpart patches differ, and the extent of this 
difference is the same as the extent to which the returns of the pairs of counterpart patches differ.  
In Section 1.2 the inverse relationship between many similarities and differences was mentioned.  
This is relevant here: a difference in returns is closely connected to a converse similarity in 
returns.  As two returns become more different in their luminances (the amount of energy had by 
the returns), they also become less similar.  Likewise, consider the color-ish solid phenomenal 
properties had by an experience of the gray regions in Figure 1.9, Section 1.4.2.  The more 
different two color-ish solid phenomenal properties are from each other, the less similar they are 
to each other.  Thus, related to The Phenomenal Difference -Return Correspondence of pairs of 
counterpart Mondrian patches, the color-ish solid phenomenal properties of the experiences of 
such pairs are similar to the same extent as the returns of the pairs are similar.  Importantly, the 
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extent to which the experiences of pairs of counterpart patches are phenomenally similar in 
color-ish solid phenomenal properties is not greater than the extent to which the returns of those 
patches are similar. This is the case even though, supposedly, in some sense, pairs of counterpart 
patches look the same in color.  I will argue that there is another type of color constancy (Type-2 
color constancy).  Roughly, in Type-2 color constancy the extent to which the experiences of the 
patches are phenomenally similar in color-ish solid phenomenal properties is greater than the 
extent to which the returns of those patches are similar.   
An example of Type-2 color-constancy is found in the real-world counterpart of 
Adelson’s well-known checkershadow illusion. To argue for this conclusion, the phenomenal 
similarity between experiences of different regions needs to be compared to the returns reflected 
from those regions.  But in order to get an understanding of the phenomenal similarity, I intend 
to give you, the reader, such experiences which have this phenomenal similarity.  Unfortunately, 
since I cannot provide the color-constant regions which would induce the relevant experiences, I 
must go about things in a round-about way.  Specifically, I will use pictures to induce the 
experiences with the relevant phenomenal similarities.  From the pictures, with some empirical 
details about returns, illuminances, and reflectances, a real-world counterpart of the picture 
(essentially, what the picture is a picture of) will be “reconstructed.” I will argue that the real-
world counterpart exhibits color constancy.  As noted in discussion of Arend and Reeves’s 
SACM experiments which used Mondrians, simulations are often used in color constancy 
experiments.  The present discussion will consider what is presupposed by such a method.   
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Figure 2.1: Adelson’s checkershadow illusion 
 
Modified from Adelson (1995) 
So to begin, let’s consider Adelson’s illusion.  The flat object before you, Figure 2.1, 
which causes Adelson’s illusion, is merely composed of colored patches on a page. The whole 
surface is evenly illuminated.  There is no color-constancy involved.  (I will write as if the Figure 
2.1 that you are viewing is on paper instead of a screen to make the relationship between 
reflectance, returns and illuminances/illuminants more straightforward.) The experiences of 
parallelograms A and B are phenomenally different in a color-ish way.  To recognize this leaves 
open many details of this phenomenal difference and any correlated representational difference.  
But, as Adelson describes on his website, the figure is illusory because “A and B are the same 
shade of gray” (Adelson 1995).  That is, each is the same color and each has the same 
reflectance.  I will assume colors and surface spectral reflectances are the same thing.  A more 
complicated presentation could drop this assumption.  As Adelson notes, we could know that A 
and B are the same in reflectance by, for example, measuring them with a photometer.  In lieu of 
this, convincing evidence that B is the same color/reflectance as A is available from Figure 2.2, 
where, to put matters pre-theoretically, they look the same in color.   
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For reasons that carry over from the previous sections, color-ish solid phenomenal 
properties will be employed.  Given how color-ish solid phenomenal properties were defined, I 
think it is safe to say that, at least to a very close approximation, the experiences of A and B in 
Figure 2.2 share a color-ish solid phenomenal property.  A name can be given to that determinate 
phenomenal property- Dark Gray-ish.  Because the issues concern illusions and veridical 
experiences, phenomenal properties will be associated with represented properties in some form 
of Representationalism35.  So, we can give names to the determinate represented color of A and 
B in Figure 2.2.  We can call the represented property, which is associated with the phenomenal 
property Dark Gray-ish, Dark Gray.  A and B in Figure 2.2 are represented as Dark Gray. 
  One might question whether B in Figure 2.1 is the same in color and reflectance as B in 
Figure 2.2.  One method for testing this is to print out the page and cut out B in Figure 2.1.  
Away from the patches that surround it in-figure, it will be represented as Dark Gray.  
Alternatively, one could take a piece of paper, cut it in such a way that when it is placed on top 
of Figure 2.1 it covers the patches touching B but does not cover B, and then place it on top of 
Figure 2.1.  Under these conditions, B will also be represented as Dark Gray. 
 
                                                 
35 A Representationalism committed to 2-way supervenience between the phenomenal properties and 
representational properties would be sufficient. 
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Figure 2.2: Non-illusory patches  
 
Modified from Adelson (1995) 
So, A and B in Figure 2.1 are the same in color and reflectance, though, they look 
different (to put it pre-theoretically), and there is a phenomenal difference between the 
experiences of each.  Likewise, there is a phenomenal difference between the experiences of B in 
Figure 2.1 and B in Figure 2.2. Assuming, vaguely, Representationalism, there is a 
representational difference between A and B in Figure 2.1, and B is misrepresented.  
While there is a phenomenal difference between the experiences of B in Figure 2.1 and B 
in Figure 2.2, another aspect of the illusion is important.  In Figure 2.1, B is phenomenally 
similar to C.  In fact, the experience of B in Figure 2.1 is more phenomenally similar to the 
experience of C in Figure 2.1 than the experience of B in Figure 2.2 is to the experience of C in 
Figure 2.1.  What is this phenomenal similarity?  Is it a phenomenal similarity grounded in color-
ish solid phenomenal properties?  Or is it a phenomenal similarity grounded in some other color-
ish phenomenal properties?  At the least, it is a phenomenal similarity that is very close to one 
grounded in color-ish solid phenomenal properties.  That is, the color-ish phenomenal properties 
of the experiences of B and C in Figure 2.1 are very close to being color-ish solid phenomenal 
properties.  For the time being, let’s assume that the color-ish phenomenal properties of the 
experiences of B and C in Figure 2.1 are color-ish solid phenomenal properties   So, a name can 
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be given to the color-ish solid phenomenal property of the experience of B in Figure 2.1.  Call it 
Middle Gray-ish.  And call the representational property it is associated with Middle Gray.  And 
the color-ish solid phenomenal property of the experience of C in Figure 2.1 is Light Gray-ish.  
And call the representational property it is associated with Light Gray.   
Since B is represented as Middle Gray, it is represented as more similar to C than it 
actually is.  (B is Dark Gray, recall.)  In that B and C in Figure 2.1 are represented as Middle 
Gray and Light Gray, respectively, let’s say they are represented as 1 unit (of some measure) 
apart in represented color. This leads to the first premise of the argument for Type-2 Color 
Constancy. 
Premise 1: In Figure 2.1, B is represented as Middle Gray and C is represented as Light 
Gray, and B is represented as 1 unit lower in color than C.   
Additionally, it should be noted for future purposes that, while one’s experience of Figure 
2.1 involves an illusion, it is not entirely illusory. That is, many of the colors represented of the 
patches of Figure 2.1 are veridically represented.  Most relevantly, A and C, being represented as 
Dark Gray and Light Gray, respectively, are as they are represented to be. 
In that A and C in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 are represented as Dark Gray and Light Gray, 
respectively, let’s say they are represented as 2 units (of some measure) apart in represented 
color.  Likewise the experiences of each are 2 units apart in color-ish solid phenomenal 
properties.  Since the experiences of A and C are veridical, the reflectances between A and C are 
2 units apart. This reflectance difference tells us about another reflectance difference.  Since A 
and B are represented as the same color in Figure 2.2 and are the same color, C is represented as 
being as different from A as it is from B.  So: 
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Premise 2: In Figure 2.2, B is represented as being 2 units lower in color than C in Figure 
236.    
Premise 3: The representation of B and C in Figure 2.2 is veridical. 
Premise 4: Therefore, in Figure 2.2, B is 2 units lower in color/reflectance than C. 
Establishing some physical features of Figures 2.1 and 2.2, we can draw conclusions 
about the returns of the figures.  In the simple cases employed here which lack transmittances, 
inter-object reflections, fluorescent objects, etc, the return is determined by the reflectance and 
illumination.  Since the illumination of B and C in Figure 2.1 is the same, and the illumination of 
B and C in Figure 2.2 is the same, the return differences of the patches is determined by the 
reflectance difference.  Therefore: 
Premise 5:  In Figure 2.2, B is 2 units lower in return-luminance than C. 
This leads to a conclusion about the most important patches in the figures, B and C in 
Figure 2.1.  Since the reflectance, illumination/illuminance, and returns of A, B, and C of Figures 
2.1 and 2.2 are the same, we can conclude: 
Premise 6:  In Figure 2.1, B is 2 units lower in return-luminance than C.   
 With the features of Figure 2.1 and the experiences it causes in hand, we can begin to 
connect those experiences to the experiences of a color-constant object.  To do this let’s look at 
the presuppositions of experiments that use Figure 2.1 as a simulation for a case of color 
constancy. While Adelson merely presents the illusion on his website and has not published on a 
color constancy experiment using Figure 2.1, an experiment has been performed on a variant of 
Adelson’s checkershadow illusion in Zeiner and Maertens 2014.  Though Zeiner and Maertens 
use simulated stimuli, they did construct a real checkerboard.   
                                                 
36 It should be understood that the units of difference is in the same respect throughout. 
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 The first thing to note is that, in using a simulation, the experimenters go to great lengths 
to ensure the returns of the simulation and the real object are as similar as practically possible.  
Thus, they measured the return luminances of the simulated stimulus (in their case, a computer-
rendering of the checkerboard presented on a computer monitor).  Then the features of the real 
scene “were adjusted so as to produce approximately the same range of luminance values…that 
was measured for the rendered board on the monitor” (Zeiner and Maertens 2014: 4).  They also 
matched the return luminances of the shadowed checkers on the real board with the return 
luminances of the patches of the simulation which are depicted as being in shadow.     
 So we have some information about the returns of Figure 2.1, its illuminances, 
reflectances, how it looks and the phenomenology of its experience.  If we assume that there is a 
real checkerboard that looks the same, has an experience with the same phenomenology and 
content, and has the same returns, can we “reconstruct” this Real Checkerboard such that it has 
the illuminances and reflectances of an object that exhibits color constancy?    To begin this 
attempt, first recall that with Figure 2.1, the whole figure is not experienced illusorily, only the 
patches in simulated shadow. Therefore, patches A and C, for example, are experienced 
veridically.  To begin reverse engineering the Real Checkerboard, let’s name some of the regions 
of this checkerboard.  Corresponding to the patches A, B, and C of Figure 2.1, there are the 
checkers A’, B’, and C’ of the Real Checkerboard.  Again there are 2 assumptions: 
Premise 7: The figure and Real Checkerboard reflect the same returns, and each patch 
and its counterpart checker reflect the same returns. 
Premise 8:  There is sameness in looks between each patch of the figures and its 
counterpart checker in the Real Checkerboard, and there is sameness in the phenomenal 
properties and content of the experiences of each patch and its counterpart checker.   
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Since A and C are represented veridically, A is Dark Gray and C is Light Gray.  Nothing 
bars A’ and C’ from being the same colors as their Figure 2.1-counterparts, so they are Dark 
Gray and Light Gray, respectively.  Also, in that Figure 2.1 is in normal, “white” light (roughly, 
light that has equal amounts of energy at all wavelengths and a relatively high overall intensity), 
we can stipulate that the checkerboard is in the same lighting, except for its shadow.   
 The place to look for color constancy in the checkerboard is at the location that is the 
counterpart of the location of the illusion in Figure 2.1.  So, in that B is represented, with respect 
to color, as closer to C than it actually is (being Dark Gray but represented as Middle Gray), we 
should look to the relationship between B’ and C’.  From Premise 1 and Premise 8 it can be 
concluded that: 
Premise 9: B’ is represented as Middle Gray, and C’ is represented as Light Gray, and B’ 
is represented as 1 unit lower in color than C’.   
What would color constancy be like in the real checkerboard? 
Premise 10: The following would be sufficient conditions for imperfect Type-2 color 
constancy: 1) B’ is the same in reflectance as C’, but having a lower illuminance (because 
it’s in shadow), reflects a lower return luminance than C’.  2) The degree to which B’ is 
represented as a similar gray as C’ is greater than the degree to which the return 
luminance of B’ is similar to the return luminance of C’. 
 Generally, this captures the idea that color constancy occurs when the visual system 
overcomes the effect of differing return to produce more similar experiences. At the extreme, 
there would be perfect Type-2 color constancy if 1) obtained and B’ is exactly the same in 
represented color as C’.  For present purposes, there would be imperfect Type-2 color constancy 
if: 1) B’ and C’ were the same in reflectance, but because B’ has an illuminance that is two units 
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lower than the illuminance of C,’ the return luminance of B’ is two units lower than C’.  And 2) 
B’ were represented as only one unit darker in gray than C’.  And this is what we find in a 
checkerboard that looks the same, has an experience of the same phenomenology and content, 
and has the same returns as Figure 2.1.   
From Premise 6 and Premise 7, it can be concluded that: 
Premise 11: B’ is two units lower in return-luminance than C’. 
There are a number of reflectance-illuminance pairs that can produce the type of return-
luminance that is commonly reflected by B and B’.  Premise 6 (In Figure 2.1, B is 2 units lower 
in return-luminance than C) is true since there is a reflectance difference between B and C while 
they have the same illuminance.  But B’ and C’ might have any number of reflectances and 
illuminance and still satisfy Premise 11.  The question is whether there are any combinations of 
reflectance-illuminance pairs for B’ and C’ which satisfy condition 1) of Premise 10.  Suppose 
we assume: 
Premise 12:  B’ has the same reflectance as C’. 
 If this is the case, then B’ would have to have an illuminance that is 2 units lower than 
that of C’ in order for their return-luminances to match those of B and C.  So by Premise 11 and 
Premise 12: 
 Premise 13: B’ has an illuminance that is two units less intense than the illuminance of 
C’.  
 Premise 13 can be true because of a cast shadow. But given the sameness in represented 
properties and phenomenal properties between the experience of Figure 2.1 and the Real 
Checkerboard, the represented colors of B’ and C’ are only one unit apart (Premise 9).  
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Therefore, the Real Checkerboard satisfies condition 1 of Premise 10, given Premises 11, 12, and 
13, and satisfies condition 2, given Premises 9 and 11.  Therefore: 
 Conclusion: The Real Checkerboard exhibits imperfect Type-2 color constancy. 
 The color constancy involved in the Real Checkerboard “reconstructed” above should be 
distinguished from the color constancy involved in the Mondrian case.   In the idealized 
Mondrian case, there is The Phenomenal Difference -Return Correspondence.37  If this color-ish 
solid phenomenal difference were all there were to the look and experiences of the patches, then 
at least one of the experiences would be illusory.  The visual system that produced such 
experiences would fail to overcome the inverse projection problem, outputting experiences that 
differ in phenomenal properties (and represented colors) because of, and to the extent of, the 
difference in returns, despite the surface colors of the patches being the same.  However, if the 
accepted view of the Mondrian cases is correct, the experiences are not illusory because the 
patches look the same in color and are the same in color.  This was Type-1 color constancy. 
The color constancy involved in the Real Checkerboard “reconstructed” above is of a 
different kind because of the relationship between the color-ish solid phenomenal properties and 
the returns.  The color-ish solid phenomenal property of the experience of B’ is similar to the 
color-ish solid phenomenal property of the experience of C’, to a certain degree.  The degree of 
this similarity is greater than the degree to which the return luminance of B’ is similar to the 
return luminance of C’.  This contrasts with The Phenomenal Difference -Return 
Correspondence in Arend and Reeves’s color constancy case and warrants distinguishing this as 
a second type of color constancy.   
                                                 
37 Recall that it was not the case that, for each experimental participant, the extent of the difference between the 
color-ish phenomenal properties was exactly the same as the extent of the difference between the returns.  This was 
taken to be evidence of participants exhibiting somewhat imperfect color constancy.  (In light of this section, it 
would be imperfect Type-1 color constancy).  If the extents of the differences were the same, then there would be 
perfect Type-1 color constancy.  
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Another figure and real world, color-constant counterpart might be helpful.  Consider 
Figure 2.3: 
Figure 2.3: Lotto and Purves’s Rubik’s Cubes 
A            B 
 
From Lotto and Purves 200238 
 
 Like with Figure 2.1, I will write as if Figure 2.3 before you is on paper, instead of also 
describing the figure as it would be if you were viewing it on a computer or tablet screen.  Figure 
2.3 is a flat surface composed of colored patches.  Consider the right-most yellow patch in Figure 
2.3A, marked Z, and right-most yellow patch in Figure 2.3B, marked Z. Your experiences of 
each Z patch are not exactly phenomenologically the same.  But compare Figure 2.4, and 
consider your experience of its Z-patch; it has a gray-ish phenomenal property.  Your experience 
of patch Z in Figure 2.4 is veridical, whereas your experience of patch Z in Figure 2.3B is 
                                                 
38 Reprinted from Lotto, Beau R & Purves, Dale (2002). The empirical basis of color perception. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 11(4), 609-629. with permission from Elsevier. 
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illusory.  This is analogous to the way patch B in Figure 2.2 is experienced veridically, whereas 
patch B in Figure 2.1 is experienced illusorily.  Like with Figure 2.1, if you are unconvinced that 
Z in Figure 2.3B is experienced illusorily, there are ways to verify.  For example, Figure 2.3B 
can be printed out, patch Z can be cut from the rest of the figure, and then your experience of Z 
will be like your experience of Z in Figure 2.4.   
Figure 2.4: Non-illusory Rubik’s Cube 
 
From Lotto and Purves 200239 
 So your experience of Z in Figure 2.3B is phenomenologically more similar, because it is 
more yellow-ish, to your experience of Z in Figure 2.3A than your experience of Z in Figure 2.4 
is to your experience of Z in Figure 2.3A.  This parallels Figures 2.1 and 2.2.  One’s experience 
of patch B in Figure 2.1 is Middle Gray-ish.  One’s experience of patch C in Figure 2.1 is Light 
Gray-ish.  One’s experience of patch B in Figure 2.2 is Dark Gray-ish.  Therefore, one’s 
experience of B in Figure 2.1 is more phenomenologically similar to one’s experience of C in 
Figure 2.1 than one’s experience of B in Figure 2.2 is to one’s experience of C in Figure 2.1. 
                                                 
39 Reprinted from Lotto, Beau R & Purves, Dale (2002). The empirical basis of color perception. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 11(4), 609-629. with permission from Elsevier. 
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 Now, as Figure 2.1 correlates to the Real Checkerboard which causes a very similar 
phenomenological-type of experience, Figures 2.3A and B correlate to real-world Rubik’s 
Cubes, A and B, which cause very similar types of experiences.  In the case of the Real 
Checkerboard, given the relationships between its returns, reflectances, and illuminances and 
those of Figure 2.1, it was argued that checkers B’ and C’ are alike in reflectance, B’ has a lower 
illuminance than C’, and therefore B’ has a lower return-luminance than C’.  However, the color-
ish solid phenomenal property of the experience of B’ is similar to the color-ish solid 
phenomenal property of the experience of C’, to a certain degree.  The degree of this similarity is 
greater than the degree to which the return luminance of B’ is similar to the return luminance of 
C’.  Therefore, B’ exhibits imperfect Type-2 Color Constancy. 
  Similarly, the real Rubik’s Cubes, A and B, exhibit imperfect Type-2 Color Constancy.  
Suppose, correlative to patches Z in Figures 2.3, A and B, Rubik’s Cubes A and B have 
segments Z.  Cubes A and B are SSR-identical.  However Rubik’s Cube A is under a light that is 
similar to normal daylight, radiating roughly equal energy at each wavelength in the visible 
spectrum, and Rubik’s cube B is under a light that radiates more energy at the shorter 
wavelengths in the visible spectrum- call it “blue” light.  The extent of the difference between 
the return reflected from segment Z on Cube B and the return reflected from segment Z of Cube 
A matches the extent of the color-ish solid phenomenal difference between segment Z of Cube A 
and segment Z of Cube C (where Cube C is the real counterpart of Figure 2.4).  However, just as 
the extent of the color-ish solid phenomenal similarity between the experiences of segments Z of 
Cubes A and B is greater than the extent of the color-ish solid phenomenal similarity between the 
experiences of segments Z of Cubes A and C, the extent of the color-ish solid phenomenal 
similarity between experiences of segments Z of Cubes A and B is greater than the extent of the 
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similarity between the returns of segments Z of Cubes A and B.  Thus, segments Z of Cubes A 
and B exhibit imperfect Type-2 Color Constancy. This is a vivid example of a Type-2 Color 
Constancy. 
Now I will address two complications.  First, earlier it was assumed that the experiences 
of parallelograms B and C in Figure 2.1 are similar in color-ish solid phenomenal properties. 
(And since the phenomenology of Figure 2.1 is the same as that of the Real Checkerboard, it was 
assumed that the experiences of checkers B’ and C’ are similar in color-ish solid phenomenal 
properties.)  That is, not only are the experiences similar in color-ish phenomenal properties, 
they are similar in color-ish solid phenomenal properties.  So the initial assumption was that the 
color-ish phenomenal property of the experience of, for example B’, is identical to the color-ish 
solid phenomenal property, which I named Middle Gray-ish.  This may not be quite right.  But 
the color-ish phenomenal property which is had by the experience of B’ is very close to the 
color-ish solid phenomenal property Middle Gray-ish.   So, at least, we can consider the 
assumption that the total color-ish phenomenologies of the experiences of A’, B’, and C’ are 
color-ish solid phenomenologies as a close approximation.  Therefore, it can still be argued that 
the Real Checkerboard exhibits a type of color constancy which is different than Type-1, even if 
this type of color constancy does not precisely involve color-ish solid phenomenal properties.  
For surfaces exhibiting only Type-1 color constancy, there is not a color-ish solid phenomenal 
similarity which is to a degree that is greater than the degree of similarity between the returns of 
the surfaces.  Additionally, this applies to color-ish phenomenal similarities that are remotely 
close to the color-ish solid phenomenal similarity between experiences which are Middle Gray-
ish and Light Gray-ish.  
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The second complication: To distinguish Type-2 from Type-1 color constancy, the focus 
has been on comparing the extent of the phenomenal similarity to the extent of the return-
similarity.  As noted earlier, many similarities are closely connected to inversely related 
differences, and vice versa. This would apply to color-ish solid phenomenal similarities and 
differences.  However, if the experience of the Real Checkerboard involves a color-ish 
phenomenal similarity which is not a color-ish solid phenomenal similarity, I will remain 
noncommittal about the relationship between the color-ish phenomenal similarity and an inverse 
color-ish phenomenal difference.  That is, I distinguish Type-2 color constancy from Type-1 in 
virtue of Type-2 involving a degree of color-ish phenomenal similarity which is greater than the 
degree of the similarity of the returns, whereas for Type-1 the degree of color-ish phenomenal 
similarity is not greater than the similarity of the returns.  This is silent on the comparative 
degrees of phenomenal difference and return difference involved in Type-2.  For example, this 
allows that, for Type-2, the degree of the color-ish phenomenal difference is the same as the 
degree of the difference in the returns, as long as this difference is not inversely related to the 
color-ish phenomenal similarity referenced two sentences back40.  So, if one is inclined to think 
that the extent of the color-ish phenomenal difference between the experiences of B’ and C’ is to 
the same extent as the color-ish phenomenal difference between B in Figure 2.2 and C in Figure 
2.2 (and so is also to the same extent as the difference in the return-luminances of B’ and C’), 
there is still reason to distinguish Type-2 from Type-1.       
                                                 
40 This could be the case if the color-ish phenomenal property of the experience of B’ has two dimensions.  The 
property might have two dimensions in the way that being rectangular has two dimensions of length.  For the color-
ish phenomenal property one dimension might make for the color-ish phenomenal similarity between the 
experiences of B’ and C’ which I claim is characteristic of imperfect Type-2 Color Constancy.  The other dimension 
might make for a color-ish phenomenal difference between the experiences of B’ and C’ which is to the same extent 
as the color-ish phenomenal difference between B in Figure 2 and C in Figure 2.  
62 
 
In summary, I have argued that, as a matter of the relationship between color-ish 
phenomenal similarities and similarities between returns, there are at least two types of color 
constancy.  Now, we can return to the philosophical theories of color and experience which draw 
support from color constancy.  It will be argued that Gert, Cohen, and Matthen’s theories appear 
unable to accommodate Type-2 color constancy. 
2.2. Type-2 Color Constancy and Dual-Dimension Views  
Gert, Cohen and Matthen, taking first-level positions about phenomenal and looking 
relationships as dictated by the Mondrian cases, provide second-level views about 
representational differences and similarities in at least some color constancy cases.  As I will 
argue, the sort of phenomenal similarity present in Type-2 color constancy is not easily 
assimilated into their accounts.  
For Gert and Cohen, the problem is that their counterfactual/dispositional accounts of 
color in color constancy cases competes with Type-2 color constancy in how the veridicality of 
experience is secured.   
The problem relates to the response Gert gives to the unity problem that Kalderon poses 
for dispositional accounts of color.  As we saw with Gert and Cohen’s theories, color-like 
properties2 are associated with functions from viewing-conditions to color-like properties1.  Gert 
explicitly states that objective colors (color-like properties2) are dispositions which manifest 
apparent colors (color-like properties1).  However, Cohen does not describe his view as a form of 
dispositionalism even though his counterfactual account is very similar to a dispositional account 
given the close relationship between dispositions and certain counterfactual conditionals41.  
Therefore, I will address both Cohen and Gert under the umbrella of dispositionalism, focusing 
                                                 
41 This relationship can be seen in the extensive literature on dispositions and conditionals. 
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on Gert.  So the same dispositional color-like property2 is had by the Standard patch and the Test 
patch in the SACM experiments, post successful Paper Match.  But the Standard patch, under the 
Standard illuminant, manifests one color-like property1 while the Test patch, under the Test 
illuminant, manifests another color-like property1.  Both manifestations, in their appropriate 
stimulus conditions, are part of the dispositional color-like property2.  Kalderon’s challenge to 
the dispositionalist is to explain why some clusters of manifestations count as colors while others 
do not, for certainly “not every plurality of such [manifestations] constitutes a colour” (Kalderon 
2008: 950). 
There is a form of this objection which is especially relevant to the present issues in color 
constancy.  Without color constancy, when illumination, amongst other conditions, changes, our 
experiences would illusorily change.  And we do have color illusions, sometimes because of 
failures in color constancy.  Gert and Cohen’s accounts of color constancy need to be able to 
allow for such color illusions.  That is, the accounts need to rule out certain clusters of color-like 
property1 manifestations as genuine colors, otherwise illusions that result from a failure of color 
constancy would be impossible.   As Gert says, there is a burden to “explain how it is that these 
‘privileged’ clusters [of color-like property1 manifestations] can be distinguished from other 
‘gerrymandered’ clusters that do not count as colors” (Gert 2013: 95).  For an example of an 
instance of illusion: suppose one sees the patch in Figure 2.5 on a piece of paper. It is yellow, i.e. 
it has the yellow color-like property2.  Supposing you are in roughly “white” lighting conditions, 
it manifests an experience with the same color-ish solid phenomenal property your experience 
has as you view Figure 2.542.  Call the color-ish solid phenomenal property yellow-ish. And the 
experience represents the associated yellow color-like property1.  Call this scene 1.   
                                                 
42 By “white” lighting I mean lighting that has roughly equal intensity at each wavelength and is of a relatively high 
total intensity.   
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Figure 2.5: Yellow patch 
 
However, there are some conditions under which the patch could be experienced 
illusorily.  For example, suppose the patch were moved to a different illumination, X.  X 
interacts with the SSR of the patch in such a way that the return reflected off it has the same 
chromaticity as that of the return reflected off a gray object which is in the “white” lighting that 
the patch was originally in43.  There are conditions under which our experience of the patch in X 
has a gray color-ish solid phenomenal property and represents the patch as having a gray color-
like property1. (Such a gray-ish color-ish solid phenomenal property would be instantiated by 
one’s experience of a segment of Figure 1.9, Chapter 1)   Call this scene 2.  While the yellow 
color-like property2 has a manifestation that involves a yellow color-like property1 in the “white” 
lighting, amongst many other manifestations, if there is a manifestation of this disposition that 
involves the gray color-like property1 in illumination X, then the theory would predict that scene 
2 would be experienced veridically.  When the patch is represented as having the two color-like 
properties1, one in the “white” illumination and the other in illumination X, it would instantiate 
the yellow color-like property2 in both conditions.  However, scene 2 is illusory44. Thus, Gert and 
Cohen need a way to rule out, as a genuine color, a yellow color-like property2 that has a 
                                                 
43 The chromaticity of X would be one which, when combined by superposition with the reflectance of the patch, 
yields a return which has roughly equal energy at each wavelength and is of a moderate to low luminance.  X could 
be a “blue” illumination. 
44 If one thinks that an experience of scene 2, with the gray-ish phenomenal property and  representing  a gray color-
like property1, would be veridical, then a variant case can be substituted.  Certainly there is some case of the same 
general form that is illusory. 
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manifestation that involves a yellow color-like property1 in the “white” lighting and a 
manifestation that involves the gray color-like property1 in illumination X. 
 Gert does not explain what unifies certain clusters of manifestations as genuine colors/ 
color-like properties2.  However, he claims Kalderon’s problem of unity can be solved, though it 
is difficult and “cannot be solved a priori.  Moreover, it is unlikely that the solution can be 
expressed perspicuously in language” (Gert 2013: 195).  He is confident it can be solved 
because, as he claims, within childhood we come to know, for example, when a course of 
experiences representing various color-like properties1 under different viewing conditions 
involves a genuine color/ color-like property2 and when a course of experiences representing 
various color-like properties1 under different viewing conditions does not involve a genuine 
color/ color-like property2.  Gert likens this to “our ability to recognize words in our native 
language; an intense course of contingent experience with native speakers suffices to allow us 
spontaneously to pick out words-even new ones- from sounds that are not words…” (Gert 2013: 
195).  Some strings of sounds form a word in English. Some do not.  Early on we gain the ability 
to distinguish the two even though it is difficult to articulate what makes a string of sounds a 
word in English. 
Suppose Gert is right, and there is some solution to the unity problem which rules out, as 
a genuine color, a yellow color-like property2 that has a manifestation that involves a yellow 
color-like property1 in “white” lighting and a manifestation that involves the gray color-like 
property1 in  illumination X.  One thing we see in Gert and Cohen’s accounts of color constancy 
is that even when two surfaces exhibit color constancy, and so are both represented as having the 
same color-like property2, the surfaces are represented as differing in color-like property1 to an 
extent that is the same as the extent of the difference in the returns of the surfaces.  We saw this 
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in the Mondrian case.  This feature of the representation of color-like properties1 is shared with a 
subject’s experience which does not involve color constancy.  For a constancy-free subject, the 
representation of color-like properties1 varies with variations in the return.  For Gert and Cohen, 
the difference between color-constant and constancy-free subjects lies in the representation of 
color-like properties2.  It is in virtue of the representation of color-like properties2 that the 
illusions of a constancy-free subject are avoided. 
However, in Type-2 color constancy, the illusions of a constancy-free subject are avoided 
(or at least lessened, if the constancy is merely imperfect) in virtue of the color-like properties1, 
that is, those represented properties associated with color-ish solid phenomenal properties45.  In 
the color-constancy exhibited by the Real Checkerboard, the experience of checker B’ has (at 
least approximately) a Middle Gray color-ish solid phenomenal property, and there is a Light 
Gray color-ish solid phenomenal property of the experience of checker C’.  If one’s experience 
of checker B’ were constancy-free, then there would be a Dark Gray color-ish solid phenomenal 
property of that experience.  This phenomenal property would be as different from the color-ish 
solid phenomenal property of the experience of checker C’ as the return of B’ is different from 
the return of C’. These features of the phenomenal properties of the experiences translate over 
into the color-like properties1 represented by the experiences. Our imperfect Type-2 color 
constancy and the fact that our experience of the Real Checkerboard is less illusory than the 
constancy-free subject’s experience are, therefore, in virtue of the color-like properties1, not the 
color-like properties2.  This contrasts with the dispositional/counterfactual accounts of Type-1 
color constancy. 
                                                 
45 Or at least illusions are avoided because of the representation of properties associated with some color-ish 
phenomenal properties that are close to color-ish solid phenomenal properties. 
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Type-2 color constancy also cannot be easily assimilated into Matthen’s account of what 
is involved in color constancy cases.  Recall the features of Matthen’s view: Matthen assimilates 
color constancy cases to the Mondrian cases of Arend and Reeves’s experiments.  Thus, color 
constancy cases involve experiences with The Phenomenal Difference-Return Correspondence, 
The Similarity-Difference Distinction, and The “Looks Similar” Uncertainty. The color-ish solid 
phenomenal difference is associated with the representation of color-like properties1.  Experience 
also represents color-like properties2.  The later is associated with whatever is involved in pairs 
of counterpart patches looking alike.  Color-like properties1 are dimensions of the illumination.  
Color-like properties2 are dimensions of surface color. 
The problem for Matthen concerns his association, in the Mondrian cases, of represented 
color-like properties2 with something that is not even approximately color-ish solid phenomenal 
properties.  In the imperfect Type-2 color constancy exhibited by the Real Checkerboard, the 
experience of checker B’ has a Middle Gray color-ish solid phenomenal property that is similar, 
to some less than perfect extent, to the color-ish solid phenomenal property of the experience of 
checker C’46.  The extent of this similarity is greater than the extent of the color-ish solid 
phenomenal similarity between the experiences of counterpart patches in the Mondrians which 
exhibit Type-1 color constancy.  This is because, in Type-1 color constancy, color-ish solid 
phenomenal properties differ to the extent that the returns and illuminances differ. There is not 
the color-ish solid phenomenal similarity that is found in Type-2 color constancy.    
 In Type-2 color constancy, the color-ish solid phenomenal similarity between checkers 
B’ and C’ is associated with the represented surface color of B’ and C’.  This explains the degree 
to which the experience of the Real Checkerboard is veridical.  Thus, our experiences of B’ and 
                                                 
46 The simple hypothesis will be employed for brevity, where the color-ish phenomenal similarity is not merely 
approximately, but is identical to a color-ish solid phenomenal similarity. 
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C’ represents them as closer in surface color than a constancy-free subject’s experiences would 
represent them.  However, for the Type-1 color constancy of Mondrian cases, Matthen does not 
associate represented surface color (color-like properties2) with color-ish solid phenomenal 
properties in the Mondrian cases, his pink wall case, and whatever other Varying Illumination 
cases he intends to assimilate to Mondrian cases.  Represented surface colors (color-like 
properties2) were associated with whatever phenomenology (if there is such) which is related to, 
for example, counterpart Mondrian patches looking the same.   
To extend his view to Type-2 color constancy, in addition to associating the 
representation of surface colors with the phenomenology (or lack thereof) that he associates them 
with in the Mondrian cases, Matthen would need to associate the representation of surface colors 
with color-ish solid phenomenal properties in Type-2 color constancy.  This would seem to 
contravene one of Matthen’s tenets of his theory on experiential representation.  According to his 
representationalism, “color experiences denote color” (Matthen 2010b: 77).  However, that a 
type of experience denotes a type of color is contingent and a “matter of historical and genetic 
happenstance.”  But, Matthen stresses that “it is important to internal functioning that [a] type of 
experience consistently be used to mark [a] particular color” (Matthen 2010b: 77).  This requires 
that, at least for an individual’s perceptual system, a color should be marked by only one type of 
experience, not marked by one type of experience at one moment and another at the next.  But to 
subsume Type-2 color constancy under the view he develops from the Mondrian cases, Matthen 
would two phenomenal-types of experiences which each mark or represent surface colors.  Thus, 
assimilating Type-2 color constancy to Matthen’s account of the Mondrian cases seems to 
conflict his principle of representationalism, a very plausible principle generally.  
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Therefore, it does not look as if Gert, Cohen and Matthen can extend the theories of color 
and experience which they develop from the Type-1 color constancy of the Mondrian cases to 
Type-2 color constancy.  
2.3. Conclusion 
Let’s review how Type-2 color constancy is situated with respect to Varying Illumination 
cases.  Roughly, Varying Illumination cases are situations where reflectance/color-identical 
surfaces are differently illuminated and our experience of the scene is, by and large, not 
illusory47.   The first-level of disagreement about Varying Illumination cases concerns how 
things in such situations look and the phenomenology of the experiences of the things in such 
situations. At this level of debate, parties disagree on whether things only look different/there is 
only a phenomenological difference in the experiences of the things or whether things only look 
alike/there is only a phenomenological similarity in the experiences of the things or whether 
things look different and alike/there is a phenomenological difference and similarity in the 
experiences of the things. 
Within each side of the first-level debate, there are second-level debates.  Most relevant 
to this paper, there is the Dual-Dimension First-Level View.  Proponents of such a view agree 
that, in Varying Illumination cases, things look different and alike/there is a phenomenological 
difference and (maybe) a phenomenological similarity in the experiences of the things.  To take 
the Dual-Dimension First-Level Position leaves open sub-positions, which differ in the specifics 
of the dual-dimensions.  However, beyond these differences, Dual-Dimension Views disagree on 
the way in which things look different and the way in which things look alike.  And, for those 
                                                 
47 Matters are restricted in various ways: the illumination varies over space at a single time; the relevant parts of the 
object are reflectance/color-identical; simple and direct illuminants are employed.  However Varying Illumination 
cases can be extended to include diachronic illumination variation, illumination variation coupled with reflectance 
variation, inter-object reflections, non-diffuse illumination and more.  
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mentioned here, they disagree on the representational difference associated with the 
phenomenological difference and the representational similarity (possibly) associated with the 
phenomenological similarity.   
In at least partial support for their particular Dual-Dimension Position, Gert, Cohen and 
Matthen appeal to the empirical work of Arend and Reeves. This is an appeal to color constancy. 
By appealing to the Mondrian cases of the SACM experiments, they stake out a particular first-
level Dual-Dimension View, one according to which there is The Phenomenal Difference-Return 
Correspondence and The Similarity-Difference Distinction.  Making commitments with respect 
to the second-level debate, Gert and Cohen, on the one hand and Matthen on the other, claim 
Arend and Reeves’s work motivates their second-level views.  Though the experiments of Arend 
and Reeves employ a very narrow range of stimuli (two flat, patchwork surfaces seen 
simultaneously under differing illumination), Gert, Cohen and Matthen do not merely mean to 
propose content for the experiences of these stimuli.  They mean to use such scenes as paradigms 
of something more general, possibly Varying Illumination cases as a whole.  So they might think 
that there is a single, theoretically-significant kind which unifies Varying Illumination cases, and 
of which the Mondrian case is an exemplar.  And they might intend to give a theory of this kind.  
Or they might have more modest aims, allowing that their theories do not encompass all Varying 
Illumination cases.  
Because of Gert, Cohen and Matthen’s heavy appeal to Arend and Reeves’s work, 
Chapter 1 closely analyzed the relevant experiments to get a clearer picture of the prospects of 
the Dual-Dimension Views.  Three central points emerged: The Phenomenal Difference-Return 
Correspondence, The Similarity-Difference Distinction, and The “Looks Similar” Uncertainty. 
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The results of this investigation of the experiments bear on the first-level debate.  My 
discussion proceeds without settling in what (illumination, surface color, etc.) things look similar 
and different and what representational similarities and differences are associated with the 
phenomenal similarities and differences. 
With some clarity on the looks and phenomenology of the Type-1 color constancy of 
Mondrian cases, I argued for a second type of color constancy. In Type-1 color constancy there 
is no color-ish solid phenomenal similarity that is to an extent that is greater than the extent of 
the similarity between the returns.   In Type-2 color constancy there is a color-ish solid 
phenomenal similarity between the experiences of the relevant regions which is of an extent that 
is greater than the extent of the similarity between the region’s returns.  Or, more cautiously, the 
above color-ish phenomenal similarity may not be a color-ish solid similarity, but it is close.  In 
Type-1 color constancy however, there is not a color-ish phenomenal similarity which even 
remotely approximates a color-ish solid phenomenal similarity and which is of an extent that is 
greater than the extent of the similarity of the returns.   
Therefore, again largely within the first-level debate, Type-2 color constancy is 
distinguished as a kind of Varying Illumination case which differs from the kind of Type-1 color 
constancy.  Whether Type-2 color constancy falls under a Dual-Dimension View or not depends 
on whether the color-ish phenomenal property of the experience of, say, checker B’ is a color-ish 
solid phenomenal property or whether it is something somewhat different.  That issue must be 
left for subsequent work. 
It was then argued that Gert, Cohen and Matthen’s second-level positions within the 
Dual-Dimension View, which propose representational properties for the experiences involving 
Type-1 color constancy cases, do not seem to be able to extend to Type-2 color constancy.  The 
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role of color-like properties2 in Type-1 color constancy is not the same as their role in Type-2 
color constancy. 
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CHAPTER 3: AGAINST RELATIVISM ABOUT VARYING 
ILLUMINATION CASES 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapters 1 and 2 introduced Varying Illumination Cases, a kind of case in which an 
object is, or various objects are, differently illuminated either at a time or over a period of time, 
and the experience(s) of the scene is, presumably, not overwhelmingly illusory.  In Chapters 1 
and 2, we looked at various views which were united in holding that the experiences in Varying 
Illumination cases are not overwhelmingly illusory because of some similarity in the 
experiences.  This similarity took different forms: a similarity in how relevant objects look, a 
similarity in the phenomenology of the relevant experiences, and/or a similarity in content of the 
relevant experiences.  In this chapter, we look at another approach to Varying Illumination 
Cases- Relativism.  Relativism does not explain the veridicality in Varying Illumination Cases in 
terms of  some vision-related similarity.  Instead, it utilizes only the differences in the 
experiences to recover veridicality.    
The two forms of Relativism that will be discussed are that of Jonathan Cohen and 
Sydney Shoemaker.  Roughly, the Relativist approach to Varying Illumination Cases involves 
observing that the differently illuminated regions of an object look different.  It is then claimed 
that the experience is not illusory.  Since the regions of the object are alike in intrinsic properties, 
the regions cannot look different in color and be as they look (if color is, as it seems pre-
theoretically, an intrinsic property).  So the Relativist proposes that the regions look different 
with respect to some property which is not an intrinsic property of objects.  And these proposed 
properties are instantiated, so illusion is avoided.   
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I will argue that, in light of the material in Chapters 1 and 2, Cohen and Shoemaker’s 
arguments for Relativism about Varying Illumination Cases fail.  The next two sections present 
Cohen’s argument for his version of Relativism and Shoemaker’s argument for his version of 
Relativism.  Section 3.4 challenges those arguments.  First I argue that the argument for 
Relativism does not generally apply to Varying Illumination Cases.  Then I argue against there 
being any Varying Illumination Cases for which Relativism is motivated. 
3.2. Cohen’s Argument for Relational Relativism 
Cohen’s argument against non-relativistic views of color and for his Relational 
Relativism about color takes a general form which he applies to various cases including spectrum 
inversion cases, Varying Illumination Cases, and more.  Only the Varying Illumination Cases 
matter for my purposes.   
 Before his argument is presented, it should be noted that Cohen also had a Dual-
Dimension view of Varying Illumination Cases, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.  This view was 
presented in Color Constancy as Counterfactual.  However, in The Red and the Real, it is not 
clear that Cohen still endorses this view.   In the earlier paper, veridicality in Varying 
Illumination cases is secured in virtue of a common property represented of the surfaces under 
varying illumination.  However, in the book discussed here, when he describes cases in which 
reflectance-identical surfaces are under variable illumination and so look different, he describes 
color constancy as a matter of judgment, claiming only that subjects judge the surfaces to be the 
same (Cohen 2009: 53-54).  And, as we will see, veridicality is not recovered by a common 
represented property.  Cohen’s earlier and later views will be discussed more at the end of this 
section, where it will become clearer why I will treat them as two separate views.  For now we 
turn to the details of his argument. 
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To provide the first premise of his argument, Cohen starts with an example of a Varying 
Illumination Case.  Referring to a cup and table partly in sunlight and partly in shadow (See 
Figure 3.1), Cohen states, “Clearly the regions of the coffee cup (and the table) that are in direct 
sunlight are perceptually distinguishable for the subject from the (qualitatively identical) 
contiguous regions of the coffee cup (and the table) that are in shadow…” (Cohen 2009: 53).  A 
few points of clarification: Cohen often writes of things being “perceptually distinguishable”, 
there being “variation in perceptual effects,” or there being “perceptual variation.”  However, 
Cohen uses these somewhat idiosyncratic expressions interchangeably with more ordinary 
expressions like “looks different” or “variation in the way that the stimulus looks.”  I assume 
Cohen means to use his idiosyncratic expressions in a way that is pre-theoretical like ordinary 
uses of “looks,” particularly since Cohen’s expressions are found early on, when the pre-
theoretic groundwork is being laid out, and he does not offer any elucidation as to what he means 
by those expressions. 
Figure 3.1: Cohen’s Cup 
 
From Cohen 200948 
                                                 
48 Reprinted from Cohen, Jonathan (2008). Colour constancy as counterfactual. Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92. with permission from Taylor & Francis. 
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But is this idea that the regions of the cup are perceptually distinguishable/look different 
sufficient to frame the issue?  Unfortunately, as noted earlier, statements of the form “X looks 
different than Y” or “X looks P,” for some property P, are far too liberal. True instances of those 
sentences can have nothing to do with vision.  Whatever is at issue, it must be constrained to 
visual matters.   Fortunately, Cohen makes the traditional appeal to distinctions in “looks” that 
have been employed by many in the philosophy of perception literature, including Roderick 
Chisholm, Frank Jackson, and Michael Martin (Chisholm 1957; Jackson 1977; Martin 2010).   
For example, throughout his book, Cohen repeatedly highlights that he means the “phenomenal 
reading of ‘looks’ locutions” (Cohen 2009: 161, 165, 170, 178). 
However, whether there is such a division in “looks” is unclear.  A few philosophers have 
argued that, if the division is one of ambiguity, then there is good reason to think that “looks” is 
not ambiguous, given that it fails standard tests for ambiguity.  As Michael Thau, Alex Byrne 
and Wylie Breckenridge have argued, “looks” fails the identity test for ambiguity (Thau 2002: 
230, Byrne 2016: 7, Breckenridge 2007: 40).  Additionally, as Wylie Breckenridge extensively 
argues, “looks” fails a number of other standard tests for ambiguity (Breckenridge 2007: 37-43).   
This is strong prima facie evidence that looks is not ambiguous.  However, this does not rule out 
other divisions in “looks” that might be proposed.  I will not attempt to adjudicate this issue and 
will not take this approach.  Instead, I will continue to employ the notions of the phenomenal 
character and the phenomenal properties of experience.  This is in part because standard accounts 
of Representationalism are in terms of phenomenal characters or properties, not looks, and the 
views discussed here are versions of Representationalism. 
So, we can return to Cohen’s first premise: “There are multiple, psychologically 
distinguishable, perceptual effects… of a single color stimulus” (Cohen 2009: 24). This can be 
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recast in phenomenal terms.  If we fix on Cohen’s Cup Case, we can distinguish the left side, in 
shadow, from the right side, out of shadow.  Suppose we have an experience of each side of the 
cup.  Then the experience of the left side and the experience of the right side have different 
color-ish phenomenal properties. So we have Premise1: 
Premise 1: Between experiences of different regions, the experiences have different color-ish 
phenomenal properties. 
Cohen’s second premise endorses some version of Representationalism; however, he is 
not clear about what he takes Representationalism to amount to.  However, he does state, in the 
context of considering what follows from a “variation in the way that the stimulus looks49,” that 
“[o]n a more or less standard view of the visual system as visually representing the world, this 
entails that… there is a set of variant representations … of the stimulus” (Cohen 2009: 22).  
Cohen does not commit to this being what it is for experience to represent; he merely states that 
this is a more or less standard view.  However, to have something to work with, I will assume 
that he at least endorses Weak Representationalism, framed as a thesis about phenomenal 
properties. 
Premise 2:  Necessarily, if experiences are phenomenally different, then they differ in 
representational content. 
   In this paper, I will assume that a phenomenal difference-relation is grounded in two 
different representational properties.  Given Premises 1 and 2, the experiences in the Cup Case 
have a representational difference50: 
Premise 3:  The experiences differ in representational content. 
 Next, Cohen argues for Premise 4: 
                                                 
49 Cohen claims to utilize a phenomenal use of “looks” throughout his book.   
50 It will also be assumed that the only relevant aspects of the representational content of experience are represented 
properties.  The subject component, if there is such, and other components of content are ignored by Cohen.   
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 Premise 4:  Whatever differing properties are represented by the experiences, they are 
represented veridically. 
  To argue for Premise 4, Cohen claims that, “There is no independent and well-motivated 
reason for thinking that just one of the [representational] variants catalogued at [Premise 3] is 
veridical (at the expense of the others)” (Cohen 2009: 24).  That is, seeing as the left side of the 
cup is represented as having one property and the right side another, there is insufficient reason 
for thinking only one represented property is represented veridically. Also, Cohen denies 
misrepresentation of both properties, arguing that positive reasons for it are under-motivated, and 
it should only be accepted as a last resort (Cohen 64-74).  Thus Cohen concludes that the 
experiences both veridically represent51.  We will return to this premise in Section 3.4.2.    
 After considering what two properties could be represented such that each is instantiated 
by the relevant regions of the cup, Cohen will conclude that the experience represents relativized 
color properties.  The sides of the cup have the same surface spectral reflectances and the same 
categorical grounds for such dispositions52.  Generally, it is hard to see how there could be two 
different phenomenally-subvenient represented properties of the cup which are intrinsic or non-
relational and are both instantiated.  
 However, one might think that there is an alternative representational difference: a 
difference in the represented illumination.  There is actually a difference in illumination, so an 
experience that represented this would be veridical.  But Cohen does not take this route.  
However, it is unclear why, exactly.   
Cohen clearly thinks that the representational difference is a difference in represented 
color.  When he describes the instances of which his general argument is meant to cover-
                                                 
51 Michael Tye (2012) and Adam Pautz (2010) deny that the conclusion follows. 
52 I by-pass the possibility that the sides of the cup have metamers. 
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spectrum inversion cases, interspecies variation, intrapersonal variation due to varying viewing 
conditions, etc.- he often states things like “there is a variation in the way that the stimulus looks 
(in respect of color) to a single subject” (Cohen 2009: 21; emphasis added).  And he seamlessly 
transitions between there being a mere perceptual variation to there being a perceptual variation 
in color: “Clearly the regions of the coffee cup (and the table) that are in direct sunlight are 
perceptually distinguishable for the subject from the (qualitatively identical) contiguous regions 
of the coffee cup (and the table) that are in shadow, which is just to say that there is perceptual 
variation in respect of color for the qualitatively identical regions of the coffee cup” (Cohen 53).  
For Cohen, the phenomenal difference supervenes on a representational color difference, and the 
issues turn on whether colors are relativized properties or not.  Thus, for Cohen, the 
representational difference isn’t a difference in represented illumination.  However, this begs the 
question why it is assumed that the representational difference is a matter of color.  However, I 
will not press this issue. 
If there are not intrinsic, non-relational properties differing across the cup, and the 
difference in how the cup is illuminated is not represented, then Cohen’s opponents seem out of 
options.  Thus, Cohen claims he can provide a solution and abductively concludes: 
Premise 5: The experiences represent different relativized properties.   
At this point in the argument, nothing favors one form of Relativism over another, so I 
will first describe the general Relativist response53. The essential Relativist approach can be 
found in its application to traditional spectrum inversion scenarios.  In such a scenario, two 
subjects, A and B, are spectrally inverted with respect to each other.  If both are looking at a 
                                                 
53 I follow Cohen in categorizing Relationism and Selectionism as types of Relativism.  In the philosophy literature, 
the names for these positions are not used uniformly, however.  For example Byrne and Hilbert (2017) call 
“relationism” what Cohen calls “relativism,” and so, for them, Relationism isn’t a form of Relativism.  Since this 
paper does not address any of the,  in Byrne and Hilbert’s terminology, Relativist views, I follow Cohen.  
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lime, A has an experience with a green-ish phenomenal property that we would have looking at 
that lime, whereas B’s experience has the red-ish phenomenal property we would have when we 
look at a ripe tomato.  Thus, like our Varying Illumination case, there is a phenomenal difference 
between A and B’s experiences.  Again like our case, there is a premise that both experiences are 
veridical.  Additionally, if Weak Representationalism is assumed, both experiences must 
veridically represent a different property of the lime.  The relativist proposes that A and B’s 
experiences represent relativized properties of the lime. If the relevant properties that the lime 
instantiates and that experience represents are, as Cohen claims, colors, then “there are no … 
colors simpliciter, but only colors for certain kinds of perceivers in certain circumstances” 
(Cohen 75).  In the spectrum inversion scenarios, the properties are usually relativized to either 
individuals or perceiver-types.  So, Cohen would say that A’s experience represents the lime as 
green for A (or as green-for-A).  And B’s experience represents the lime as red for B.  These are 
two properties that the lime can simultaneously have, securing veridicality for the experiences of 
A and B. 
As Cohen thoroughly covers in The Red and the Real, there are numerous types of cases 
where there is a phenomenal difference within an experience, or between multiple experiences, 
where it’s argued that the experience is, or the experiences are, veridical.   Therefore, a 
difference in representational properties that are instantiated is required.  These cases include 
spectrum inversion scenarios, interpersonal cases involving eyes with different retinal receptors, 
intrapersonal cases involving variation in viewing context, amongst others.  Depending on which 
cases the Relativist strategy is applied to, the relativized property is relativized to many different 
parameters, including individual perceivers, perceiver-types, viewing conditions, adaptive states 
of a perceptual system, and more.   
81 
 
 For the Varying Illumination cases, the only Relativism under consideration relativizes 
properties to viewing conditions, in particular illumination.  All the cases involve a single 
perceiver, so relativizing to individual perceivers or perceiver-types would not advance the 
Relativist.  Therefore, throughout the paper, I will only refer to properties relativized to 
illumination conditions.  This allows that the properties represented in experience are relativized  
to the many different parameters described above, assuming that the motivating cases are 
persuasive, or that the only way in which represented properties are relativized is to illumination 
conditions.  If the former is the case, then omission of parameters other than illumination 
conditions should be understood as an abbreviation. 
Cohen’s Relational Relativism construes the relativized properties that we, supposedly, 
represent as relational properties.  So, where a bare Relativist might respond to cases of spectrum 
inversion without misrepresentation by saying that subject A represents the lime as being green 
for A, the Relational Relativist responds to the cases by saying that A represents the lime as 
having some property which is constituted by a relation to A.   Why Cohen opts for Relationism 
over other forms of Relativism does not matter for the purposes of this paper.  So his argument 
concludes: 
Conclusion: The experiences represent different relational colors. 
For Cohen, who identifies these relational properties “with a particular (non-teleological) 
functional role,” he spells out the property of being green for A as “the property of having some 
or other structural configuration type that realizes the functional role of disposing its bearers to 
look [green] to [A]” (Cohen 179).  Looking green to A is spelled out in terms of appropriately 
causing an experience of green (182).  And the notion of an experience of green is meant “to 
pick out a type of mental state of subjects” (184).  This type of mental state is a 
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phenomenological type, given that Cohen “intend[s] a phenomenal reading of ‘looks’ locutions” 
(178).  So when all spelled out, the relevant relational properties represented in experience are of 
the form: the property of having some or other structural configuration type that realizes the 
functional role of disposing its bearers to appropriately cause a certain phenomenal type of 
experience to subject S in conditions C.  
 To abbreviate this a bit, Cohen states that the relational property is the functional role of 
disposing its bearers to cause a certain phenomenal type of experience to subject S in conditions 
C.  Given my concerns, I will drop the subject parameter. And I will specify phenomenal types 
with the –ish suffix.  So, in the Cup Case, the Relational Relativist will say that the relevant 
differing representational properties are 1) the functional role of disposing its bearer to cause an 
experience with color-ish phenomenal property X under illumination with high intensity and 2) 
the functional role of disposing its bearer to cause an experience with color-ish phenomenal 
property Y under illumination with low intensity. The right side of the cup instantiates the first 
property, and the left side of the cup instantiates the second.   Thus, the experiences are veridical. 
 Briefly, let’s return to what seem to be Cohen’s two distinct views about Varying 
Illumination Cases, the one presented in Color Constancy as Counterfactual and the other 
presented in The Red and the Real.  In The Red and the Real, when he describes cases in which 
reflectance-identical surfaces are under variable illumination and so look different, he states that 
“the subject will normally judge…that these perceptually distinguishable regions are of the same 
color”, that “she will ordinarily judge that the two adjacent regions have one color rather than 
two”, and describes experimental color constancy data as “data about subject judgments in cases 
of color constancy” (Cohen 2009; 53, 53, 54).  Unless the omission of describing color constancy 
cases in terms of sameness in looks or other clearly visual notions is unintentional, it seems that 
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in his later view, Cohen thinks the only similarity in color constancy is at the level of judgment.  
This is unlike Color Constancy as Counterfactual, where Cohen’s aim was to find a common 
experiential content between experiences of regions which look the same in color but are under 
different illumination.  But in his later theory, he does not suggest any such common experiential 
content.  Thus, it seems that Cohen’s earlier view and later view are distinct.  The earlier view 
secures veridicality in Varying Illumination Cases via the experience of color-alike surfaces 
representing the surfaces as sharing a common property.  The latter view secures veridicality in 
Varying Illumination Cases via the experience of such surfaces representing the surfaces as 
having different relational properties.      
 This is Cohen’s argument for Relational Relativism about the properties represented in 
his Cup Case, and Varying Illumination Cases, in general.  Next we turn to Shoemaker’s 
argument for a Selectionist version of Relativism. 
3.3. Shoemaker’s Argument for Selectionism  
Shoemaker also appeals to a Varying Illumination case to argue for a form of Relativism 
about the properties represented in experience.  His argument is similar to Cohen’s in outline but 
differs in details.  In what follows, I present Shoemaker’s argument. 
The first thing to understand about his argument is phenomenal character.  We get to 
phenomenal characters through, what Shoemaker calls, phenomenal ways of appearing.  
Shoemaker focuses on a particular Varying Illumination Case, call it The Table Case.  
Shoemaker states, “If the surface of a table is partly in shadow, one may say that the way the 
shadowed part of it looks is different from the way the unshadowed part of it looks, without 
implying that the two parts look to have different colors” (Shoemaker 2006: 461).  He continues, 
“where looking… different ways is not a matter of looking to have…different colors…let us 
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speak of the ways as “phenomenal” ways things look.  It is the phenomenal ways things look, 
and more generally phenomenal ways things appear that I shall be concerned with here, and 
usually I shall omit the qualifier ‘phenomenal’” (Shoemaker 2006: 462).  So, the phenomenal 
way the shadowed part of a surface looks is different from the phenomenal way the unshadowed 
part of a surface looks.  There might be other ways things look, but not all of them are 
phenomenal ways of looking. 
 Connecting phenomenal ways of looking with the phenomenal character of experience, 
Shoemaker states, “phenomenal characters are associated with ‘ways of appearing’” (Shoemaker 
2003: 276) and “the [phenomenal] way a veridically perceived color looks, and so the 
phenomenal character of the experience of it, depends on lighting conditions and a variety of 
other conditions” (Shoemaker 2006: 473).  Though the connection between phenomenal ways 
and phenomenal characters is not clearly stated, it’s plausible that phenomenal ways compose the 
total phenomenal character of experience.  As Shoemaker uses “phenomenal character” in the 
customary way, the phenomenal character of an experience is complex.  Two experiences may 
differ in their phenomenal character and at the same time be similar in their phenomenal 
character.  A plausible way to accommodate this is to say that there are phenomenal properties 
and the total phenomenal properties of an experience make up the experience’s phenomenal 
character.  Thus, if two experiences differ in their phenomenal character, there is some 
phenomenal property one has which the other does not.  And if they are similar in their 
phenomenal character, they share a phenomenal property.  Since Shoemaker endorses a 
Ways=Properties Principle (Shoemaker 2006: 464), it’s plausible that phenomenal ways of 
appearing are phenomenal properties of experience.    
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 Are phenomenal ways the only components of phenomenal characters, or are there 
aspects of phenomenal characters which are not phenomenal ways?  It seems that Shoemaker 
thinks that phenomenal ways exhaust phenomenal character.   For, according to Shoemaker, 
there are non-phenomenal ways things look.  He does not deny that things look red, green, etc.  
However, according to Shoemaker, looking red, for example, is not a phenomenal way of 
looking54.  And he states, “our introspective access is not in the first instance to colors [things 
look to have] but is rather to the nameless properties [i.e. phenomenal ways things look to be] 
correlated in our experience with those colors” (Shoemaker 2006: 464)55.  And, discussing the 
relationship between phenomenal characters and representational content, he states that “it is to 
this [phenomenal characters] that we have introspective access” (Shoemaker 2006: 465).   So it 
looks as if other ways of looking, besides phenomenal ways, are excluded from the phenomenal 
character of experience.      
 With the notions of phenomenal character and phenomenal properties in hand, we can 
return to Shoemaker’s description of The Table Case: “If the surface of a table is partly in 
shadow, one may say that the way the shadowed part of it looks is different from the way the 
unshadowed part of it looks, without implying that the two parts look to have different colors” 
(Shoemaker 2006: 461).  Thus, the experiences of the differently illuminated region of the table 
differ in phenomenal properties56: 
                                                 
54 For Shoemaker, there are phenomenal ways objects look, and there are phenomenal ways colors look.  An object 
may look some way, phenomenally.  And an object may look some way, color-wise.  But it not the case that the 
phenomenal way an object looks is colored. 
55 Shoemaker endorses, what he calls, the “Ways=Properties Principle” (Shoemaker 2006: 464).  This principle 
states that “ways things look are properties they look to have” (Shoemaker 462).  Since colors are ways things look, 
they are properties things look to have.  But phenomenal ways are also properties things look to have, but these are 
“properties other than colors- and properties for which we have no names” (Shoemaker 462).  Some including 
Levinson (1978), and  Johnston (M.S.), have disagreed with this Ways=Properties Principle.  
56 I will assume that Shoemaker is concerned with a color-ish phenomenal difference, opposed to some other, say 
space-ish , phenomenal difference. 
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Premise 1: Between experiences of different regions, the experiences have different color-ish 
phenomenal properties. 
 As a representationalist, Shoemaker claims that “the phenomenal character of perceptual 
experience consists in its representational content” (Shoemaker 2006: 464).  Let’s call such a 
Representationalism Consisting Representationalism.  From his discussions, it’s clear that 
Shoemaker thinks Consisting Representationalism entails a 2-way supervenience between 
phenomenal properties and representational properties.  For example, in considering the 
consequences of the content of experience being Fregean and involving modes of presentation 
versus being Millian and only involving properties, and assuming phenomenal ways of appearing 
are phenomenal properties, Shoemaker writes, “Sameness or difference of ways of appearing 
would amount to sameness or difference of modes of presentation, not sameness or difference of 
properties represented” (Shoemaker 466).  Thus we have Premise 2: 
Premise 2: The phenomenal character of perceptual experience consists in its representational 
content.   
 It follows that: 
Premise 3:  The experiences have a representational difference. 
However, unlike Cohen, Shoemaker claims the representational difference is not a color 
difference.  But Shoemaker claims that Varying Illumination cases in general, and The Table 
Case in a particular, do not involve illusions when he writes, “where the ways things of a certain 
color look are different in different circumstances…it may in some cases be right to say that in 
some of the circumstances an object looks to have a color it doesn’t have; and this would allow 
the way it looks to be a color it is represented (correctly or incorrectly) as having.  But this will 
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not normally be true in the case of shadowed and unshadowed objects” (Shoemaker 2006: 462).  
So we have Premise 4: 
Premise 4:  Whatever differing properties are represented by the experiences, they are 
represented veridically. 
  So we need the phenomenal difference to consist in differing represented properties 
which are instantiated in the scene. Claiming the phenomenal character of experience does not 
consist in the representation of colors, Shoemaker thinks that the properties he will propose are 
the most plausible.  Like Cohen, Shoemaker does not allow for the representational difference to 
be a difference in represented illumination, though he does not state why.  He recognizes that “it 
is differences in illumination that account for the difference in the ways things of the same color 
look” (Shoemaker 2006: 462).  But he presumably does not understand this “accounting” as a 
metaphysical relation like consisting, such that the difference in the ways the table looks consists 
in the difference in represented illumination.  Otherwise, his theory would be finished in the first 
few paragraphs, without appeal to Selectionism.  Instead the accounting is probably understood 
as causal.  And Shoemaker discusses similar cases in which, “one [surface] looks to be in 
shadow and the other doesn’t” (Shoemaker 2006: 462).  But in the context its clear Shoemaker 
does not understand this way of looking as a phenomenal way of looking, because he contrasts it 
with “the ‘phenomenal’ ways the two surfaces look” (Shoemaker 462).  Thus, a surface can look 
to be in shadow in a non-phenomenal way akin to the way a surface can look red.  It is only the 
phenomenal ways of looking that relate to phenomenal character.  So he does not accept the 
representation of illumination as what the relevant phenomenal character consists in.  Again, like 
with Cohen, I will not press this issue about illumination representation.  
Thus, without finding an alternative, Shoemaker concludes that: 
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Premise 5: The experiences represent different relativized properties.   
To satisfy Premise 5, Shoemaker, who was once a Relationist (Shoemaker 1994), turns to 
the present Selectionism in Shoemaker 2003, 2006, thus concluding: 
Conclusion: The experiences represent different Qualitative Characters. 
  According to (Shoemakerian) Selectionism, a single color has multiple qualitative 
characters.  Qualitative characters are relativized properties. So for Varying Illumination cases, 
the Selectionist multiplies properties of the external world so that there can be veridical 
representation.  For the example of The Table Case, the experience of the region of the table 
partly in shadow has one phenomenal property, X, while the experience of the unshadowed 
region of the table has another phenomenal property, Y.  Each part of the table has one color.  
However, each token color instantiates at least two qualitative characters, call them A and B.  
One’s experiences involving the phenomenal properties X and Y represent the color of the 
shadowed part of the table as having A and represent that same color, though of the unshadowed 
part of the table, as having B.  Since the color of the table has A, B, and many more qualitative 
characters, one’s experience is veridical.  This is a form of relativism because the visual system 
“selects” which properties it represents relative to the viewing conditions.  For the shadowed part 
of the table, it selects A to be represented because of the lighting conditions there.  For the 
unshadowed part of the table, it selects B because of the lighting conditions there.  There are 
important questions about what this selection amounts to, but for the purposes of this paper the 
details of selection can be left unspecified.   
In conclusion, Shoemaker and Cohen argue similarly for the representation of relativized 
properties in Varying Illumination Cases.  In the next section, I challenge their arguments, both 
in the particular case of Type-2 Color Constancy and more generally.  
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3.4. Against Relativism in Varying Illumination Cases 
3.4.1. COLOR CONSTANCY AND VARYING ILLUMINATION CASES 
To argue for their forms of relativism, Cohen and Shoemaker each discuss, at most, a few 
instances of Varying Illumination cases.  However, they clearly think that the illumination-
relativized properties they propose figure in experiences which are involved in far more Varying 
Illumination cases than The Table Case or Cohen’s Cup Case.  Therefore, there’s the question of 
to what extent experiences in Varying Illumination cases involve illumination-relativized 
properties.  In this section, first I will argue that, if the claims in Chapter 1 and 2 are correct, then 
Type-2 Color Constancy cases are Varying Illumination cases for which Cohen and Shoemaker’s 
arguments do not support the representation of illumination-relativized properties.  Then I will 
argue that Cohen and Shoemaker’s arguments generally fail to support the idea that there are 
Varying Illumination Cases which involve the representation of illumination-relativized 
properties.   
First, let’s highlight the commonalities in their arguments.  Both Cohen and Shoemaker 
begin with a P1: Phenomenal-Difference Premise.  Then each’s version of Representationalism 
entails P2: Weak Representationalism Premise.  In Shoemaker’s case this is entailed by his claim 
that the phenomenal character of experience consists in its representational content. 
P1:Phenomenal-Difference Premise and P2: Weak Representationalism Premise entail that the 
relevant experience represents different properties of the relevant surfaces- P3: Representational 
Difference.  Next there is P4: No Illusion Premise, which claims that it is not the case that only 
one or neither of the represented properties are instantiated.  These four premises are the most 
relevant for what is to come.  But from there they argue that there are not differing, non-
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illumination-relativized representational properties which are instantiated by the relevant 
surfaces.  Thus, Cohen and Shoemaker conclude that the experience involved in the Varying 
Illumination cases represent illumination-relativized properties.  How Cohen argues for the 
representation of relational colors and how Shoemaker argues for Selectionism about Qualitative 
Characters is not relevant for present purposes. 
 In light of Chapters 1 and 2, we can consider whether all Varying Illumination cases- 
cases in which an object is, or various objects are, differently illuminated either at a time or over 
a period of time, and the experience of the object(s) is, presumably, not overwhelmingly illusory- 
involve experiences representing illumination-relativized properties.  I will argue that many do 
not. 
First, there are Varying Illumination cases that exhibit imperfect Type-2 Color 
Constancy.  The Rubik’s Cube Case introduced in Chapter 2 is an example.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the experiences one has of Figure 3.2 are phenomenologically similar to the 
experiences one would have if one were looking at the real-world Rubik’s cubes that the figures 
are of.   Since what is at issue is experiences of the scenes under differing viewing conditions, 
and any associated Type-2 Color Constancy, the experience you are actually having will be used 
as a proxy for the experience you would have if you were seeing the Rubik’s cubes.  Therefore, I 
will refer to the actual phenomenology of your experience, but instead of referring to the actual 
object seen, a picture, I will refer to the picture’s real-world counterpart.  So I will refer to the 
parts of the pictured Rubik’s cube and features of the pictured illumination instead of features of 
your actual environment like the picture, paper, and whatever lighting conditions you are in.  
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Figure 3.2: Lotto and Purves’s Rubik’s Cubes 
A            B 
 
From Lotto and Purves 200257 
 
Rubik’s cube A is under a light that is similar to normal daylight, radiating roughly equal 
energy at each wavelength in the visible spectrum, and Rubik’s cube B is under a light that 
radiates more energy at the shorter wavelengths in the visible spectrum- call it “blue” light.  
Thus, there is a difference in illumination as is necessary for Varying Illumination cases.  Now, 
consider one’s experience of Segment Z of Rubik’s cube A.  It has a yellow-ish phenomenal 
property.  Consider one’s experience of Segment Z of Rubik’s cube B.  It also has a phenomenal 
property that is some shade of yellow-ish, though not the exact shade that is had by the 
experience of the counterpart segment in Rubik’s cube A.  Thus there is a phenomenal difference 
between the experiences of the segments.  In fact, all experiences of pairs of counterpart 
                                                 
57 Reprinted from Lotto, Beau R & Purves, Dale (2002). The empirical basis of color perception. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 11(4), 609-629. with permission from Elsevier. 
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segments of Rubik’s cubes A and B are phenomenally different.  However, I will just focus on 
the two Segment Z’s.   
This is a Varying Illumination Case, but does the Relativist’s argument apply?  P1: 
Phenomenal-Difference Premise is satisfied.  P2: Weak Representationalism Premise holds 
generally for experiences; so P3: Representational Difference is entailed.  But what about P4: No 
Illusion Premise?  It is at P4 that the Relativist’s argument fails, and this partly turns on a re-
evaluation of P1.  Segment Z of Cube A and Segment Z of Cube B satisfy Cohen’s original 
statement of P1: “There are multiple, psychologically distinguishable, perceptual effects… of a 
single [type of] color stimulus” (Cohen 2009:24).  The Segments also satisfy Shoemaker’s 
original statement of P1, where there is a difference in the phenomenal ways the segments look. 
For reasons given in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, both of these initial claims should be cast as claiming 
a phenomenal difference between experiences of the counterpart Z Segments. 
However, as P1 is stated by Cohen and Shoemaker, it leaves open the extent of the 
difference and the extent of any relevant similarity.  However, the extent of relevant similiarities 
and differences is important.  First, consider if there were no color-ish phenomenal difference 
and a complete color-ish phenomenal sameness, for example if the comparison were between the 
Segment Z’s of the Rubik’s Cubes A and B in Figure 3.3.  
93 
 
Figure 3.3: Identical Rubik’s Cube scenes  
A       B 
 
From Lotto and Purves 200258 
 In this variant of the Rubik’s Cube Case, there is no phenomenal difference between 
experiences of the Segments.  This should be a case in which we represent the colors of the 
Segments as the same and, since the Segments are the same in color, the relevant aspects of our 
experiences of them are perfectly veridical.  And in such a case, there is no motivation, along the 
Relativist arguments discussed here, for invoking relativized properties in order to secure the 
veridicality of the experiences59.  Whatever precisely is represented in such a case, there is no 
reason to think it is not the sort of property that the opponent of the Relativist might appeal to, 
like intrinsic surface properties.   
 Though I think it is extremely hard to deny that the experiences of the Segment Z’s 
depicted in Figure 3.3 represent them as the same color and share a yellow-ish phenomenal 
                                                 
58 Reprinted from Lotto, Beau R & Purves, Dale (2002). The empirical basis of color perception. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 11(4), 609-629. with permission from Elsevier. 
59 If the properties represented are relativized, they will be relativized for reasons unrelated to the Relativist’s 
argument in Varying Illumination cases. So, the represented properties might still be relativized to, for example, 
perceiver-types, but this will be because of , for example, reasons related to spectrum inversion cases.  
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property, the Weak Representationalism of Cohen does not guarantee this, but it also does not 
rule this out.  However, Shoemaker commits himself to phenomenal sameness entailing 
representational sameness.  Generally, Relativist should not want to deny that, given this 
phenomenal sameness between experiences for a single viewer, at a single time, in the actual 
world, the experiences represent the same property of the Segments.   
 So now reconsider seeing Cubes A and B as depicted in Figure 3.2.  There is a 
phenomenal difference between the experiences of Segment Z of Cube A and Segment Z of 
Cube B.  However, there is considerable phenomenal similarity between the experiences of the 
Segments.  The most plausible thing to say is that the Segments are represented as being 
somewhat similar (and so somewhat different), whereas in the case depicted by Figure 3.3 the 
Segments are represented as being the same.  Since in the latter case, the experiences are 
perfectly veridical, in the former case, the most plausible thing to say is that the experiences are 
only imperfectly veridical.  And, like with the case in Figure 3.3, the imperfect veridicality of the 
experiences is not in virtue of the representation of any illumination-relativized properties.         
So while there is a phenomenal difference, satisfying Cohen and Shoemaker’s first 
premise, the extent of the difference/similarity plays a crucial role.  If the case depicted by Figure 
3.3 is perfectly veridical, partly because of the phenomenal sameness exhibited by the 
experiences involved, then the Rubik’s Cube Case is imperfectly veridical (and so partly 
illusory) because of the phenomenal similarity exhibited by the experiences involved.  As a 
result, P4: No Illusion Premise is false of the Rubik’s Cube Case and cases of imperfect Type-2 
Color Constancy, generally.    
Cohen and Shoemaker might object that, even in cases of Type-2 Color Constancy, 
which involve a color-ish phenomenal similarity, not an exact color-ish phenomenal sameness, 
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and so involve some degree of color-ish phenomenal difference, the experiences are still without 
illusion.  And to recover full veridicality, the representation of illumination-relativized properties 
is required.  However, at this point we should consider why they claim, in the Varying 
Illumination cases they present, that the experiences are without illusion.   
First let’s consider Shoemaker.  In discussing The Table Case, Shoemaker writes that 
“where the ways things of a certain color look are different in different circumstances…it may in 
some cases be right to say that in some of the circumstances an object looks to have a color it 
doesn’t have; and this would allow the way it looks to be a color it is represented (correctly or 
incorrectly) as having.  But this will not normally be true in the case of shadowed and 
unshadowed objects” (Shoemaker 2006: 462).  Since Varying Illumination Cases not only 
involve variation in illumination intensity, but also involve variation in the chromaticity of the 
illumination, Shoemaker’s veridicality claim should be extended to objects in variable 
illumination, generally.  Shoemaker, however, does not provide further reasons for his 
veridicality claim. Maybe it is based in intuition.  However, we have stronger, empirical reasons 
to think that color constancy cases like the Rubik’s Cube Case do not involve perfect 
veridicality, but instead only imperfect veridicality.   
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is an extensive area of vision science concerned with 
color constancy.  It recognizes that without certain processing by our visual systems, our 
experiences would be much more illusory than they actually are.  The Rubik’s Cube Case 
exemplifies this.  Recall from Chapter 2, Section 2.1 that without a color constancy mechanism, 
the experience of Segment Z of Cube B would have a gray-ish phenomenal property. An 
ordinarily-sighted person can have this gray-ish experience if she were to screen-off the 
surrounding segments with a monochrome obstruction.  At this point, our constancy mechanism 
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fails and we cease to exhibit the relevant color constancy.  As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 
2.2, this experience can be recreated if one views a figure with patch Z surrounded by a white 
region.   
It fits in the empirical framework on Type-2 Color Constancy that the experiences of the 
Segments Z in the Rubik’s Cube Case are partially veridical because of the phenomenal 
difference and similarity had by the experiences.  The experiences being entirely without illusion 
does not.  This provides stronger reasons for thinking that our experience of Cube B in the 
Rubik’s Cube Case is imperfectly veridical than either intuition or some unspecified reason 
provides for thinking that the case if fully veridical.  
Cohen, on the other hand, provides a reason for P4 which does not turn on intuition.  In 
applying the Relativist’s argument to Varying Illumination cases, Cohen discusses them in the 
larger context of cases of “intrapersonal perceptual variation,” which include situations where 
one has “put on or removed tinted sunglasses, adjusted the lighting in a room, or been surprised 
by changes in the appearance of garments once removed from the flattering viewing conditions 
of the store” (Cohen 2009: 33).  So suppose we take one such case, say a certain garment, and 
consider two experiences of two parts of the garment which differ phenomenally.  Suppose the 
phenomenal properties of each experience are different because of the different viewing 
conditions each part is under.  Given Weak Representationalism, the experiences of the relevant 
parts of the garment differ in the color properties they represent.   After considering a potential 
privileged viewing condition which might support only one of the represented colors being 
represented veridically, Cohen proposes problems for such an approach. 
   He considers the viewing conditions that are specified in scientific and industrial 
contexts for viewing Munsell color chip samples as the privileged viewing conditions.  The 
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specifications state that “the samples should be placed against a dark achromatic background and 
‘colors should be arranged under North Daylight or scientific daylight having a color 
temperature of from 6500 degrees to 7500 degrees Kelvin.  Colors should be illuminated at 90 
degrees and viewed at 45 degrees, or the exact opposite of these conditions’” (Hardin 1988, 68).  
If these are the right privileged viewing conditions, then when there are cases of surfaces under 
varying viewing conditions, and the experiences of the surfaces differ phenomenally, the 
surfaces in the above conditions will be represented veridically.   
Cohen argues that surfaces under such viewing conditions still might not be veridically 
perceived.  He claims the specifications leave out other aspects of the viewing conditions that 
surfaces might be in and which can cause phenomenally different experiences of those surfaces. 
Additionally, the specifications only concern surfaces, neglecting other colored entities.  So there 
will be intrapersonal perceptual variation in which the above specification provides no guidance 
as to which experience is veridical.   
What we should note about the cases of intrapersonal perceptual variation Cohen is 
referring to, and the proposed specification of viewing conditions, is their complexity.  The 
specification specifies a number of different aspects of the viewing conditions: the surround of 
the target surface, the color temperature and chromaticity of the light source, and the angle at 
which the light hits the surface.  And Cohen presses that any successful specification of viewing 
conditions for veridical perception should also include “the state of adaptation of the subject, 
other objects perceived by the observer prior to or after observation of the stimulus, … the 
relative proportions of the visual field occupied by the stimulus…[and] perceptual grouping 
[factors]” (Cohen 2009: 34).  All these factors, supposedly, can lead to variation in experiences 
where the question of privileged veridicality arises. 
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In most experiences, there probably are variations in all these factors and more.  And, 
subsequently, in most experiences, there probably are all sorts of phenomenal variations that are 
caused by such factors.  Most experiences are very complex, and are not just a part of a single 
Varying Illumination case.  But we should not try to deal with all these phenomenal differences 
caused by all these varying viewing conditions at once.  Unless there is reason to think they are 
inextricably linked, we should proceed in a piecemeal fashion.  Thus, at the moment, I 
investigate a case where two objects are as alike as possible except for the chromaticity of their 
illumination.  And then the phenomenal difference that results is considered.  Cases of 
phenomenal differences caused by intervening lenses, contrast effects, etc. should, if possible, be 
treated separately.  Thus, we should not start by asking whether multi-faceted veridically-
privileged viewing conditions can be specified from the most complex experiences.  We should 
start simpler.      
So, we return to the Rubik’s Cube Case and consider one phenomenal difference because 
of one variation in the viewing conditions.  In the Rubik’s Cube Case, and Type-2 Color 
Constancy cases generally, there is good reason to think one representation is fully veridical over 
the others.  Suppose in addition to Cube B which is under “blue” light, there are other Cubes, C, 
D, and E which are each under a different light.  So, we have experiences of Z Segments of 
Cubes A, B, C, D, and E.  According to Cohen, there is no non-stipulative reason for thinking 
that only one of the experiences represents fully veridically.  And concluding they all 
misrepresent fully should be avoided if at all possible.  But a well-motivated reason can be given 
for thinking that only one of the experiences represents fully veridically.  The first thing to note 
is that every illumination differs to some extent from every other illumination.  The exact 
specification of this, in terms of spectral power distributions, is not necessary for present 
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purposes.  But the lightings of Cubes B, C, D, and E all differ from the lighting of Cube A.  And 
the lightings of Cubes A, B, C, D, all differ from the lighting of Cube E, etc.  There is nothing 
special about the differences between the illuminations.   Next, consider Figure 3.4. 
Figure 3.4: Rubik’s Cube Variations 
A    B      
 
 
C 
 
 
100 
 
Figure 3.4, cont.: Rubik’s Cube Variations 
D       E 
 
Modified from Lotto and Purves 200260 
 
 
The experiences of each Z Segment of Cubes B, C, D, and E involves Type-2 Color 
Constancy.  The yellow-ish phenomenal property of each experience of each Segment Z is 
similar to the phenomenal property of the experience of Segment Z of Cube A to a certain extent.  
The extent of this phenomenal similarity is greater than the extent of the similarity in the returns 
(and illuminances).  This can be verified by consideration of the region to the right of each cube-
depiction.  The color-ish phenomenal property of one’s experience of each of those regions is the 
phenomenal property of the experiences one would have of each Z Segment of Cubes B, C, D, 
and E, if one lacked a Type-2 Color Constancy mechanism.  For each adjacent region, the extent 
of the color-ish phenomenal difference between one’s experience of  that region and Segment Z 
of Cube A matches the extent of the return (and illuminance) difference between that region’s 
associated Z Segment and Segment Z of Cube A.  For example, consider the adjacent region in 
                                                 
60 Modified from Lotto, Beau R & Purves, Dale (2002). The empirical basis of color perception. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 11(4), 609-629. with permission from Elsevier. 
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Figure 3.4C. The phenomenal difference between the experience of it and the experience of 
Segment Z of Cube A matches the return difference between Segment Z of Cube C and Segment 
Z of Cube A.    In contrast, for each pair composed of a Z Segment and Segment Z of Cube A, 
the phenomenal similarity between the experiences of the pair is closer than the similarity 
between the illuminances of the pair.  This shows that the phenomenal properties of the 
experiences of the Z Segments of B, C, D, and E “converge” on the yellow-ish phenomenal 
property of the Z Segment of Cube A. Instead of the phenomenal properties of the experience of 
the Z Segments being as they are in the experiences of adjacent regions (which provide what the 
constancy-free experiences would be like), the phenomenal properties are more yellow-ish.   
This converging on yellow-ish contrasts with the relationship between the illumination 
differences that obtain between pairs of cubes.  Consider the following pairs of illumination 
differences: the difference between Cubes A and B, the difference between Cubes A and C, the 
difference between Cubes A and D, the difference between Cubes A and E.  Those differences 
are no more unique than these differences: the difference between Cubes B and A, the difference 
between Cubes B and C, the difference between Cubes B and D, the difference between Cubes B 
and E.  The same applies for other pairs of illumination differences following this pattern.  
However, there is a unique relationship between pairs of differences between the color-ish 
phenomenal properties of the experiences of the Z Segments.   
And this is what one should expect from the mechanism of Type-2 Color Constancy.  
Roughly, the purpose of color constancy is to resist the effect that confounding factors like 
illumination can have on the representation of surface color, given the inverse projection 
problem.  The above variant of the Rubik’s Cube Case is best explained by a constancy 
mechanism working to reduce the degree to which illumination chromaticities that deviate from 
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the illumination chromaticity of Cube A cause the representation of the Z Segments  to deviate 
from the pure yellow of the Z of Cube A . This is a well-motivated, non-stipulative reason for 
concluding that the color representation of Segment Z of Cube A is fully veridical, opposed to 
the color representation of the other Z Segments.  The color representations of the others are not 
entirely veridical, but still somewhat, at least compared to experiences lacking Type-2 Color 
Constancy. 
So not all Varying Illumination Cases satisfy the Relativist’s argument, and so there is 
not sufficient reason to think that the experiences in those cases involve illumination-relativized 
properties.  Some Varying Illumination Cases involve Type-2 Color Constancy which undercuts 
the need for illumination-relativized properties in such cases.  We can also ask whether cases of 
Type-1 Color Constancy undercut the need for illumination-relativized properties.  Until more is 
understood about Type-1 Color Constancy, it is hard to say.  Recall that, in Type-1 Color 
Constancy, reflectance-identical surfaces are under different illumination.  The experiences of 
the two surfaces differ phenomenally.  The extent of this phenomenal difference is to the same 
extent as the extent of the difference between the returns reflected from the surfaces.  The returns 
differ to the extent that they do because of the extent of the difference in the illumination of the 
surfaces.  The claim is that the surfaces, despite having phenomenally different experiences, look 
the same in color.  However, as was discussed in Chapter 1, it is unclear what this sameness in 
looks amounts to.  For example, are the relevant experiences phenomenally the same?  Most 
relevantly for present purposes, it is unclear whether this sameness is associated with a 
representational sameness, whether this sameness is a phenomenal sameness or something else61.  
So it is unclear whether the Relativist’s argument applies. 
                                                 
61 If there is a sameness in looks but no phenomenal sameness, and there is a representational sameness, then there 
would need to be a significant modification in standard forms of Representationalism.  
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As noted earlier, in The Red and the Real Cohen discusses color constancy.  In discussing 
Paper Matches and Hue-Saturation Matches, he cites Arend and Reeves (1986) and Arend et al. 
(1991), the experiments discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.  Additionally he cites Troost and deWeert 
(1991), Cornelissen and Brenner (1995) and Bauml (1999).  Some of these latter experiments 
reproduced Arend and Reeves original results and also added variations to the original 
experiments.     However, Cohen seems to think that the color constancy of these experiments 
(Type-1, as I call it) only involves judgments that reflectance-identical surfaces under varying 
illumination are the same in color; he only claims that subjects have “the judgment that there is 
one color rather than two in cases of simultaneous and successive color constancy” (Cohen 2009: 
54).  He does not claim that the surfaces look the same in color, that there is perceptual 
sameness, or that there is a common experiential content represented of the surfaces.  Thus, his 
view of color constancy seems to be a construal of Type-1 Color Constancy in which there is 
only a judgment that there is a sameness in color.  So if Type-1 Color Constancy is as Cohen 
describes in his later view and it is a category of Varying Illumination cases, then it does not 
avoid the Relativist’s argument for the reasons Type-2 Color Constancy does.    
In summary, cases of Type-2 Color Constancy are instances of Varying Illumination 
Cases for which the Relativist argument does not apply.  Thus, there is insufficient reason for 
thinking the experiences involved represent illumination-relativized properties.  Type-1 Color 
Constancy might satisfy the Relativist’s argument, though.  Next, I will argue that, in general, 
there are insufficient reasons for thinking the Relativist argument applies to cases in which 
reflectance-identical surfaces are under varying illumination.  
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3.4.2. AGAINST THE RELATIVIST’S ARGUMENT IN VARYING ILLUMINATION CASES             
If the preceding is correct, not all Varying Illumination Cases satisfy the Relativist’s 
argument.  However, for Varying Illumination Cases which are not of Type-2 Color Constancy, 
the Relativist’s argument might apply.  This class might include Cohen’s later apparent view of 
color constancy. In general, we can ask whether there are any Varying Illumination cases which 
satisfy the Relativist’s argument and which therefore involve experiences that represent 
illumination-relativized properties.   
If the Relativist’s argument applies to a case, a more specified P1: Phenomenal 
Difference Premise would be required.  In such a case the color-ish phenomenal difference 
between experiences of the relevant surfaces would need to be to at least the same extent as the 
illuminance difference between the surfaces.  This is unlike cases of Type-2 Color Constancy, 
where the extent of the color-ish phenomenal difference between experiences of surfaces is less 
than the extent of the illuminance difference between the surfaces.  As we saw in an attempt to 
apply the Relativist’s argument to cases of Type-2 Color Constancy, there is no need for 
represented illumination-relativized properties to secure imperfect veridicality. 
As the argument would continue, given P2: Weak Representationalism, a more specified 
P3: Representational Difference follows, where the extent of the representational difference is 
the same as that of the phenomenal difference.  The issue, then, turns on P4: No Illusion Premise.  
Why think that in such a case, the experiences are without illusion?  Again, we will consider 
Shoemaker and Cohen separately.  However, the general challenge to P4 in such a case is that 
there are illusions which are similar to the sorts of cases they claim are not illusory.  There are 
visual illusions, and there are visual illusions caused by the lighting conditions of some scenes.  
It should be a considerable mark against any view that entails otherwise.  And many color 
illusions caused by illumination result from a failure in color constancy.  To review, in such 
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illusions reflectance-identical surface are under differing illumination.  The returns reflected 
from the surfaces differ to the same extent that the illumination differs, as a result of the physics 
of light.  The constancy-free visual system produces experiences based solely off of the returns, 
so the system produces experiences that differ in color-ish phenomenal properties.  And this 
difference is to the same extent as the difference in the returns and thus is to the same extent as 
the difference in the illumination.  So, in terms of phenomenology, the return difference, and the 
illumination difference, these color illusions are the same as the experiences that Shoemaker and 
Cohen argue are veridical.  Why would Shoemaker and Cohen’s experiences be veridical?   
Shoemaker’s reasons for P4 are not clear.  If the reason is intuition, it is not very strong in 
the face of the empirical matters.  However, maybe Shoemaker’s reason for P4 is not based in 
intuition.  In discussing The Table Case, Shoemaker writes that “where the ways things of a 
certain color look are different in different circumstances…it may in some cases be right to say 
that in some of the circumstances an object looks to have a color it doesn’t have; and this would 
allow the way it looks to be a color it is represented (correctly or incorrectly) as having.  But this 
will not normally be true in the case of shadowed and unshadowed objects” (Shoemaker 2006: 
462).  Maybe Shoemaker thinks that if such an ordinary, arbitrarily-chosen case like the Table 
Case involved an illusion, then situations where objects are under varying illumination would be 
illusory, generally.   But surely objects under varying illumination are not normally represented 
as having colors they do not have.  So an arbitrary case like the Table Case is veridical. 
However, again making an empirical appeal, once imperfect Type-2 Color Constancy is 
recognized, widespread color illusion because of variation in illumination is avoided.  In 
Shoemaker’s Table Case, we do not know enough about it to determine whether the color-ish 
phenomenal difference between experiences of the relevant surfaces is to at least the same extent 
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as the illuminance difference between the surfaces.  This might not be its character, and instead 
the relationship between the phenomenal difference and the illumination difference might be that 
of imperfect Type-2 Color Constancy.  But if it is not a case of Type-2 Color Constancy, its 
veridicality can be denied without there being widespread illusion: there are plenty of cases of 
Type-2 Color Constancy, if not other forms of color constancy62.   
On the other hand, Cohen also faces the challenge of explaining why some cases of an 
object being under varying illumination, where the experiences differ in phenomenal properties 
to an extent that is at least the same as the extent of the difference in the illumination, are illusory 
while some cases are not. The reason, again, turns on Cohen’s acceptance of P4.  So we turn to 
Cohen’s no-privileged-variant argument for P4: given the different properties represented of the 
differently illuminated surfaces, there is no non-stipulative reason why one illumination-
condition and one property representation is veridical.  And, as the argument continues, since 
misrepresentation of all the properties should be avoided if at all possible, we should conclude 
that none of the representations are illusory.  However, there is a well-motivated, non-stipulative 
reason for thinking that only one of the representations is veridical.  We can turn to a case of 
illusion, since surely there are some, to see why. 
I will start with a stick-in-water illusion.  If there is resistance to this case, another 
illusion will do, for the points I will make are quite general.  From most viewing angles, a stick 
partly in and partly out of water is represented as bent. See Figures 3.5A and B. This is because 
as the light reflects off of the stick, travels through the water and crosses the water-air interface, 
it bends as a result of the different refractive indexes of the air and the water.  Differences in the 
direction light travels before reaching the eye pose an inverse projection problem, one which our 
visual system has not evolved a constancy mechanism to accommodate, though maybe some 
                                                 
62 Future work argues for forms of color constancy besides Type-1 and Type-2. 
107 
 
creatures’ systems have63.  Therefore, for humans, as the relative position between us and the 
stick changes, the representation of the stick’s shape illusorily changes.  However, compare 
Figure 3.5C and Figure 3.6.  Figure 3.6, a picture of a stick out of water, provides the experience 
one would have if one were viewing the stick out of water.  If one were viewing the actual stick, 
of the various properties experience represents of the stick, one is straightness. Figure 3.5C, a 
picture of a stick in water, provides the experience one would have if one were viewing, at a 
particular angle, the stick in water.  Experience also represents this stick as straight.  And the 
stick in water is straight.  So, from most viewing angles, the stick is illusorily represented as bent 
or broken.  However, there is an angle at which the stick’s shape is represented as it actually is.   
This veridical sweet-spot exists at this viewing angle because, roughly, even though the water 
and air have different refractive indexes, from the right angle, the path of the light does not bend 
at the interface of the media but is the same as the path the light would take if it were reflected 
from a stick out of water.  In such a circumstance, the water does not “obstruct” the visual 
system’s determination of object shape given the incoming light. 
Figure 3.5: Stick in water 
A     B     C 
                  
                                                 
63 Some have argued that the Archer fish has such a constancy.  See for example Schuster et. al. (2004).   
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Figure 3.6: Stick out of water 
 
 
If Cohen were to run his no-privileged-variant argument on the stick-in-water illusion, it 
would fail.  Between the experiences of stick A, B, and C, there is a curvature-ish phenomenal 
difference.  The experience of A has one bent-ish phenomenal property.  The experience of B has 
another bent-ish phenomenal property.  And the experience of C has a straight-ish phenomenal 
property.  With Weak Representationalism, there are three different curvature properties 
represented of the sticks.  Is one privileged as the only one veridically represented?  Yes. It is the 
representation of straightness.  The reasons are empirical: it is at the viewing angle of scene C 
that the light reflected off of the stick travels through the water and the air in the same manner 
that it travels through the air alone, unbent.  And when the light travels through the air alone, the 
viewing conditions of the scene depicted by Figure 3.6, we experience the stick’s curvature 
veridically.  Since scene C delivers the same input to the visual system, the visual system outputs 
the same experience as the experience of the stick out of water.  The fact that scene C’s viewing 
conditions allow for the light to travel in the same way it does in the scene depicted by Figure 3.6 
does not necessitate that the representation of stick C as straight is veridical.  However, it does 
provide well-motivated, non –stipulative reasons for thinking the representation is veridical.  
109 
 
Veridical sweet-spots amongst sequences of illusions and veridical experiences are also 
present with respect to color representation.  Suppose a surface is red (and so has a particular 
surface spectral reflectance).    Suppose that two regions of the surface differ in the chromaticity 
of their illumination.  Region A is illuminated by a light that emits equal amounts of energy at all 
wavelengths, and region B is illuminated by a light that emits more light at a certain range of 
wavelengths- call it “blue” light.  Suppose a subject seeing the surface has an experience of one 
region and an experience of the other.  The experience of A has one phenomenal property, the 
experience of region B has another, and the phenomenal properties differ to the same extent that 
the illuminations differ.  Given Weak Representationalism, there are two different color 
properties represented of the surface.  Is one privileged as the only one veridically represented?  
Yes.  It is the color representation of the experience of region A.  The reasons are empirical: for 
an equal energy illuminance of the right (“normal”) intensity, the spectral power distribution of 
the return will be the same as that of the surface spectral reflectance.  The lighting conditions of 
region A are such that the illumination’s chromaticity does not “obstruct” the features of the 
reflectance.  This is analogous to the way the viewing conditions of stick C do not obstruct the 
path of the light reflected off the stick.  Therefore, there are well-motivated, non-stipulative 
reasons for thinking that the color representation of region A is the veridical representation.   
Thus, in cases where the represented color difference is to the same extent as the extent 
of the difference in the illuminance of the relevant surfaces, there is good reason to think one 
color representation is privileged as veridical.  Therefore, in such cases Cohen’s reasons for P4 
fails, and the argument for illumination-relativized properties is insufficient.  Since Shoemaker’s 
P4 also lacks support, his argument for Relativism in such cases is insufficient.   
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3.5. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, Relativism about Varying Illumination Cases was presented.  Such views 
attempt to recover veridicality in such cases by finding two different instantiated properties of 
the differently-illuminated surfaces which experiences represent64. The properties, they claim, 
are illumination-relativized properties.  I have argued that veridicality in Varying Illumination 
Cases involving Type-2 Color Constancy is secured via the represented color similarity of the 
differently-illuminated surfaces.  Thus there is no need for illumination-relativized properties in 
such cases.  Additionally, I have argued that, in cases more promising for the Relativist’s 
approach, Cohen and Shoemaker’s reasons for thinking that the relevant experiences are not 
illusory are insufficient. 
 
                                                 
64 Or the view attempts to recover veridicality in such cases by finding two different instantiated and represented 
properties of the common color of the differently-illuminated surfaces. 
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CHAPTER 4:  INFORMATIONAL TELEOSEMANTICS AND THE 
PROBLEM OF PROXIMAL STIMULATION 
4.1. Introduction 
 The preceding chapters of the dissertation were largely concerned with the what of color 
constancy- what is it (or what are they, if there are different types).  In particular, we looked at 
whether color constancy involves a similarity in how things look, a similarity in phenomenal 
properties of the relevant experiences or a similarity in how things are judged to be.  This chapter 
turns to the question of how color constancy is accomplished (whatever exactly color constancy 
is).  Thus, the discussion will center on color constancy mechanisms, characterized at an abstract, 
computational level.  The target around which the discussion of constancy mechanisms will take 
place will be recent advances in naturalistic theories of sensory representation. 
The chapter starts by explaining Karen Neander’s Causal-Informational Teleosemantic 
account of perceptual representation which grounds perceptual representation in the response 
functions of the visual system.  The persistent Distality Problem is introduced and the threat it 
poses for the theory’s ability to secure determinate representations is explained.  To solve this 
problem, Peter Schulte appeals to the perceptual constancies found in visual systems. 
I, however, argue that there is a common picture of perceptual constancies that Schulte 
bases his argument on which is mistaken, and a more accurate view undercuts Schulte’s strategy 
for solving the Distality Problem.  My argument starts in Section 4.3 with a type of illusion that 
lacks an adequate explanation.  In Section 4.4, by appealing to a well-established Bayesian 
approach to constancy, I propose an explanation of such illusions.  Finally in Section 4.5, it is 
argued that this feature of the workings of constancy-involving visual systems undermines 
Schulte’s solution to the Distality Problem.   
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4.2. Informational-Teleosemantics and the Distality Problem 
 This section introduces Karen Neander’s recent and extensive project to naturalize mental 
intentionality, the problem it faces, and Peter Schulte’s proposal on how to solve the problem 
while maintaining the core of Neander’s theory.   
4.2.1 INFORMATIONAL-TELEOSEMANTICS 
Karen Neander’s psychosemantic theory, as expounded in Toward an Informational 
Teleosemantics and her recent book A Mark of the Mental, aims to provide an account of 
perceptual representation.  Suppose that a perceptual representation’s producing system 
functions to respond to X.  The rough idea of the account is that the content of such a perceptual 
representation is X.  She characterizes her view as an informational-teleosemantics because it 
purportedly reconciles both informational and teleological approaches to mental content.  While 
teleosemantic theories were characterized to focus on the effects of representations in 
determining the representation’s content, informational theories were thought to focus on the 
causes or co-occurring conditions of representations in determining the representations content.  
Neander’s hybrid view incorporates input-oriented, informational views by involving responses 
and it incorporates output-oriented, teleological views by involving functions (Neander 2013: 
22).      
Neander’s theory of mental content begins with a simple version and expands, adding 
qualifications to accommodate prima facie challenges.  One such challenge- the Distality 
Problem, and its accommodation, will be the focus of this paper, but we will start with the simple 
version of her theory- causal-informational teleosemantics (CT): 
CT: A sensory-perceptual representation, R, which is an (R-type) event in a sensory 
perceptual system (S), has the content there’s C if and only if S has the function to 
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produce R-type events in response to C-type events (in virtue of their C-ness). (Neander 
2017: 151) 
 
To unpack this, first consider the left-hand side of the bi-conditional.  Sensory perceptual 
representations include things like visual experiences, auditory experiences, and experiences in 
the other sense modalities.  They have intentional content, representing the world as thus and so.  
Unlike beliefs, they have nonconceptual content in that one can have a sensory perceptual 
representation without having a concept of the components that make-up that content.  In 
Neander’s theory sensory perceptual representations are not only sensory experiences but are 
also subpersonal states like certain brain states.   
The right-hand side of the bi-conditional involves the functions systems have.  The type 
of function employed here is a response function- a function “to respond to something by doing 
something” (Neander 2017: 126).  In the case of perceptual systems, they have the function to 
respond to states and conditions (potentially internal or external to the organism) by producing 
certain types of states or events.  For Neander, functions are understood aetiologically, in terms 
of “what traits of the type did in the past that contributed to the inclusive fitness of ancestors, and 
which as a result caused that type of trait to be selected” (2017: 129).  This means that a trait has 
the function to ϕ iff (1) traits of this type have ϕ-ed in the past and (2) doing ϕ in the past “caused 
that type of trait to be selected [by natural selection]” (Neander 2017: 129).  For an example 
from Schulte: 
[Z]ebra stripes have the function of deterring parasitic insects (Caro et al. 2014).  
According to the aetiological conception, this function ascription is correct if (1) earlier 
tokens of the type zebra stripes … have deterred parasitic insects and (2) the fact that 
earlier tokens of the type zebra stripes have deterred parasitic insects helps to explain 
why zebra stripes were selected for, i.e. why the striped pattern was favoured by natural 
selection over rival patterns, thus becoming dominant in the ancestor populations of 
today’s zebras, and remaining dominant from then on. (Schulte 2018: 352) 
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Specifically, a sensory-perceptual system has a certain type of function- a response 
function, which is a function to produce certain states in response to certain events.  So a 
sensory-perceptual system has a response function to produce R-type states in response to C-type 
events iff earlier sensory-perceptual systems produced R-states in response to C-events and the 
fact that earlier sensory-perceptual systems have produced R-states in response to C-events helps 
to explain why the sensory-perceptual system was selected for.  As with many aspects of 
Neander’s theory, responding is understood causally such that “to respond to something…is to 
be caused by something to do something” (Neander 2017: 127).  So, a sensory-perceptual system 
responds to C-event types by being caused by those event types to (in the relevant cases) produce 
R-states. 
The qualification “in virtue of their C-ness” will be relevant in Section 4.5 and so 
discussed then. 
Neander uses CT to explain the content of a state in the brains of frogs which is often 
discussed in the psychosemantics literature.  Certain neurons in the optic tectum of the visual 
system of such frogs activate under certain conditions.  When they activate, they cause the frog 
to engage in prey-catching behavior, which includes “orienting toward the stimulus; stalking or 
approaching it; fixating it or viewing it with both eyes from front on, which allows binocular 
vision; and lunging at it and extending the tongue or snapping the jaw” (Neander 2017: 102).  
The neuronal activation in the optic tectum, i.e. the activation in T5(2) cells, is usually caused by 
prey moving into the frogs field of view.  But it is also produced when anything small, dark, and 
elongated which is moving parallel to its axis of elongation comes into the frog’s visual field.  
Let’s call such an object SDM, for small, dark and moving (Neander 2017: 156).  Neander argues 
that the content of the frog’s perceptual state is that there’s something small, dark and moving.  
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Why CT delivers this result will be addressed in Section 4.5.  For now, let’s assume Neander is 
right.   
4.2.2 THE DISTALITY PROBLEM 
 A long-standing problem in the psychosemantics literature requires that Neander modify 
CT.  As it stands, CT does not rule out T5(2) states representing certain patterns of retinal 
stimulation or arrays of spectral returns.  This is the Distality Problem.  In its general form, the 
problem concerns ruling out the more proximal causes of psychological representation from 
being represented.  In the case of T5(2) activation, it is caused by prior brain states, which are 
caused by the stimulation of retinal cells, which are caused by certain arrays of incoming light, 
which are caused by the joint interaction of spectral reflectances, illuminances, and 
transmittances.  And Neander accepts that the visual system has the function to respond to all 
these things since “responding to variations in patterns of light that hit the retina is the means by 
which a visual system responds to visible features of distal objects.  And…if a system was 
selected for doing one thing by doing another then it was selected for doing both” (Neander 
2017: 219).  For example the frog’s visual system was selected for producing T5(2) states in 
response to SDM objects by producing T5(2) states in response to certain arrays of incoming 
light.  So it was selected to do both and so has both response functions, and so, by CT, represents 
both SDM objects and certain arrays of incoming light. Similar lines of reasoning for other 
conditions/states, both more proximal and more distal than the properties of objects like color, 
size, shape and motion, leads to substantial indeterminacy in the content of representational 
states, like T5(2).  Thus Neander qualifies CT. 
  Essentially, the supplement to the theory states that, though the frog’s visual system has 
many response functions because it has many functions to produce T5(2) activation in response 
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to each link in the causal chain reaching back to the distal state, it is the response function that 
the system performs by performing all others  that determines the content of T5(2).  In general,  
R [a sensory-perceptual representation] refers to C rather than the more proximal Q if the 
system responsible for producing Rs was adapted for responding to Qs (qua Qs) by 
producing Rs as a means of responding to Cs (qua Cs) by producing Rs, but it was not 
adapted for responding to Cs as a means to responding to Qs  (Neander: 222). 
 
Thus, T5(2) states represent the property of being SDM rather than properties of 
incoming, reflected light because the frog’s visual system was adapted for producing T5(2) states 
in response to some pattern of incoming, reflected light  as a means of responding to SDM 
objects by producing T5(2) states, but it was not adapted for responding to SDM objects as a 
means of responding to some pattern of incoming, reflected light.  This qualification to CT 
seems to rule out too-proximal states as the contents of representations like T5(2) states.    
However, Peter Schulte argues that Neander’s qualified CT still falls to the Distality 
Problem.  More specifically, the qualified CT is in conflict with Neander’s preferred contents-
low-level properties like color, shape, size, etc.  For example, discussing the frog, Neander 
claims “its perceptual processing in the detection of prey concerns the size, shape, motion, and 
motion relative to shape of the stimulus” (Neander 2013:32).  Schulte provides a case in which 
the representation of Neander’s preferred property is preempted by the representation of another, 
more distal, property.  This occurs because the former property figures in a state or event which 
the visual system has the function of responding to by activating T5(2) as a means of responding 
to a state or event with the more distal property by activating T5(2).  Schulte gives the 
hypothetical case of a “tectal state T that initiates prey-catching behavior and […] is normally 
produced by the toad’s visual system if and only if a tiny red moving object […] is present” 
(Schulte 2018: 358).  The toad has evolved to catch and eat a type of tiny red insect because of 
its need for potassium.  When the insect eats potassium-rich food, and thus becomes a 
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potassium-rich food source, it turns red.  “[P]otassium-richness … is causally relevant for 
producing the insects’ red surface color” (Schulte 359).  Having a potassium need, the toad has 
evolved, we can suppose, to try and catch the insect only when it is red.  By Neander’s qualified 
CT, the toad’s visual system has the function to produce T in response to a tiny red object being 
present, but it also has the function to produce T in response to a potassium-rich object being 
present.  And it has the function to produce T in response to a tiny red object being present as a 
means of producing T in response to a potassium-rich object being present.  Thus, Schulte 
concludes that “T has the content <there is a potassium-rich object>, a result that is in conflict 
with Neander’s view that (basic) perceptual states represent the surface features of objects” 
(Schulte 359). 
 As a result of this problem for Neander, Schulte attempts to solve the Distality Problem 
in a different way, while maintaining a causal-informational teleosemantics which is very similar 
to CT.  His plan is to do this by appeal to perceptual constancies.  In canonical fashion, Schulte 
appeals to the fact that at least some perceptual states for at least some organisms “track” certain 
constant properties, like size, shape, motion, brightness, and color, under variation in external 
and internal conditions which produce variation in proximal stimulation.  This perceptual 
“tracking” characteristic of perceptual constancies is enabled by constancy mechanisms (Schulte 
360).  Schulte leaves details about these mechanisms open.  Though not explicit about what is 
meant by his use of “tracking,” it is plausible that he means a notion of representational 
sameness.  That is, a visual system tracks invariant properties of the environment despite changes 
in proximal stimulation that results from changes in external and internal conditions by 
producing invariant representations.  This conclusion is supported by Schulte’s discussion of 
toads exhibiting size constancy.  As he writes, “the system produces tectal states which ‘track’ 
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the real size of objects, not the size of their retinal images.  For instance, the toad’s visual system 
normally produces +T5(2) in response to an elongated object with a height of 1 cm when the 
object is rather distant…as well as when the object is very close…despite the fact that the 
vertical size…of the object’s retinal image is 2° in the first case and 32° in the second” (Schulte 
361).  Thus, it is safe to conclude that, for Schulte, it is the sameness in representation that is 
operative in perceptual constancies. 
 Schulte then goes on to argue that we can secure determinate representation, not by 
allowing many functions and privileging one as grounding representation, as Neander does, but 
instead by ruling out all but one function.  Taking the toad case as an example, Schulte argues 
that since perceptual constancies deliver sameness in representational states when distal 
properties remain unchanged despite changes in proximal stimulation, “there is no single type of 
retinal stimulation pattern which normally causes the toad’s visual system to produce T5(2) 
activation […] Hence, the only external state that qualifies as a normal cause of T5(2) excitation, 
i.e. as a cause that is always present in normal situations, is the distal state…” (Schulte 2018: 
361).  Schulte concludes that “the toad’s visual system has the function to generate +T5(2) 
tokens in response to [SDM] objects, but not the function to generate +T5(2) tokens in response 
to any particular type of proximal stimulus” (Schulte 361).  To evaluate Schulte’s view, this 
argument needs to be unpacked.  
To clarify what Schulte could mean by the claim that “there is no single type of retinal 
stimulation pattern which normally causes the toad’s visual system to produce T5(2) 
activation…Hence, the only external state that qualifies as a normal cause of T5(2) excitation, 
i.e. as a cause that is always present in normal situations, is the distal state,” let’s return to the 
basic version of CT and connect normal causes and normal situations with functions.  It will be 
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assumed that Schulte’s idea of normality is the same as Neander’s since he will be extending her 
theory to incorporate constancies.  Neander states that “the normal cause…is the triggering cause 
implicated in the response function” (Neander 2017: 136).    According to CT, if Y represents X 
then Y has the relevant response function with respect to X.  If there is this response function, 
there was a time when X caused the visual system to produce Y and this fact helps explain why 
the visual system was selected for.  So there was a circumstance, the function-conferring 
circumstance, in which the visual system gained this function and X was the triggering cause in 
that circumstance.  So, the normal cause of a representational state is the triggering cause in the 
function-conferring circumstance.  And normal circumstances are those circumstances which are 
sufficiently similar to the function-conferring circumstance.   
 In terms of functions, Schulte’s argument claims that there are a host of present-day, state 
tokenings which are of the same representational type.  And each of these tokenings is the result 
of the same response function of the visual system.   And each of these tokenings represents the 
same distal property.  However they differ in the proximal stimulations that are causal 
intermediaries between them and the instance of the distal property.  And whatever exactly it is 
that makes these states have the content that they do, it is not in virtue of their sharing all the 
same proximal stimulation with each other or with the state which was tokened in the function-
conferring circumstance.  Call this Lack of Proximal Correlation.  Any particular proximal 
stimulus is not as correlated with the representational state as the distal state is.  
 To conclude that a constancy-involving visual system does not have the function to 
produce some constancy representation in response to any proximal stimulus, Schulte seems to 
assume that a visual system can have the function to respond to something by producing some 
representational state only if that something is present in all productions of that representation 
120 
 
and is present in the function-conferring circumstance.  That is, the Lack of Proximal Correlation 
excludes the proximal from being part of the response functions which involve constancy 
representations and so excludes the proximal from being represented. 
 The Lack of Proximal Correlation Principle is a principle commonly held, in some form 
or other, in discussions of perceptual constancies.  For example, discussing and endorsing 
Dretske’s points on constancy in Misrepresentation (1986), Sterelny writes, “The stable 
correlation, Dretske points out, is between concept and [distal] object, not between concept and 
its sensory intermediaries [i.e. proximal stimulation]” (Sterelny 1990: 121-122).  Though, given 
the times, Sterelny is using “concept” as a part of the content of visual experience, he is 
endorsing the Lack of Proximal Correlation Principle.  From this he concludes, “So concepts are 
concepts of those objects, not sensory intermediaries,” a conclusion very similar to Schulte 
(Sterelny 1990: 122).     
 In what follows, I will argue that, in a way, the Lack of Proximal Correlation Principle is 
right, but in another way, it is wrong.  And it is the way in which it is wrong that creates a 
problem for Schulte’s solution to the Distality Problem. 
 However, before I begin to build the case against the Lack of Proximal Correlation 
Principle, I present a quick challenge to Schulte’s solution to the Distality Problem.  Schulte’s 
solution claims that a perceptual representational state has determinate content only if it employs 
constancy mechanisms.  He notes that some states, like the magnetosome states of the 
Spirochaeta plicatilis, made popular by Dretske (1986), might seem to challenge this.  However, 
Schulte is ready to either deny that “primitive states like the one just mentioned are 
representations” or accept that they are representations but claim “their content is indeterminate” 
(Schulte 2018: 362).  However, he recognizes that “representational states with determinate […] 
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content [which are also] products of sensory systems which do not employ constancy 
mechanisms […] would indeed constitute a serious problem for my proposal” (Schulte 2018: 
362).  But, he thinks there are no such states.   
However, it seems that our experience of a stick partly in and partly out of water is one 
such state.  From most viewing angles, a stick partly in and partly out of water is represented as 
bent. See Figures 4.1A and B. This is because as the light reflects off of the stick, travels through 
the water and crosses the water-air interface it bends as a result of the different refractive indexes 
of the air and the water.  Differences in the direction light travels before reaching the eye pose an 
inverse projection problem, one which our visual system has not evolved a constancy mechanism 
to accommodate, though maybe some creatures have65.  Therefore, for humans, as the relative 
position between us and the stick changes, the representation of the stick’s shape illusorily 
changes.  Though we lack a constancy mechanism that overcomes the affect that light-bending as 
it passes through media with different refractive indexes has on the representation of shape, we 
still seem to determinately represent the shape of the stick at various viewing angles.   
Figure 4.1: Stick in water 
A     B     C 
                  
                                                 
65 Some have argued that the Archer fish has such a constancy.  See for example Schuster et. al. (2004).  Though, if 
what has been proposed so far in the dissertation is correct, it is far from clear whether the fish exhibits even Type-1 
constancy or whether the fish is able to compensate for the effect of difference in transmittance refractive properties 
only in extra-experiential ways. 
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Figure 4.2: Stick out of water 
 
 
While each experience of the stick seems to lack at least one shape constancy, as a whole, 
each experience represents many properties, many of which result from constancies.  And our 
visual system, as a whole, employs many constancy mechanisms.  So maybe Schulte can salvage 
his view by appealing to these facts, recovering determinate content as long as there is 
substantial constancy in an experience or visual system as a whole.  I won’t press this because 
the point I wish to make against Schulte concerns the Lack of Proximal Correlation Principle.  
Essentially, I wish to argue that even if Schulte is right that there are no ”representational states 
with determinate […] content [which are also] products of sensory systems which do not employ 
constancy mechanisms” or even if, counterfactually, it were the case that all representational 
states with determinate content employed constancy mechanisms, his solution faces a larger 
problem.  Schulte’s view of perceptual constancies misunderstands the relationship between the 
perceptual output and the proximal causes.   
  In what follows, I will argue, focusing on color constancy, that the picture of perceptual 
constancy enshrined in the Lack of Proximal Correlation Principle is mistaken and a more 
accurate view undercuts Schulte’s strategy for solving the Distality Problem.  In Section 4.3, I 
return to illusions, which are what constancies are supposed to offset, and argue that there is a 
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type of illusion that needs a different explanation. In Section 4.4, I present a well-established 
approach to how constancies are accomplished by the visual system.  This will allow for the, 
previously lacking, explanation of certain illusions.  In Section 4.5, I argue that this feature of the 
workings of constancy mechanisms undermines Schulte’s view.    
4.3. Different Types of Illusions 
The first step is to take a closer look at the connection between illusions and color 
constancy.  Two basic features have already been mentioned.   First, because of the inverse 
projection problem, a visual system is liable to produce color illusions as a result of variations in 
illumination.  To avoid this, a color constancy mechanism might be employed.  Additionally, 
Section 2.4 of Chapter 2 addressed how experimenters in color constancy often use, for practical 
reasons, simulations.  In a given experiment, the simulation does not exhibit color constancy.  
However, the scene that the simulation is meant to be a simulation of supposedly does, and the 
simulation can be used in lieu of the scene.  This experimental method assumes that if the returns 
of the simulation and the scene are the same, then the simulation and the scene induce the same 
phenomenal experiences.  The experience of the scene is veridical while that of the simulation is 
illusory.  Now it is time to take a critical look at the assumptions of this method. 
  As a note, for simplicity in this chapter, I will identify phenomenal properties with 
representational properties.  In addition, the only type of color constancy of concern will be 
Type-2 color constancy, even though much of what is written plausibly applies to other types of 
color constancy.   
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Figure 4.3: Adelson’s checkershadow illusion 
 
From Adelson (1995) 
In Chapter Two I argued that there is a real checkerboard which produces the same return 
as Figure 4.3 and induces the same phenomenal experience, but exhibits color constancy.  Figure 
4.3 involves an illusion because B is represented illusorily as Middle Gray when it is actually 
Dark Gray.  Since B is represented as Middle Gray, it is represented as more similar to C than it 
actually is.  As the argument went, if there is a real checkerboard with checkers B’ and C’ which 
are counterparts of Figure 4.3’s patches B and C, then the represented similarity between B’ and 
C’ is the same as the represented similarity between B and C.  B is represented as more similar to 
C than the similarity between their colors or reflectances.  And this makes for illusion in Figure 
4.3.  However, B’ is represented as more similar to C’ than the similarity between their returns 
and illuminances.  And this makes the representation of B’ less illusory than it would be for an 
experience lacking color constancy.   
 But what is the significance of two objects differing in their distal properties, but with the 
same return, which induce experiences which are phenomenally the same? We can return to the 
inverse projection problem for clarity.  For an individual who does not have a color constancy 
mechanism, two surfaces of the same reflectance-type which are under different illuminations 
reflect different types of returns.  These differing returns are the only information about distal 
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properties that the visual system has.  Thus, a constancy-free visual system will produce 
experiences that differ in represented color and so will produce illusions.  However, when there 
is color constancy, there is visual color-sameness despite the difference in returns.   
Additionally, there is, one might say, Reverse Color Constancy when two surfaces which 
differ in reflectance are illuminated in such a way that their returns are the same, but the surfaces 
are represented as different, in the right way.  For example, a visual system produces reverse 
color constancy when a white object and black object are represented as white and black, 
respectively, even though the first is in dim light and the second is in bright light such that their 
returns are the same.  A constancy-free visual system would produce experiences representing 
the objects as the same in color.  Without a reverse color constancy mechanism, sameness in 
returns guarantees sameness in experiences.  Analogously, without a color constancy 
mechanism, difference in returns guarantees difference in experiences.  Thus, in cases where a 
subject lacks reverse color constancy and the same return is caused by different reflectance-types 
this yields at least one illusory experience.   
At first pass it might seem that Figure 4.3 and the real checkerboard involve a failure in 
reverse color constancy.  Between Figure 4.3 and the real checkerboard, the returns are the same 
and this yields a sameness in phenomenal experience of the two, though they differ in 
reflectances and illumination.  And the experience of the figure is illusory.  However, the illusion 
is not the result of a lack of reverse color constancy.  If there were a failure of reverse color 
constancy, it would be the real checkerboard that is illusory while the figure would be veridical.   
The reason turns on veridical sweet-spots.  We’ve seen that even a constancy-free perceptual 
system can get things right sometimes.  For example, in the stick in water case, from most 
viewing angles, the stick is illusorily represented as bent or broken.  However, there is an angle 
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at which the stick’s shape is represented as it actually is.  Compare Figure 4.1C and Figure 4.2.  
This veridical sweet-spot exists at this viewing angle because, roughly, even though the water 
and air have different refractive indexes, from the right angle, the path of the light does not bend 
at the interface of the media but is the same as the path the light would take if it were reflected 
from a stick out of water.   
Veridical sweet-spots are present with respect to color representation, also. Suppose a 
surface is red (and so has a particular surface spectral reflectance) and the person viewing the 
surface lacks color constancy.  As a result, for most illuminances, varying in their chromaticity 
or intensity, and subsequent returns, the subject’s experience will be illusory with respect to 
color.  However, for an equal energy illuminance of the right (“normal”) intensity, the spectral 
power distribution of the return will be the same as that of the surface spectral reflectance.  
Therefore, the subject’s experience will represent the surface veridically.  As a result, even 
subjects lacking color constancy veridically represent color when the illuminance is equal energy 
and of the right intensity.  However, for our experiences of Figure 4.3 and the real checkerboard, 
it is the figure which is illusory for us.  If we lacked color constancy in this case, the figure, a 
colored patchwork under normal lighting (roughly equal energy light of the right intensity) 
would be represented veridically (a veridical sweet-spot for us), while the part of the real 
checkerboard in shadow would be represented illusorily. Thus, something other than a lack of 
reverse color constancy explains the illusory experience of Figure 4.3.  So, individuated by their 
causes, there are at least two illusions.  Type-1 illusions are caused by a lack of constancy or 
reverse constancy.  Type-2 illusions are caused by something else. 
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The next sections argue for an explanation of Type-2 illusions which is based in 
empirical proposals of the mechanism of color constancy.  As it will turn out, Type-2 illusions 
are the result, not of the lack, but of the presence of color constancy.   
4.4. Constancy Mechanisms and the Constancy-Illusion Tradeoff  
 As was seen above, Type-2 illusions lack an adequate explanation.  In this section I lay 
out the very popular Bayesian approach to constancy mechanisms and argue that such an 
approach provides a plausible explanation of Type-2 illusions.  It is argued that Type-2 illusions 
are a price the visual system pays for employing a constancy mechanism to avoid Type-1 
illusions.  
4.4.1. BAYESIAN MODELING OF CONSTANCY MECHANISMS 
As discussed throughout the dissertation, the input to the visual system underdetermines 
its distal causes.  Assuming that the visual system provides information about, and our 
experiences represent, distal properties, the visual system produces output under input-
uncertainty.  A leading way to model credences, other mental states, and decision-making under 
uncertainty is with Bayesian Decision Theory.  In a natural extension, Bayesian Decision Theory 
(BDT) has been employed to model the mechanisms by which color constancy is achieved.   
 BDT begins with subjective probability (Strevens Ms).  Often when one is uncertain 
which of a number of possible states of affairs obtains, one might think some of those possible 
states are more likely, some less likely, or some equally as likely as others.  Consider the flip of a 
fair coin. If we call the possible states of the coin (turning up heads and turning up tails) that one 
entertains “hypotheses” and use numbers to designate the extent to which one believes the coin 
will end up in one state or the other, then, most would believe there is a 50% chance the coin will 
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turn up heads and a 50% chance the coin will turn up tails.  These levels of expectation for the 
two hypotheses are subjective probabilities.  An agent’s subjective probabilities are reflected by 
a probability function, p, from each hypothesis, h, to a real number p(h).  Sometimes the 
subjective probability is assigned to a hypothesis conditional on some other event occurring.  
This reflects a conditional probability of a hypothesis, h, given another event, e, written as 
p(h|e).   
 Bayes’s Rule prescribes a relationship between what one’s subjective probabilities should 
be, conditioned on a particular type of event- new evidence.  When new evidence arises, one 
should update ones credences in light of the new evidence.  Thus, where p2( ) is the subjective 
probability at some later time and p( ) is the subjective probability at an earlier time, Bayes’s 
Rule can be written as:  
p2(h) = p(h|e)     Equation (1) 
           Bayes’s Rule is expanded with Bayes’s Theorem: 
p(h|e) = p(e|h)p(h)/p(e)    Equation (2) 
 This tells us that p(h|e), which is called the posterior probability, equals the product of 
the initial subjective probability before the evidence is encountered (p(h), i.e. the prior 
probability) and the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis (the likelihood), divided by 
the probability of the evidence.   
According to a rapidly increasing body of theorists in vision science, particularly in the 
study of color constancy, Bayes’s Theorem models how the visual system deals with the 
uncertainty in sensory input.  Before we consider how Bayes’s Theorem is applied here, some 
simplifying idealizations need to be made.  First, I will idealize that the retinal photoreceptors are 
“transparent” meaning that it is as if the visual system has direct access to the return and isn’t 
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hampered by the limitation of only 4 receptor-types.  In reality, there is no such direct access and 
one must consider more than the information loss that occurs because of the interaction between 
illuminances, surface spectral reflectances, transmittances, and other distal factors.  Instead, the 
post-receptoral visual system draws on the responses of the retinal mosaic of photoreceptors.  
However, because of the way the photoreceptors respond to light, the properties of the return are 
confounded such that two different returns can produce the same photoreceptor responses.  So 
there are at least two informational collapses, one in the production of the return and another in 
the response of the retinal cells.  The problem worsens in that “there is at most one photoreceptor 
at each retinal location […so] the visual system must combine information [from photoreceptors 
across the retina]” (Brainard 2009:2).  This is a third layer of informational collapse66. Noise is 
an additional problem the visual system faces, including noise in the visual system and photon 
noise (Mamassian et.al 2002).  To avoid these difficulties, which are not required to make my 
case, the idealization makes it as if there is no difference between retinal input to the visual 
system and the return input.  However, the Bayesian framework arguably has the resources to 
accommodate all these forms of input uncertainty and ambiguity.    
Second, issues with the experience of spatial features of the scene, like spatial constancy 
and the extent of the field of view are neglected.  It is assumed the experience is spatially 
veridical and color constancy isn’t relevantly dependent on the processing of spatial features.  
Thus, the only challenge to vision is the confounding of illumination and reflectance in the return 
array. 
    With these idealizations, we can return to Bayes’s Theorem in the context of constancy 
mechanisms.  Where does the uncertainty arise? Suppose there’s the return caused by a black 
                                                 
66 Idealizing from these two informational collapses means idealizing from two classes of metamers.  In general 
metamers are ignored in this paper. 
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surface reflecting an equal energy, normally-intense light.  This same return can also be the 
result of a surface that is just slightly less black (and more white) and an illuminance that is just 
slightly less intense.  This move can be repeated again and again until the surface is white and 
the illuminance is very low in intensity.  All the steps in this sequence yield the same return.  
Thus the return ambiguity is quite extensive.  And each illuminance-reflectance pair is equally 
likely to produce the given return.  Because there are many illumination-reflectance pairs that 
can produce the given return, the visual system is acting under uncertainty and thus making 
Bayesian calculations would be quite useful.   
To begin to model constancy using BDT start with a single small surface with a 
homogenous surface spectral reflectance, illuminated by a single illuminant, which reflects a 
return which is the product of only the reflectance and the illuminance.   The illuminance is 
specified by a single number i and the surface reflectance is specified by s.  Thus, the return is r 
= (i)(s).  The return is the proximal input to the visual system which confounds the illuminance 
and the reflectance.  In Equation (2), the return is the evidence.  If we suppose for the time being 
that the output of the visual system is some information about the reflectance and the 
illuminance, then the alternative “hypotheses,” to which the visual system will assign 
probabilities, as formalized in the posterior probability, concern illumination-reflectance pairs.   
Because of the way a single return can be produced by many different illumination-
reflectance pairs, a probability can be assigned to the chance that a given return is produced by 
any illuminant-reflectance pair.  As was seen, the same return can be produced by a black 
reflectance under an equal-energy, normally-intense illuminance or a white reflectance under a 
less intense illuminance.  However, a red surface reflectance and a blue illuminance could not 
produce this return.  The likelihood, expressed as p(r|i,s), captures these facts.  For a return, it 
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assigns a probability to the return being produced by each illumination-reflectance pair.  For 
some illumination-reflectance pairs the likelihood is zero.  But some illumination-reflectance 
pairs have a likelihood of equal probability, in which case the visual system faces uncertainty. 
The likelihood formally captures the ambiguity in the return.  
 In the context of the processing of the visual system, the likelihood usually takes the form 
of a discreet probability mass function or a continuous probability distribution function. Thus, if i 
and s are real numbers, they determine a two-dimensional space where any point in that space is 
a return. A third dimension, orthogonal to the i and s dimensions, represents the likelihood 
p(r|i,s). See Figure 4.4A. Surfaces and slopes in this space illustrate the differing probabilities.  
The highest “ridges” or “plateaus” in the space represent the highest likelihoods of equal 
probability.  For our purposes, it does not matter what likelihood is represented by Figure 4.4A.  
The important point is that the lowest regions represent zero probability and the ridge represents 
the highest likelihoods which are of equal probability.    
Figure 4.4: Likelihood and prior functions 
A       B 
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From Brainard 200967 
 From the point of view of the visual system, only given the return-information available 
in a likelihood like the one depicted in Figure 4.4A, when there is a ridge, the visual system has 
no “reason to choose” one illumination-reflectance pair over another. However, the Bayesian 
framework addresses how to resolve the uncertainty in the likelihood, yielding a posterior that, 
ideally, has it that one pair is more probable than the rest.  This turns on the prior.  
 The prior tells the probability of any illumination-reflectance pair, independent of the 
return.  Figuratively, it reflects the “assumptions” the visual system makes about distal 
properties. For example, a visual system might employ a prior that reflects the system’s 
assumption that the illuminance is most likely in the range of lighting found in natural daylight.  
Thus, the probabilities of those illuminances would be higher than other illuminances. For a 
geometric construal, consider Figure 4.4B. It represents that all reflectances are equally probable 
but certain illuminances are more probable, particularly as one approaches i = 2.  (This is not the 
prior that would reflect the assumption that the illuminance is most likely in the range of lighting 
found in natural daylight.  The figure is just used for illustrative purposes.)   
 With the prior and likelihood in hand, Bayes’s Theorem requires multiplying them.  In 
effect the prior “shifts the peak of the posterior away from the peak of the likelihood (Mamassian 
2002: 20). This yields something proportional to the posterior probability. The factor p(r) (p(e) in 
Equation 2) , in the vision science contexts, plays the role of normalizing the posterior so that the 
total probability is one.  Thus we have the equation for the probability a visual system assigns to 
illumination-reflectance pairs, i and s, given a return-input, r.   
p(i,s|r) = p(r|i,s)p(i,s)/p(r)    Equation (3) 
                                                 
67 Reprinted from Brainard D. H. (2009). Bayesian approaches to color vision. In Gazzaniga M., editor. (Ed.), The 
cognitive neurosciences (4th ed., pp 395–408) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press with permission from The MIT Press. 
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 Graphically, when r yields the likelihood represented in Figure 4.4A, and Figure 4.4B is 
the prior the visual system employs, Figure 4.5 represents the resulting posterior.  In effect the 
prior has reduced the uncertainty in the likelihood to yield a most probable distal configuration 
of illumination and reflectance.   
Figure 4.5: Posterior function 
 
From Brainard 200968 
 A final step is required since, on the one hand, the outputs of the visual system are not 
usually probabilistic, whether they are beliefs about distal properties, actions directed towards 
distal properties, experiences representing distal properties, or some other outputs, and on the 
other hand the posterior is a probability distribution.  A single “hypothesis” must be chosen via a 
decision rule69 (Mamassian et. al. 2002).  In the vision science literature, the single illuminance-
reflectance pair is usually either the most probable value according to the posterior, i.e. the 
                                                 
68 Reprinted from Brainard D. H. (2009). Bayesian approaches to color vision. In Gazzaniga M., editor. (Ed.), The 
cognitive neurosciences (4th ed., pp 395–408) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press with permission from The MIT Press. 
69 The decision rule is meant to pick out the illumination-reflectance pair which maximizes the expected utility to 
the subject.  Thus, each possible hypothesis is specified a gain and loss by the gain function and so, given the 
posterior, each hypothesis is associated with an expected utility.  A hypothesis will be outputted relative to systems 
balancing of gains and risk (Mamassian, et.al. 2002 ; Geisler and Kersten 2002).  
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maximum of the posterior, or the mean of the posterior (For example, see Brainard and Freeman 
1997).  For present purposes, which decision rule is used does not matter.   
This provides the rough outlines of how BDT is employed in various areas of vision 
science including perceptual constancies.  Some complications need to be added to this account.  
Earlier it was assumed that Bayesian color constancy was being applied to one small surface 
with a single reflectance, illuminance, and return.  However, in realistic visual cases, the 
constancy mechanism must be extended across the field of view.  Thus there will be an array of 
distal surfaces, each with its own reflectance, illuminance and return.  Also, there is a return 
array- an expanse of contiguous regions where each region has a chromaticity and luminance 
which is the product of the reflectance and illuminance of a reflecting region of the distal scene.   
Thus the visual system would employ a more complex Bayesian system that incorporates all of 
this.   
4.4.2. AN EXAMPLE OF BAYESIAN COLOR CONSTANCY 
 An example of Bayesian Color Constancy will be used to argue against Schulte’s solution 
to the Distality Problem.  However, before I turn to this central example of Bayesian color 
constancy, it would be useful to get a simple concrete example on the table.   
 So let’s retain the assumption of one small surface with a single reflectance, illuminance, 
and return.  Suppose illuminances/illuminants have a maximum intensity of 10, in some unit of 
measurement. And suppose reflectances also have a maximum intensity of 10, in some unit of 
measurement.  White objects have reflectances close to 10, black objects have reflectances close 
to 0, and grays are naturally distributed in between.  Suppose there is some small surface which 
is nearly white, with a reflectance of 9, and which is in very dim lighting of 2.  By r= (i)(s), the 
return is 18. 
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 But many illuminances and reflectance pairs, (i,s), can produce a return of 18, including 
(9,2), (6,3), (3,6), and (2,9).  So there is a likelihood, p(r| i,s), which assigns equal probability to 
a return being caused by any pair of illuminances and reflectances which multiply to 18.  How 
might a visual system deliver an experience representing the surface as white, at least 
approximately, despite the uncertainty in the return? 
 Suppose the visual system in question belongs to a mole which lives in an environment 
where the lighting remains very dim, around a 2.  If the light in the mole’s environment remains 
sufficiently constant around 2, it could be evolutionarily advantageous to evolve a prior which 
assigned a very high probability to 2, so which, geometrically speaking, steeply declines from 
this peak of 2, zero-ing out at 1.5 and 2.5.  If this is the prior, then the peak of the posterior 
would be shifted from the broader peak of the likelihood.   This posterior assigns the highest 
probability to illuminance-reflectance pairs around (2, 9). 
 Now, suppose the environment continues its historical pattern, maintaining a very dim 
lighting around 2.  If this is so, then when the surface color darkens to 6, yielding a likelihood 
which assigns equal probability to the return being caused by all illuminance-reflectance pairs 
whose product is 12, our mole will experience color constancy.  The prior assigning the highest 
probability to an illuminance of 2 will reduce the uncertainty in the likelihood, yielding a 
posterior which assigns highest probability to a reflectance of 6.  Here we have a simple example 
of a Bayesian color constancy mechanism. 
 Now I turn to the central example of a constancy mechanism which can be subsumed 
under the Bayesian framework.  This constancy mechanism will provide a counterexample to the 
Lack of Proximal Correlation Principle. The example I will give is a simplified version of a more 
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complicated constancy mechanism that might be employed by actual animals, and has at least 
been proposed as such. 
 Two complications need to be made to the simple Bayesian color constancy employed so 
far. In the above presentation of the Bayesian approach to color constancy, the Bayesian 
algorithm was p(i,s|r) = p(r|i,s)p(i,s)/p(r).  The visual system was trying to solve for illumination 
and reflectance.  However, many models of color constancy do not take this form.  There are 
models which work by “discounting the illuminant”.  On the extreme, these models propose that, 
at least with respect to the experiences being investigated, the visual system only represents the 
surface color of things, not the illuminance or the illuminant.  The idea is that the illumination is 
a confounding factor, a distraction to the visual system’s aims, and needs to be done away with.  
This has consequences for the Bayesian algorithm proposed. For example, Brainard and 
Radonjic (2014) describe the work of Brainard et al. (2006) as assuming “that observers, in 
effect, use a specific Bayesian algorithm to estimate the illuminant and then discount the effect 
of this estimated illuminant” (549).  The effect being discounted is the confounding effect the 
illuminant has on the visual system’s detection of the reflectance.   
Alternatively, some employ the Bayesian framework in the way it was originally 
presented here, assigning probabilities to both the illuminance and the reflectance70.   
The example that follows will involve a Bayesian algorithm which also discounts the 
illuminant.  It is not meant to be an accurate model of our processes of color constancy, only a 
possible example of a constancy mechanism.  This leaves open whether there are experiences 
that represent illumination and whether there are additional computations which estimate 
illumination. 
                                                 
70 See, for example, Allred and Brainard (2013). 
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The second complication concerns advancing beyond the processing of the return, 
illuminance, and reflectance of a single, small surface. The example will involve multiple 
surfaces, instead.  However, the idealization of a flat, viewer-facing surface will be maintained.   
Let’s make some psychophysical assumptions: the maximum reflectance intensity is 10 
units of some measure.  The maximum illuminance/illuminant intensity is 10 units of the some 
measure. The example will only involve achromatic colors, intensities and luminances, so I will 
assume the reflectances, returns, and illuminances have chromaticities of equal-energy at each 
wavelength.   Suppose there are surfaces A and B. A has a reflectance of 10.  B has a reflectance 
of 5.  The entire scene is illuminated by a diffuse, even, equal-energy light so that all surfaces 
have an illuminance with an intensity of 6. Suppose this illumination has the intensity of normal 
daylight.  Thus, the return of A is 60 and the return of B is 30. Suppose to us, and anything else 
that represents the scene veridically, A looks white and B looks middle-gray.  
 Let’s consider a Constancy-Free Subject who does not employ a constancy mechanism, 
and assume that under these conditions, she enjoys a veridicality sweet-spot.   Recall from the 
case of the stick in water from Section 4.2, that even a subject without a particular constancy 
mechanism represents veridically sometimes. We lack a constancy mechanism that offsets the 
effects that multiple intervening media with different refractive indexes have on the proximal 
stimulation.  So from many viewing angles we misrepresent the shape of the stick in water.  
However, at the right viewing angle, there is a veridical sweet-spot.  Therefore, it is plausible 
that the Constancy-Free Subject viewing the scene under equal-energy, normal light would also 
have a veridical sweet-spot, representing the figure as a normal human viewer would.  So she 
represents A as white and B as middle-gray.   
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Now, suppose at some later time, t2, the original uniform illuminance is halved to an 
intensity of 3.  Thus, the luminances of the returns of A and B are halved, to 30 and 15 
respectively.  Without a color constancy mechanism, the Constancy-Free Subject’s experience 
corresponds to the return.  As a result, the Constancy-Free Subject has an experience in which 
the represented color of A and B is half of what it was at t171.  A is represented as middle gray, 
and B is represented as a dark gray.       
What color constancy mechanism might provide achromatic color constancy for the 
scene?  I will consider an early hypothesized constancy mechanism called The Highest 
Luminance is White Assumption (Gilchrist 2006; Foster 2011).  The basic idea is that, given a 
return array which corresponds to the regions of some distal surface that reflects that return 
array, the regions of the surface that reflect returns with the highest or most intense luminance 
are represented as white.  The represented achromatic colors of the other regions of the distal 
surface are scaled according to their relative return luminances.  The Highest Luminance is 
White mechanism provides color constancy for the scene at t2.  Even though the illumination of 
the scene uniformly changes at t2, the relationship between the return luminances of surfaces 
remains the same.  So by following this “assumption” the visual system will continue to 
represent A as white and B as middle-gray. 
 The Bayesian modeling of color constancy can incorporate The Highest Luminance is 
White Assumption in the form of, one might say, The Highest Luminance is White Prior.  To see 
this, first, matters must be complicated beyond the simple Bayesian modeling applied only to a 
single small surface with a single reflectance, illuminance, and return.  We need at least two 
surfaces, A and B.  So the likelihood will involve a probability distribution for multiple regions.  
We can consider a simple case in which the return, illuminances, and reflectances of each region 
                                                 
71 Idealizing for simplicity that color represented falls off linearly with return luminance. 
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are independent and have no effect on one another72.  The likelihood will assign, to each surface, 
probabilities to a return being produced by each reflectance and illuminance.  At t2, A’s return of 
30 has equal chances of being caused by any reflectance, s, which, when multiplied by the value 
of the illuminant equals 30.  So, for example, it is equally probably that the reflectance is 10, 
where the illuminant is 3, or 3, where the illuminant is 10, or 8, where the illuminant is 3.75.  
Similar points apply to the likelihood of B at t2.  So what we want is a prior which, when 
combined with the likelihood, produces a posterior which adjusts the likelihood such that the 
highest probability is assigned to a reflectance of 10 for A and a reflectance of 5 for B.   
We saw in the mole case that its visual system assumed that the environment is fairly 
dark, and thus it employed a prior which assigned highest probabilities to illuminance-
reflectance pairs which had illuminances around 2.  Qualitatively described, what prior might a 
visual system employ which captures The Highest Luminance is White Assumption?  The higher 
a surface’s reflectance-intensity and illuminance-intensity, the higher its return-luminance since 
the product of the former values equals the return-luminance.  So the prior will reflect that, for 
example, the surface with the highest reflectance-illuminance product has the highest probability 
of being white.  And the surface with the next highest reflectance-illuminance product will have 
the highest probability of being a gray proportional to how much lower its product is compared 
to that of the highest product.  Generally, the prior compares the illuminance-reflectance 
products across surfaces.  Then, the probability it assigns to an achromatic color for each surface 
is proportional to the rank of that surfaces illuminance-reflectance product, relative to the 
illuminance-reflectance product of all other surfaces.  
                                                 
72 This simplifying assumption would be violated in more complicated circumstances in which there are, for 
example, inter-object reflections. 
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So given a likelihood that assigns equal probability to A’s illuminance-reflectance pairs 
of (10,3), (3,10), (8, 3.75), (3.75, 8), etc. and to B’s illuminance-reflectance pairs of (5, 3), (3,5), 
(3.75, 4), (4, 3.75), etc. the prior shifts the posteriors probability distribution away from that of 
the likelihood.  Since the prior compares the illuminance-reflectance products between A and B, 
and A has the highest products, the posterior assigns the highest probability to A being white 
(having a reflectance of 10)  and so assigns the highest probability to A having the pair (3, 10).  
Since B’s illuminance-reflectance products are half of A’s, the posterior assigns the highest 
probability to it being middle gray (having a reflectance half of 10), and so it is assigned the 
highest probability of having the pair (3, 5).  
As noted earlier, since this is an illumination-discounting mechanism, at some point in 
the computation of the output, the illumination is dropped, leaving only the representation of 
surface color.  Where this occurs is not relevant for present purposes. 
So, at t2 when the illumination of A and B halves uniformly, and the returns of A and B 
halve, a Constancy-Free Subject’s color representations halve.  However, for the Constancy-
Having Subject whose visual system employs The Highest Luminance is White Prior, A 
continues to be represented as white, and B continues to be represented as middle gray.  
4.4.3. THE EXPLANATION OF TYPE-2 ILLUSIONS 
However, a visual system that employs the Highest Luminance is White Assumption/ 
Highest Luminance is White Prior as its sole constancy mechanism will cause illusions in some 
circumstances.  The mechanism works to deliver color constancy only when the illumination is 
uniform across the scene.  Also, the mechanism delivers color constancy only when there is a 
white surface.  Suppose that at t3, A and B, respectively having reflectances of 5 and 2.5, are 
illuminated by a 6-intensity illuminant.  If the entire scene consisted of A and B, then the 
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relationship between their luminances is the same as that of the scene at t1. At t3 A still has the 
highest return-luminance and B’s return-luminance is still half of A’s. Thus, A will be 
represented as white and B will be represented as middle-gray.  Thus, this Constancy-Having 
Subject would be subject to a color illusion.   However, the Constancy-Free Subject experiencing 
the scene at t3, whose visual system represents veridically when there is equal-energy, normal 
lighting, would have a veridical-sweet spot, experiencing A as middle-gray and B as a darker 
gray.  
Here we have a case of a Type-2 illusion in the illusion had by the Constancy-Having 
Subject.  The illusion is not because of a lack of color constancy with respect to the scene at t3, 
where the visual system treats a return as if it were caused by whatever reflectance is compatible 
with an equal-energy illuminant of normal intensity.  Instead, the illusion results from the 
particular assumption/prior that the Constancy-Having Subject’s visual system employs- Highest 
Luminance is White Assumption/ Prior. This shows that constancy mechanisms can have trade-
offs.  They can avoid representing one scene illusorily, in the way that this prior does with the 
scene at t2.  However, that very mechanism causes an illusion with respect to the scene at t3.  
And we see that the Constancy-Having Subject’s illusory experience of the scene at t3 is avoided 
by the Constancy-Free Subject.  Thus, sometimes the use of one color constancy mechanisms 
comes at a cost, leading to an illusion that the Constancy-Free Subject isn’t subject to.  Call this 
phenomenon The Cost of Constancy.  It explains why the Constancy-Having Subject’s 
experience of the scene at t3 is illusory.  In general it provides a plausible explanation of Type-2 
illusions and our illusory experience of Figure 4.3.  The Adelson checkershadow illusion, which 
we have in Figure 4.3, is the result of the particular prior that our visual system employs in 
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providing color constancy with respect to the real checkerboard.   However, a Constancy-Free 
Subject experiences Figure 4.3 veridically.   
Having introduced Bayesian approaches to color constancy mechanisms, I have provided 
The Highest Luminance is White Assumption/Prior as an example of a constancy mechanism 
which will be employed in what follows to argue against the Lack of Proximal Correlation 
Principle and Schulte’s solution to the Distality Problem. 
4.5. Against the Lack of Proximal Correlation Principle 
 As was seen above, Type-2 illusions are plausibly explained by the particular type of 
constancy mechanism that a visual system uses to avoid Type-1 illusions.  Thus, there’s the Cost 
of Constancy phenomenon: by avoiding some Type-1 illusions, a visual system gains some 
Type-2 illusions.  In this section, I argue how the above points about constancy mechanisms 
undercut the Lack of Proximal Correlation Principle, at least in one sense.  The claim will be that 
there are perceptual constancies where there is some aspect of the proximal stimulation which is 
as correlated with the representational state as the distal is.  This, in turn, challenges Schulte’s 
solution to the Distality Problem. 
 First, recall that the Distality Problem arose, in part, because of the fact that “responding 
to variations in patterns of light that hit the retina is the means by which a visual system responds 
to visible features of distal objects.  And…if a system was selected for doing one thing by doing 
another then it was selected for doing both” (Neander 2017: 219).  So the visual system has a 
response function for each proximal state in the causal chain from the initial distal cause to the 
final representational effect.  However Schulte denies that, for constancy-having representational 
states, the visual system has all of these proximal response functions.  This is because of the 
Lack of Proximal Correlation Principle and the assumption that a visual system can have the 
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function to respond to something by producing some state only if that something is present in all 
productions of that state and is present in the function-conferring circumstance.  Thus, according 
to Schulte, the proximal is excluded from being part of the response functions of constancy-
involving representations.  As I will argue, the problem with this is that there are two ways to 
think of the proximal.  In one way, the Lack of Proximal Correlation Principle is true, in the 
other way, it is false. 
Return to the Highest Luminance is White Assumption/ Highest Luminance is White 
Prior. We saw that, for the Constancy-Having Subject viewing surfaces A and B at t1, if the 
illumination were to reduce by half at t2, the subject’s experience would still represent A as 
white and B as middle-gray.  If the illumination were to change again, at t3, to twice the original, 
the content of the experience would still be the same.  The constancy mechanism tells us 
something about what such a visual system is responding to.  Corresponding to each co-planar 
region of the flat scene, there is a region of the return array which is, heuristically, the projection 
of the scene onto a 2-D surface right before the viewer.  When the illumination of the scene 
uniformly changes, the absolute values of the return-luminances of each region of the return 
array change.  However, there is a property of the return array which remains the same.  This is 
the relative luminance values between the regions of the array, a relational property of the 
regions.  Under scene changes like the one at t2, this property of the return array remains 
invariant as the reflectances of the distal surfaces remain invariant.   
Through this simple constancy mechanism the challenge for Schulte arises.  Schulte, 
expressing the Lack of Proximal Correlation Principle, claimed that the distal state is the only 
external state that qualifies as a normal cause (i.e. a triggering cause implicated in the response 
function) of the representational state because “there is no single type of retinal stimulation 
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pattern which normally causes the toad’s visual system [or any constancy-exhibiting visual 
system] to produce [the relevant representations]” (Schulte 361). Recalling that I am making the 
simplifying assumption that we can identify the return with the retinal or proximal stimulation, 
we can see from above that this is not the case. If we are only considering variations in particular 
returns of the return array, where those returns are specified in terms of absolute values of 
luminances, it is true that between the Constancy-Having Subject’s veridical representations of A 
and B at t1 and t2, there is no common return/proximal stimulation.  However, those constancy-
involving representations produced by the Highest Luminance is White Assumption do involve a 
single type of return as each representation is tokened across differing specific returns.  It is just 
that what is in common across representation tokenings is a higher-order property of the return, a 
property of the luminance properties of the return.  Thus, when understood in terms of the return, 
characterized most specifically, the Lack of Proximal Correlation Principle is true.  However, at 
the proper level of abstraction, the Principle is false for visual systems employing constancy 
mechanisms like Highest Luminance is White Assumption73. 
One might worry that, though there are various properties instantiated by a token return-
array input, these high-level properties are not causally relevant and only the low-level properties 
of the return are.  Therefore, Schulte is right after all.  However, Neander’s causal-informational 
teleosemantics, as captured by CT, claims that these high-level properties are causally relevant.  
And since Schulte responds to the Distality Problem from within CT, the problem still stands.   
To see that high-level properties are relevant according to CT, let’s return to the end of 
the thesis. CT states that systems with response functions respond to “C-type events…in virtue 
of their C-ness” (Neander 2017: 151).  In this way, the causation involved in Neander’s 
                                                 
73 This problem for the Lack of Proximal Correlation Principle is present even if the simplifying assumption which 
identifies the return with the retinal stimulation is dropped.  There will be higher-order properties of properties of 
retinal cells.  The account just becomes more complicated. 
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psychosemantics is property-sensitive (159).  Roughly, Neander cashes out property-sensitivity 
in the following way: Amongst simultaneously co-instantiated properties of an object, the 
instantiated property which causes the relevant representation to be produced by a perceptual 
system is the property for which, if only it were instantiated, the representation would have 
occurred, and if it weren’t, but competing properties were, instantiated, then the representation 
would not have occurred (271).   
As introduced in Section 4.2, Neander appeals to this property-sensitive causation in 
order to argue that tectum representations represent low-level surface properties instead of 
properties like being food, being nutritious, or being a fly.  Return to the toad example.  When 
the fly flies past, causing T5(2) activation, between being a fly, being food, and being SDM, 
which property is causally relevant?  Applying the above principle of property-sensitive 
causation: If the object that flew past were a bee-bee and so not a fly or food but still SDM, then 
T5(2) activation would occur.  But if it had been a frog-food fly which was not SDM, then T5(2) 
activation would not have occurred.  Thus SDM is causally relevant in the response function.  
Therefore, only those properties and not being a fly or being frog food enter the content of 
T5(2)74. 
This property-sensitive causation extends to the proximal.   At some level, the proximal 
has to be the causal intermediary between the representation and the distal state.  But is it the 
absolute values of luminances at each region in the return array that are causally relevant, or is it 
a higher-order property captured by the Bayesian prior that is causally relevant?  Let’s consider 
this with respect to the Highest Luminance is White Prior and the higher-order property that it 
turns on. Applying Neander’s account of property-sensitive causation, if the return had 
                                                 
74 See Green (2018) for discussion of Neander’s use of property-sensitive causation and potential problems it creates 
for her preferred perceptual contents in cases of representing succession and motion.    
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instantiated that higher-order property but not the same absolute chromaticity and luminance, the 
experience would have occurred.   Typing experiences by what they represent, this is true 
because this is just what happens as the situation changes from t1 to t2 to t3.  The higher-order 
property of the return is invariant under some changes in the absolute value of the return.  
Now for the second counterfactual:  if the return array had instantiated the same absolute 
luminances but not the same higher-order property, then the experience would not have occurred.  
This is true because the absolute luminances of the regions of a return array necessitate the 
higher-order properties and relations between those regions.  For example, if the higher-order 
relation between two return regions is being of different luminance values, this supervenes on the 
absolute luminance values of the related regions. So the antecedent of the conditional is 
impossible. So, this latter conditional is true vacuously.  Therefore the relevant proximal cause is 
the relational property of luminance values that is reflected by the prior.  Thus the visual system 
of the Constancy-Having Subject has the function to produce representations in response to 
higher-order properties of returns.  Therefore, Schulte has not avoided perceptual states 
representing the proximal and the distal, which results in a proliferation of representations in 
seemingly determinate representational states.  And so the Distality Problem is not resolved. 
The case of the Constancy-Having Subject who employs the Highest Luminance is White 
Assumption is a challenge if it is merely a metaphysically possible, but not an actual, instance of 
color constancy.  Schulte, and Neander, are providing a constitutive account for representation in 
terms of response functions, etc.  So the possibility is a sufficient counterexample.  But maybe 
one might doubt the possibility of such a case, for example thinking that the mechanism is too 
impoverished or simple.  However, given the Cost of Constancy phenomena in actual cases of 
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constancy, actual, complex constancy mechanisms plausibly turn on higher-order properties of 
proximal stimulation.   
We have Type-2 illusions.  A plausible explanation, at least as I argued, is that we have a 
constancy mechanism that faces the Cost of Constancy.  Our visual system employs some 
mechanism in order to avoid Type-1 illusions with respect to shadowed checkers in real 
checkerboards.  However, whatever the constancy mechanism is, and the prior that it employs, it 
results in a Type-2 illusion of Figure 4.3. Though current vision research is far from 
understanding the constancy mechanism and prior we employ, that we and the Constancy-
Having Subject face the Cost of Constancy suggests that there is some complex, higher-order 
property of returns which is causally responsible for our tokenings of the experience we have 
upon viewing the real checkerboard and Figure 4.3. At the very least, this is an open question, 
requiring highly recherché investigation and so cannot yet be ruled out.  But the representations 
of the checkerboard are certainly determinate and involve color constancy, so Schulte is not in a 
position to conclude that the determinate representation is because of the experiences being 
produced without sharing a common higher-order property of the proximal stimulation.  
4.6. Conclusion 
 Neander’s Causal-Informational Teleosemantics aims to ground perceptual representation 
in the response functions of the visual systems.  However, the visual system seems to have 
numerous functions to respond to the intermediary links in the causal chain from the pre-
theoretic objects of perception to the produced perception.  This Distality Problem threatens the 
theory’s ability to secure determinate representations when those representations are the final 
result of a long causal chain.  To solve this problem, Schulte appeals to the perceptual 
constancies found in visual systems and argues that the visual system does not have a 
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proliferation of response functions with respect to the intermediate causal links since such links 
are not present in all productions of the perceptual representations. 
I argue that the common picture of perceptual constancy enshrined in the Lack of 
Proximal Correlation Principle which Schulte bases his argument on is mistaken and a more 
accurate view undercuts Schulte’s strategy for solving the Distality Problem.  My argument starts 
with a type of illusion that lacks an adequate explanation, then, by appealing to a common 
Bayesian approach to constancy, I propose it is the presence of constancies that cause such 
illusions.  The price a visual system pays in avoiding one type of illusion by employing a 
constancy mechanism is another type of illusion.  This feature of the workings of constancy-
involving visual systems suggests that there is some aspect of the proximal stimulation that is not 
less correlated with the representational state than the distal.  This, in turn, challenges Schulte’s 
attempt to rule out the visual system having more than one response function.  Thus, Schulte’s 
solution to the Distality Problem is undermined. 
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